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Abstract 
This thesis offers new insights explaining the lack of dissaving among elderly in China. We 
provide new survey data from China with detailed information on the economic situation of 
elderly, and in particular on the interaction between elderly parents and adult children. We 
present data on the extent of inter-vivos transfers and intended bequests, and we test whether 
these transfers represent strategic interaction with adult children, reflecting life-cycle and 
precautionary motives for wealth accumulation, or altruistic motives.  
We find that elderly Chinese on average intend to pass along more than six times their yearly 
net income in bequests and large inter-vivos transfers to their children. We also reveal that 
these transfers serve as strong motives in the saving behaviour of the old generation in 
China. Furthermore, we find that the extensive amount of transfers fits better to an exchange 
model of intergenerational transfers than to an altruistic model. Recipient’s earnings affect 
downward transfer amounts positively, and both the probability of receiving bequests and 
downward transfer amounts correlates positively with strategic child interaction. We find a 
positive relationship for elderly-care provision by adult children, and, for a subset of the 
population, evidence of intra-family annuity markets where children provide elderly parents 
with regular financial support in exchange for increased bequests. We find only weak 
indications of intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism, and this effect is 
concentrated among those with the highest income levels. 
The findings have powerful implications both theoretically and for policy making. First, they 
contribute with supportive evidence to the debate over the capability of life-cycle motives to 
explain wealth accumulation among elderly in China. The findings also suggest that large 
amounts of bequests and intergenerational transfer not necessarily are contradictory to such 
saving motives. Indeed, the findings indicate that downward intergenerational transfers have 
an important role in securing elderly-life care and income security for elderly in China. This 
has implications for new governmental social security and health care programs that need to 
carefully take into account the effect such programs will have on intergenerational transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s export-led economic development has been characterized by very high levels of 
investments, accompanied by even higher national savings. There are growing concerns over 
the sustainability of this growth model, and the need to rebalance the Chinese economy is 
advocated not only by its trading partners, but also increasingly within China itself (Barnet 
and Chalk, 2010). The household savings, which accounts for about one third of total savings 
in China, is a central variable in this transition towards stronger domestic demand. The 
household savings rate is much higher than in most other countries, and a particular feature 
for China is that savings remains high and increasing also for old households (Kuijs, 2006; 
Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Liane, 2011). China’s population over 60 years is set to surpass 
200 million in 2013 (Time, 2011), and this group has a higher saving rate than their peers 
almost anywhere else in the world. This high level of savings among elderly contradicts 
the predictions of the basic life-cycle hypothesis that saving rates should decrease prior to 
retirement, and turn negative as dissaving occurs throughout elderly life. 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between are two major sources of accumulation of 
household wealth: income put aside for life-cycle savings, created from scratch by each 
generation on one hand, and inter-vivos transfers and bequests on the other1 (Gale and 
Scholtz, 1994). Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) estimated that intergenerational transfers and 
bequest could account for a major part of US wealth. Given the importance of kinship and 
filial piety in Chinese culture there is reason to believe that the corresponding number could 
be substantial also in China2. Still, as the review in chapter 2 reveals, the majority of 
literature on Chinese savings fails to consider transfer motives. More generally, studies of 
intergenerational interaction and transfers in China mostly adapt an anthropological or 
historical approach, not taking into consideration economic factors3. We seek to fill this gap 
                                                
1 We will use inter-vivos transfer to refer to transfers between living people and bequests to refer to transfers occurring at 
the time of the death of the donor. 
2 See section 3.4 for a review on literature on the Chinese family and intergenerational transfers in China. 
3 For example do Zhu and Xu (1992), Cooney and Shi (1999) and Messineo and Wojtkiewicz (2004) among others discuss 
parent–child co-residence behavior in China in an historical and sociological perspective, but only briefly considers 
economic variables. 
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in the literature by providing new and detailed survey data on the extent and motivation of 
intergenerational transfers, and investigate how these factors relate to the saving behaviour 
of elderly in China. The survey gather unique data on both intended bequests and downward 
inter-vivos transfers, and upward transfers from adult children to parents. 
Still, identifying large amounts of transfers does not prove an intentional transfer motive for 
saving out of line with life-cycle considerations4. In this thesis, we therefore also consider 
the motivation behind the intergenerational transfers, first by identifying intentional 
transfers, and then by distinguishing between altruistically motivated transfers (Becker, 
1974) and transfers motivated by strategic exchange (Bernheim et al.,1985; Cox, 1987; 
Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981).  
Based on these blocks of literature this thesis aims to answer the two following questions: 
“To what extent is there an intentional transfer motive behind the savings behaviour of 
Chinese elderly?” and “Are intentional intergenerational transfers in China motivated by 
altruistic of strategic behaviour?”.  
These questions are interesting for several reasons. In general, understanding of the 
determinants of Chinese household savings is important because it provide information on 
the sustainability of the saving- and investment driven Chinese growth model and China’s 
current account surpluses. Such information will also provide useful information for 
policymakers aiming for a successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards stronger 
domestic demand. In particular, effective policies for influencing private saving and 
consumption may look rather different depending on whether saving is intended for 
consumption later in life or for being passed along to the next generation. Appropriate 
policies will further depend on whether any “passing along” is motivated by altruism or is 
part of an intergenerational exchange.  
First, with the existence of substantial private transfers, the benefits of public programs on 
recipients might be less than expected if private transfers are crowded out and public 
program benefits shared with private donors rather than intended beneficiaries (Cox and 
                                                
4 Transfer can for example be made as “accidental bequest” (see section 3.2.1) or as a part of a selfishly motivated 
exchange (section 3.3). 
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Jimenez, 1990)5. For an improved pension system, for example, the increased utility for 
elders will be equal to government outlay only if no crowding out of upward transfers from 
children occurs. Altruistic feeling towards offspring can have implications for the saving 
response of elderly following improved social security programs. Increased expenditures on 
social security aimed at increasing pay-outs and future pension wealth would result in 
decreased saving according to a consumption-smoothing LCH-model. However, altruistic 
feelings toward children may result in increased savings to compensate for higher future 
contributions by ones offspring (Barro, 1978). More broadly, perfect altruism implies a 
“Ricardian Equivalence” conclusion in which any forced intergenerational transfer funded 
by governmental borrowing will be neutralized by adjustments in private transfers. 
Furthermore, whether most of wealth is earned or received as transfers will also affect the 
inequality of wealth distribution. Large inter-vivos transfers and bequests in the Chinese 
society may reduce income mobility among offspring and therefore contribute to the 
increasing inequalities in China.  
Looking at the saving behaviour and economic situation for elderly is especially important 
because China is a rapidly ageing country where more than 330 million people, or 23.1% of 
the population, will be aged over 65 years by 2050 (Zeng and George, 2000). In addition, 
more than 60% of Chinas elderly life in rural areas, where an average income of about a 
quarter of the elderly in urban areas and scarce provision of government services make 
individual savings and family relations crucial (Joseph and Phillips, 1999; Li et al. 2004).  
In sum, at a time of large economic and social changes in China, and with implementation of 
retirement and health systems facing demographic challenges like rising life expectancy and 
costs of caring for old, it is important to know how private and public transfers are 
connected. The processes of individualization and changing structures within the Chinese 
family make this and especially interesting topic6. 
                                                
5 As I will show in part 3.2, the degree of crowding out of private transfer depend if they are altruistically or strategically 
motivated. While altruistic donors would decrease transfers to relatives who benefit from more government aid, strategic 
transfers might increase with recipient income. 
6 See section 3.4 
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We find that elderly in China hold substantial amounts of wealth intended for future 
downward intergenerational transfers. We calculate that the respondents on average transfer 
more than 6 times their yearly net income, even when excluding the value of any real estate 
that parents intend to leave to their children. Secondly, we reject the hypothesis of a pure 
altruistic motive for intergenerational transfers. We find a positive relationship between 
child income and downward transfer amounts, and furthermore we find some support for 
two out of the three proposed types of intergenerational exchange. First, we find a positive 
relationship between downward transfers and elderly-care provided by adult children to 
retired parents. Second, we also find that the amount of regular financial payments to retired 
parents is positively related to the amounts of bequests and lump-sum inter-vivos transfers 
children receive. All in all, the findings suggest that although intergenerational transfers are 
important for the accumulation of wealth and the lack of dissaving for the old generation in 
China, they do not reflect altruistic values that are out of line with the individual life-cycle 
consideration of the elderly. 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows: In chapter 2 I present some of the recent literature 
on Chinese savings. I will put special focus on the efforts to explain the saving levels of 
elderly, and how the literature relates to transfer- and bequest motives. I present the 
theoretical and empirical foundation for the survey design and analysis in part 3.1-3.4, 
before I conclude chapter 3 by restating the research question of the thesis in light of the 
literature presented. Chapter 4 presents the sample- and survey design, and discusses the 
limitations of the methods applied. Chapter 5 presents descriptive statistics from the survey 
and the empirical analysis, before chapter 6 concludes and discusses the implications of the 
results.  
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2. Background: Chinese Household Savings  
The motivation for investigating intergenerational transfers in China originates in the high 
and largely unexplained saving rates among Chinese households, especially for old 
households.  
Chamon and Prasad (2010) use data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS) from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and estimate a total average household savings rate of 
24.7 per cent in 20067. Furthermore, they find that the saving rate over time has evolved as a 
function of age. In the early 1990s the saving rate was increasing with the age of the 
household head, but the saving rate in 2005 peaked for young and for old households. In 
2005 they estimate a saving rate for elderly up to 70 years just below 30 per cent. Liane 
(2011) estimates the saving rate in China using micro data from the 1995 and 2002 Chinese 
Household Income Project Study (CHIPS). She confirms both the high and increasing saving 
rates for old households in both the urban and rural sample, and the u-shaped saving profile 
where old and young households have higher saving rates than middle-aged. She finds the 
total urban and rural average saving rate in 2002 to be 24 per cent for households with 
household heads aged 55-64, and 28 per cent for households with household heads aged 65 
and above. The financial saving rate is 18 per cent and 24 per cent respectively8. For the US, 
she finds the corresponding numbers for total savings to be 13% for households with 
household heads aged 55-64 years and close to zero for household heads aged above 65 
years9. For the oldest households the saving rate becomes negative. The findings of Liane, 
and Chamon and Prasad corresponds to those of Kuijs (2006), who find the household 
saving rate in China to be between 5 and 12 per cent higher than in the US, France, Japan, 
Korea and Mexico, and Poterba (1994), who finds evidence of strong dissaving among 
elderly in a group of OECD countries including United States, the United Kingdom, Canada 
and Germany.  
                                                
7 They also perform another estimation using aggregate data estimated from the National Accounts (Flow of Funds) and 
find this to be 32% for 2004. They point out that the discrepancies between micro and macro data on savings rates are well 
acknowledged, and are amongst other based on definitional issues.   
8 Financial savings is defined as total savings less housing and fixed capital. 
9 For the US, Liane uses data from the 2002 U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistiscs´ Consumer Expenditure Survey  
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The low saving, and dissaving, of elderly in the United States and other OECD countries 
corresponds well to the predictions of the standard life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) in which 
dissaving occurs after reaching the peak income level in order to smooth the level of 
consumption over the life cycle. The high saving rate identified among old households in 
China contradicts the predictions of the LCH. In particular because the saving rate increases 
with age from a low level mid-life when the LCH would predict high savings since 
consumers should have a high current income relative to expected average life income. 
Many authors have sought be explain the unusual profile of the Chinese household savings 
by augmenting the standard LCH model in order to consider income uncertainty, housing 
motives and credit constraints. Chamon et al. (2010) calibrate a multi period LCH-model 
with credit constraints (buffer-stock model) using income panel data from the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey10 and estimates effects from changes in earnings uncertainty on 
household savings. They find that nearly half of the increase in the saving rates among 
elderly observed in their panel data sample (from 1989 to 2006) could be explained by the 
1997 pension reform, and a decrease in the pension replacement rate from 75% to 60%. In 
this estimation, however, they operate with high parameters for risk aversion in order to 
match the mean average saving rate, especially before 1997 when strong expected income 
growth and low risk was combined with a high replacement rate. Feng (2010) reaches equal 
conclusions when estimating the impact on household savings by an exogenous change in 
pension wealth. Using CHIPS household data, Feng estimates that reduced pension wealth 
due to the pension reform increased household savings for cohorts aged 50-59 years by 2-
3%. On the other hand, he also find a “offset effect” of pension wealth on private savings in 
China that is relatively small compared to findings from US and Europe, and he is not able 
to explain the entire increase in the saving rates of urban workers. Feng cites precautionary 
and bequests motives as possible explanations for the small offset effect.  
                                                
10 This survey is performed by the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety and the Chinese Centre for Disease Control. The survey focus on health, 
nutrition and family planning policies, and does not provide data on savings or consumption.  
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The potential role of bequest motives is elaborated by Horioka and Wan (2006) who suggest 
a strategic bequest motive among old households as an explanation for a positive coefficient 
for the old-dependency ratio on saving in China11.  
“Moreover, the elderly in China may be planning to leave a bequest to their 
children in order to repay them for financial support received during old age 
and may be saving for this purpose. Thus, it is not surprising that the old 
dependency ratio does not lower, and may even raise, the household saving 
rate.” (p.11)  
Furthermore, Chamon and Prasad (2010) use household survey data12  to explain an 
observed increase in the average saving rate of 7 per cent from 1995 to 2005, and most 
interestingly they find that about 6 per cent of the increase for old household (55-59 year) 
can be attributed to the preparation for uncertain and lumpy health expenditures due to 
increasing health expenditures and breaking of the iron rice bowl13. For young households 
they estimate that the extensive privatization of the housing stock has increased savings 
substantially, but they disregard this as an important explanation the high saving among 
elderly that are more likely to own their own dwellings. In the same paper Chamon and 
Prasad find less evidence for a set of conventional theories for the increased savings, 
including demographic changes14, habit formation and macroeconomic uncertainty due to 
the transition to the market economy. Interestingly, Chamon and Prasad do not discuss the 
possible implications of bequest or transfer motives in the development of Chinese 
household savings.  
Conversely, Modigliani and Cao (2004) use aggregate data to relate demographic structure 
and economic growth to the saving rate, and find support the life-cycle hypothesis. They 
acknowledge large upward transfers from adult children to parents in China, and thus regard 
                                                
11 The old-dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the population aged 65 or older to the population aged 15-64. A 
positive coefficient explaining the saving rate contrasts a large cross country literature finding that high dependency ratios 
are associated with lower saving (Kraay, 2000). 
12 Chamon and Prasad use data from the Annual Urban Household Surveys from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
13 Breaking of the iron rice bowl is used to illustrate the reduction of the state’s responsibilities for employment and social 
services after the economic liberalisation policies initiated Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Culture, education and health 
has fallen as share of government expenditure from 22% in 1995 to 18% in 2005 (Chamon and Prasad, 2010) 
14 For example do they not find any significant effect on saving for the cohorts most affected by the one-child policy. 
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children as a substitute for tangible life-cycle savings and assets. With the family planning 
policies starting in the late 1970s, they argue, this substitute was reduced and saving 
increased. One recent paper by Banerjee et al. (2010) addresses this view using household 
data to test the importance of children’s upward intergenerational transfers on the saving 
decision of Chinese parents. They use micro data from the Urban Household Survey 
(UHS)15, and find that saving increases with almost a third of average income with one child 
less in the household. This applies however, only if a daughter is the eldest child. The 
authors therefore suggest that the convention that sons will provide parents with more 
elderly life income, encourage parents of daughters to save more16. They develop a LCH-
model with credit constrains and upward transfers from children in order to predict changes 
in saving rates arising from the exogenous decrease in household fertility following the 
family planning policies in China. Their estimates, however, fail to match observed levels of 
savings with plausible parameters, suggesting that other variables for increased savings are 
left out17.  
The rest of this paper will look closely on the link between intergenerational transfers and 
household savings. Are children a means of saving, a substitute for life-cycle savings, as 
suggested by Modigliani and Banerjee? Or are, on the other hand, downward transfer and 
bequest motives also prevalent in China? That is, could children be a motivation rather than 
just a mean for saving? And if they are, is this motivation due to altruism or strategic 
interaction and exchange?  
                                                
15 UHS is a part of the 2008 Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia survey for China, administered by the 
Australian National University. 
16 Wei and Zhang (2011) on the other hand, predict higher saving by households with sons because they compete for a 
spouse through wealth accumulation in a marriage market with an imbalanced sex ratio. 
17 In particular would a model that generates sufficiently high saving rates have to rely on a low propensity for children to 
make transfers to elderly parents – something that contradicts the empirical findings on relatively large effect on the number 
and gender of children on savings. The model does on the other hand not include uncertainty, and does therefore not allow 
for a ”precautionary savings” motive. Neither are bequests of downward transfer motives included. 
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3. Intergenerational Transfers 
In this chapter we will present relevant theories and empirical findings on the role of 
intergenerational transfer in private capital accumulation. First we will briefly survey the 
literature on the importance of intergenerational transfers in private wealth accumulation. 
Then, in 3.2 we consider the question of whether observed bequests are determined by an 
intentional decision to leave bequests or not. We discuss determinants of “accidental” 
bequests in 3.1.1, before we consider the role of intentional bequests in private wealth 
accumulation in 3.1.2. This discussion is important for the survey design and the 
identification of an intentional bequest motive in chapter 5. In part 3.3 we will look closer at 
explanations for intentional bequest and inter-vivos transfers, in particular distinguishing 
between models based on altruism as opposed to exchange motives. In 3.4 we will review 
relevant literature on the Chinese family and intergenerational transfers in China, and in 3.5 
we restate the research question in light of the discussion so far. 
3.1 Intergenerational Transfers and Wealth Accumulation 
Intergenerational transfers were established as a major contributor to total wealth in an 
economy by the influential work of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). They estimated that as 
much as 80% of total wealth in the US could be accounted for by bequests and inter-vivos 
transfers, and thus challenged the established view that most wealth accumulation was a 
result of saving over the life-cycle18. This had been the proposition of the Life-Cycle 
Hypothesis presented by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Ando and Modigliani (1963). 
Modigliani (1988) responded in support of the life-cycle hypothesis, and criticized amongst 
other Kotlikoff and Summers´ inclusion of expenditure on family members over 18 years of 
age19, and interest on former bequests as intergenerational transfers. Modigliani refers to 
several other studies indicating that the share of private wealth resulting from bequests and 
                                                
18 They used “Transfer Wealth”, defined as the ratio of wealth received through inheritance and large inter-vivos gifts to 
total private wealth, to assess the importance of the bequest process to total wealth.  
19 Most importantly Modigliani criticized the inclusion of adult children’s educational expenses. 
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major gifts does not exceed one-fourth. He also argues that bequests could be incorporated 
into the life-cycle model without changing its implications given certain assumptions. 
Even though he seminal papers by Kotlikoff and Summers, and Modigliani motivated a 
range of empirical papers on the topic, there have been no conclusion of the debate until 
today. Brown and Weisbenner (2002) present evidence of transfer wealth at approximately 
25 per cent of total wealth, both when using direct survey evidence and when estimating the 
stock of transfer wealth based on the aggregate flow of transfers. They also find a large 
heterogeneity in transfers, and demonstrate that while of minor importance in aggregate, 
transfers can be very significant for subsets of the population – often the most affluent. On 
the other hand, Gale and Scholtz (1994) estimated the separate contributions to total 
household wealth by inter-vivos gifts and bequests, and found that each of them accounted 
for at least 30 per cent of U.S wealth. Similar to the approach in this thesis, Hurd and 
Munaca (1989) use survey material to directly estimate the fraction of assets from gifts and 
bequests20. They find that up to 20 per cent of household wealth come from inheritance and 
about half of that form gifts, concluding that it is not credible for anything close to 80 per 
cent of the total wealth in the sample to originate from intergenerational transfers. To my 
knowledge, no accounting exercise has been done to estimate the amount of transfer wealth 
in China.  
3.2 Accidental versus Intentional Transfers 
Family transfers from elderly to adult children can either be made as bequests upon the death 
of the parent, or as inter-vivos transfers during the donors lifetime. While inter-vivos 
transfers are intentional per se, bequests can represent both the actions of a selfish person 
failing to annuitize her wealth and those of a person intentionally leaving bequests out of 
shared utility or strategic exchange with his offspring. The latter is important, because it 
means that there may also be selfish life-cycle considerations behind intentional bequests21. 
The obvious methodological challenge is that data on aggregate bequests or bequests post-
                                                
20 They use the 1964 survey of the economic behaviour of the affluent and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, both 
from the United States. 
21 Different models for intentional transfers and their implications are discussed in part 3.2. 
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mortem does not enable us to determine whether the transfer was due to an intentional 
bequest motive.  
The distinction is nonetheless important because accidental bequests are fundamentally 
different from intentional transfers. As pointed out by Modigliani (1988): 
“Bequests originating from the precautionary motive are quite different by 
nature from those dictated by the bequest motive. Indeed, they belong with 
pure life-cycle accumulation since they are determined by the utility of 
consumption, and furthermore, the surviving wealth must tend, on the 
average, to be proportional to life resources” (p. 37)  
While bequests and transfers arising from a precautionary motive can be expected to respond 
to the same sort of stimuli as the life-cycle savings themself; such as length of retirement, 
liquidity constraints, income uncertainty, pension arrangements and health insurance, these 
variables may have unexpected effects on wealth, and new variables may come in to play, if 
wealth accumulation is motivated by intentional intergenerational transfers. 
3.2.1 Accidental Bequests  
A pure life-cycle approach to saving and consumption implies that current saving is a mere 
transfer of consumption over periods, leaving no room for bequests. This is apparent in the 
standard life-cycle model, which based on a preference for smooth consumption proposes 
that saving in one period of life corresponds to dissaving in another, depending on whether 
current income is above or below life average (Modigliani, 1988). Assuming constant secure 
income up until retirement and known longevity, the model predicts a hump shaped profile 
of savings, increasing until retirement when dissaving starts22.  
Merely by allowing for uncertain longevity however, unintentional bequests might occur if 
the “selfish” individual fail to annuitize her stock of wealth23. Indeed, Davies (1981) claims 
that uncertain lifetime is a major element in the slow dissaving of elderly, and he show that 
                                                
22 Assuming increasing income over the life path means that young persons will borrow at early stages of life, but does not 
change the implications regarding dissaving for elderly. If income declines prior to retirement, dissaving will occur earlier 
when income fall below total average life income (Deaton, 1992). 
23 Modigliani (1988) points out that the wealth that is left behind because of the precautionary saving motive will reflect a 
combination of risk aversion and the cost of running out of wealth – including “the institutional obstacles of dying with 
negative net worth” (p. 36). 
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the life-cycle model without a bequest motive explains a large part of the lack of dissaving 
by elderly when allowing for uncertain lifetime24.  
Further expansions of the life-cycle model include uncertainty also about future income 
streams, leading to precautionary savings in order to ensure smooth consumption over the 
life-cycle even if a negative income shock occurs. This will increase the savings that are held 
by people with uncertain future income, allowing for larger wealth to be retained by risk 
averse elderly and therefore also larger possible accidental bequests25. Uncertainty about 
future out-of-pocket health care expenses is also argued to be a major motive for keeping a 
non-annuitized stock of wealth throughout elderly life. Palumbo (1999) and Nardi et al. 
(2010) have developed life-cycle models with multiple risks after retirement, including 
stochastic out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures. In such situations, optimal life-cycle saving 
will include both a stream of annuities, and a stock of precautionary wealth that will be 
bequeathed if illness does not occur. In particular, Nardi et al. point out that the risk of 
expensive health expenses rise quickly with age and therefore is a key motive for retaining a 
large stock of wealth even at very old age. This view is supported by Sinclair et al. (2004) 
who use a dynamic programming model to compute the demand for annuities in an 
overlapping generations model including health shocks, and shows how high health risk 
makes it sub-optimal for risk averse individuals to keep all wealth in annuity form. In China, 
increased health expenses have been estimated to increase the savings among elderly by up 
to 5% (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). These finding suggest that a substantial part of observed 
bequests could be accidental transfers following saving for health expenditures at late stages 
in life.  
Indeed, many other risks those mentioned above could cause an individual to keep 
precautionary wealth26, and also other than precautionary motives could lead to bequests 
                                                
24 He uses a utility function with small but plausible values for intertemporal elasticity of substitution to show that 
uncertain longevity depress the propensity to consume increasingly with age. 
25 Direct income shocks may have little effect on savings of elderly as they will have low exposure to other than pension 
income, and larger accumulated savings relative to young households that enable them accommodate such shocks. As 
Chamon et al. (2010) show, however, older household will be substantially affected by changes in pension systems. 
Insecurity about future pension benefits and pension replacement rates could therefore be legitimate motives for failure to 
dissave among elderly.  
26 Chinese savers might also be uncertain about other things such as political stability, continuation of economic growth, 
continuation of inter-generational links etc. 
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being left unintentionally27. When I choose to focus on precautionary saving due to uncertain 
future income and health expenditures is that mainly in order to contrast the main findings in 
the literature on Chinese savings with intentional transfer and bequest motives. 
3.2.2 Intentional Bequests 
The potential role of an intentional bequest motive in old age capital accumulation is 
illustrated by Lockwood (2012), who show how even a modest bequest motive would keep 
people from annuitizing any of their wealth, despite the large welfare gains that that 
annuities offer through an exchange of accidental bequests for increased consumption28. In 
particular he shows how the value of annuities decrease with the existence of a bequest 
motive, until the level where it is not longer worth paying the annuity load29. First, the value 
of increased consumption would decrease because individuals attach value to the bequests 
that are sacrificed. Secondly, the value of smoothing consumption through an annuity 
program would be reduced because the intended bequests serves as a partial insurance in the 
way that some of it can be consumed in a long lifespan situation.  
Lockwood’s findings oppose the conventional view that one is better off annuitizing any 
wealth that is not intended for bequests. This has important implications for saving 
behaviour because it suggests that also persons who wish to retain considerable parts of 
wealth for own consumption, and indeed may report other primary saving motives than 
bequests, may be better off keeping close to all their wealth un-annuitized throughout 
retirement because of a bequest motive.  
This clearly illustrates the ambiguity of savings held by elderly. Indeed, due to the 
indistinguishable existence of accidental bequests, Kessler and Masson (1989, p. 145) 
conclude that it is "virtually impossible to distinguish life-cycle from bequest savings”. This 
view is shared by Dynan et al. (2002) who argue that wealth can provide utility to its owner 
                                                
27 For example can several of the “psychological propensities and habits” for individuals to save proposed by Keynes 
(1936), such as “freedom to invest money if and when it is favourable” and “means to enjoy a gradually increasing 
standard of living over time” (p. 108), imply no or low dissaving at late stages of life. 
28 There is a large literature on explanations for the Annuity Puzzle, why so few household make use of welfare increasing 
annuity contracts. It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss these explanations in detail. 
29 Annuity load is the percentage by which premiums exceed expected discounted benefits in the annuity program.  
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in more than one way, and that a latent bequest motive only becomes “operational” in given 
states of the world.  
”A dollar saved today simultaneously serves both a precautionary life-cycle 
function (guarding against future contingencies such as health shocks or 
other emergencies) and a bequest function because, in the likely event that the 
dollar is not absorbed by these contingencies, it will be available to bequeath 
to children or other worthy causes.” (Dynan et al.,2002, p. 274).  
This approach is both intuitive and appealing, not least because it answers critics of a pure 
bequest motives that argue that the best way to assure bequests would be to make the 
bequest immediately, not waiting until the time of death. Dynan develops a 2-period life-
cycle model where households gain utility both from leaving bequests and from own 
nonmedical consumption. Households furthermore face uncertainty regarding future income, 
longevity and medical expenses. Medical expenses give no utility but must be paid if they 
occur. Wealth at the end of period 2 is left as bequests, but is subject to a non-negativity 
constraint, meaning that the bequest motive of a household only will be operational – and 
positive bequests left – if the household experiences a combination of short longevity, high 
income and low health expenditures. The model does not need a bequest motive to generate 
positive bequests, but it will make bequests more likely and larger30. Low probabilities of 
bad states of the world make the model predict substantial amounts of intergenerational 
transfers. What is more, according to the model – bequests are valued but not necessarily the 
main reason for capital accumulation. If expensive contingencies occur, wealth will be 
channelled to cover these costs, and indeed, because of the possible severity of such 
contingencies, large amount of wealth will be held even in the absence of a bequest motive.  
3.3 Explanations for Intentional Bequests and Inter-Vivos Transfers 
Intentional transfers, both those made though the course of life and those put aside for 
bequests, are free and voluntary non-market transfers of wealth. Being free and voluntary, 
                                                
30 While the model without the bequest motive, but with uncertainty in earnings and health expenditure, predicts a modest 
dissaving of 3,6% of income for elderly (60-90 years). Introduction of a bequest motive turns this into a net saving rate of 
0,6%. Uncertainty is modelled so that earnings are 25% over average in half of the occasions, and 25% below in the other 
half. Out of pocket medical expenses would occur with 20% probability and at a cost of 13% of income. Negative shocks 
are set to last as long as 30 years, making it a low probability event but with high economic costs for the elderly household. 
The bequest motive is set to generate bequests that are six time annual earnings all else equal. 
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however, does not mean that such transfers only can be made on the basis of altruistic 
feelings toward the recipient. Both intentional bequests and inter-vivos transfers can serve as 
parts of strategic intergenerational interaction aimed at maximizing ones individual utility in 
a situation with credit constraints, imperfect annuity or insurance markets or other 
institutional failures. In this case, the motivation for accumulation of wealth is not 
necessarily out of line with the assumptions of the life-cycle hypothesis. We will here 
present models both for altruistic and strategic intentional family transfers, and discuss how 
to test for the two motives before we review some relevant literature on the role of 
intergenerational transfers in China.  
3.3.1 A Model of Altruistic Intergenerational Transfers 
Altruistic acts ”values positively and for itself what is good for another person” (Kolm, 
2006, p. 54). Mathematically, this can be expressed as a parent having direct utility from the 
utility of ones child, such as in Becker (1974) and Laferrère and Wolff (2006): The parent 
(p) then maximize her utility (U), which increases with own consumption (C) and the child’s 
(k) utility (V):  
(1) max U (𝐶!,𝑉(𝐶!)),  
where 0 < 𝑈! < 1 measure the degree of altruism. 
This means that a downward transfer from the parent can be motivated by the utility of the 
recipient solely, and need not be contingent on exchange, reciprocity or other benefits for the 
donor. Another implication of the altruistic motive is that the transfer will be dependent on 
the economic circumstances of the recipient, and that both amount and probability of the 
transfer will be positively correlated with the income gap between parent and child. To see 
this, consider the budget constraints  
(2) 𝐶!= 𝑌! − 𝑇, and (3) 𝐶!= 𝑌! + 𝑇, with (4) T ≥ 0, 
where T is the transfer amount from parent to child, and Y is income. The parent chooses the 
consumption of both herself and the child and the transfer by maximizing 
(5) max U (𝑌! − 𝑇,𝑉(𝑌! + 𝑇)), yielding the f.o.c. (6) −𝑈! + 𝑈!𝑉! ≤ 0.   
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Given that (4) is not binding (a positive transfer occurs), the transfer equalizes the marginal 
utilities of consumption for parent and child, adjusted for the degree of altruism (7) 𝑈! = 𝑈!𝑉!.   
Because the parent chooses the transfer depending on the level of consumption of the child 
(and the willingness to substitute own consumption for the child’s), the altruistic parent will 
partially compensate any decrease in income of the child, or retain more wealth for own 
consumption in the case of an increase in child income. On the other hand, an increase in 
parental income would increase transfers in order to equalize the marginal utility of 
consumption for child and parent. This is the core prediction of the pure altruistic model, and 
can be seen explicitly from the difference in transfer income derivatives31:  
(11) !"!!! −    !"!!! = 1. 
Kolm (2006) distinguishes between two main types of altruistic views, natural altruism, 
which is induced by any increase in welfare because of an improved situation for the 
recipient, and normative altruism, which can be induced by things such as social norms and 
moral intuition. Different from natural altruism, normative altruism can value transfer out of 
a particular relation or tradition and the transfer can be felt like a duty32. 
3.3.2 A Model of Strategic Intergenerational Transfers 
Strategic intergenerational transfers are motivated by exchange and unrelated to altruism or a 
desire to leave bequests per se. Correspondingly, strategic transfers involves that both parts 
in the interaction gains, and indeed, it is a necessary condition for them to keep participating 
(Schokkaert, 2006). The exchange motive can be considered mathematically by 
                                                
31 The result depends on the pooling of parent and child resources under positive intergenerational transfers (Laferrère and 
Wolff, 2006). With pooled family budget constrains: (8) 𝐶! + 𝐶! = 𝑌! + 𝑌!, consumption can be written as function of 
family income. 𝐶!= 𝑐!(𝑌! + 𝑌!), and 𝐶!= 𝑐!(𝑌! + 𝑌!). By rewriting (3) as 𝑇 = 𝑐! 𝑌! + 𝑌! − 𝑌! the effect of income 
on optimal transfer can then be shown as (noting that 𝑐!increases in income and that the downward transfer is a normal 
good): (9) !"!!! = 𝑐!! > 0, and (10) !"!!! = 𝑐!! − 1 < 0, subtracting (10) from (9) yields !"!!! −    !"!!! = 1.  
32 Kolm (2006) also reviews a range of non-altruistic bequest and transfer motives that are also unrelated to strategic 
exchange. I will limit the discussion and analysis in this thesis to altruistic (normative or natural) and strategic transfer 
motives.  
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including upward provision of services (s) in the model from 3.2.1, such as in Bernheim et 
al. (1985) and Cox (1987):  
(12) max U (𝐶!, 𝑠,𝑉(𝐶! , 𝑠)),  
where the child´s utility decreases with the attention or service provided, and the parent´s 
utility increases with the same services. In addition, the utility of both actors still increase 
with own consumption. The level of services that maximize the parent’s utility, and the 
corresponding amount of downward transfers, is decided by the parent given the family 
budget constraints, (2) and (3) above. A participation constraint says that the utility of the 
child providing services and receiving downward transfers cannot be less than the utility 
when not providing services (and receiving the minimum amount of downward transfers).  
In an altruistic setting, where the transfers from parents are large enough for the participation 
constraint not to be binding, increased child income will lead to decreased downward 
transfers (as described in 3.3.1). If the participation constraint is binding however, 
downward transfers are made in exchange for service provision from children, and the 
transfer amount may increase with child income because the opportunity cost of the child 
providing services increase correspondingly. This can be illustrated by denoting transfers as 
payments for services with “price” p: T = ps. Cox (1987) shows that !"!!! will be positive 
when !"!!! > 0 and the reduced form elasticity (!!    !"!") is less than unity. This means that the 
change in transfer in response to a change in child income depend both on supply and 
demand factors. Therefore, whether the parent actually pay more to get the desired service 
provision, depend on parent’s elasticity of demand for the services. If there are few 
substitutes to child services and the parent has an inelastic demand, it will allow the child to 
charge higher price for the services (and provide less quantity) when child income 
increase33. On the other hand, with elastic demand, the transfer amount may be reduced as 
the parent shift to cheaper substitutes for the services (Cox, 1987).  
                                                
33 This implies that while transfer amounts will increase, the probability of a transfer taking place will decreases with child 
income. 
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3.3.3 Testing for Strategic Transfer Motives 
The different predictions of the altruistic model and the strategic model in terms of transfer-
income differentials provide an effective and much used method for testing the transfer 
motive. To summarize, probability and amount of downward transfers decrease with child 
income under altruism, while a positive relationship for transfer amount is allowed under 
strategic exchange. While there are papers who perform empirically precise test of the pure 
altruistic motive in (11)34, most papers test for an altruistic transfer motive by looking at the 
relationship between transfer amount and donor-beneficiary income differential more 
broadly. Both Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) find a positive relationship between 
child income and transfer, while Altonjii et al. (1997) find a negative relationship, but not 
strong enough to support the prediction of pure altruism in (11). McGarry and Schoeni 
(1995) look at the distribution of transfers between siblings and find that less-well off 
children get more financial assistance from parents. In sum, these findings suggest that a 
pure altruistic motive may be too narrow to explain inter vivos transfers and intentional 
bequests from adult parents.  
Income effects however, depend on an unknown price elasticity of services, and ideally need 
detailed data both on current and permanent incomes of donor and recipient 35 . A 
complementary way to test for strategic transfer motives is look directly at two-way 
exchanges. The exchange model presented in part 3.3.2 predicts by definition that downward 
transfers are contingent on services such and contact and help from children. Identifying 
mutual exchange however does not outright prove the exchange model. By allowing also for 
altruistic children, any observed mutual exchange could also represent mutual altruism. A 
positive correlation between upward and downward transfers can thus be regarded as 
necessary, but not sufficient to prove the exchange model. In addition to service provision, I 
will consider two other types of intergenerational exchange: intergenerational annuity 
markets and co-residence and housing arrangements. 
                                                
34 For example Altonji et al. (1997). 
35 By using only current income at the time of the survey, one will fail to control for the fact that the recipient’s situation 
not was identical at the time of the transfer. 
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Intergenerational Annuities Markets 
Kotflikoff and Spivak (1981) develop a model where children and parents form implicit 
incomplete annuity markets in order to share the parent’s longevity risk. Here children are 
compensated with asset transfers from their parents contingent on support payments if 
parents life longer than expected. Although one can imagine the downward transfer being 
made during the parent’s lifetime36, Kotlikoff and Spivak argue that the parent best enforces 
the arrangement if wealth is held as leverage until death and then bequeathed. Having the 
child make regular payments also before the parent run out of resources further enhances the 
enforcement.  
While this appears to be a particularly attractive mechanisms for old age support in lack of 
good credit and annuity markets, one can also imagine that intra family risk sharing can be 
preferred because trust and good knowledge about the situation of ones relatives decreases 
the problems of adverse selection and moral hazards often found in insurance markets (Cox 
et al., 1998). Kotlikof and Spivak also argue that transaction costs often are smaller within 
the family than in the open market. 
Family annuity markets can fail to be identified by a positive relationship between child 
income and downward transfer (in 11)37. We will therefore provide direct survey data on 
periodic upward transfers to elderly parents. In chapter 5 we test for informal annuity
agreements using correlational data on stated bequest motives and upward transfers.  
Intergenerational Co-residence 
Following more than 20 years of housing privatization in China, real estate has become an 
important wealth component in Chinese households as more and more people now own their 
own dwellings. Co-residence and housing provision within the family can thus also be 
expected to account for large parts of intergenerational transfers.  
                                                
36 This is proposed for example by the “Parental Repayment Hypothesis” (Lillard and Willis, 1997). Here is the informal 
capital market is formed by children implicitly repaying human capital investments from their parents by providing old age 
monetary support and risk sharing. 
37 The assumption that !"!!! > 0 do not necessarily hold for upwards monetary transfers. It is likely that the child’s costs of 
money transfers do not increase with income like other services. Indeed, it might even decrease because increased income 
could be accompanied by lower cost of capital for the child. 
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We will consider real estate transfers and co-residence in two ways. First, we provide 
information on the extent and motivation of real estate transfers from parents to elderly 
children. In addition, we test if co-residence between adult children and parents is contingent 
on repayment from parents in form of bequests or other downward transfers. If elderly 
parents value child co-residence, and children live with their parents on the condition of 
being compensated, parent-child co-residence can be explained by the exchange model. In 
an altruistic model, on the other hand, there should be no relationship between co-residence 
and transfers (Iwamoto and Fukui, 2001). We will also consider parent’s willingness to pay 
for child co-residence. If living alone is a normal good for parents, it would mean that 
parent’s value living separately from their children as long as they are economically capable 
of doing so38. In that case, increasing parental income could correspond to less demand for 
co-residence and less willingness to pay for these services by downward transfers.  
Timing: Inter-Vivos Transfers or Bequests 
Literature on transfer motives and saving behaviour are often limited to bequest motives or 
fail to specify the type of transfers discussed. For example do Modigliani’s (1988) important 
paper on transfer wealth not include most inter-vivos transfers in the discussion 
intergenerational transfers. Inter-vivos transfers might nevertheless both be substantial and 
contain valuable information about the motive for the transfer. First, because inter-vivos 
transfers are intentional by definition – they can certainly not be a part of any accidentally 
transferred life-cycle wealth. However, inter-vivos transfers may be motivated by selfish 
concerns indirectly as exchanges in in the types strategic intergenerational interaction 
presented in this chapter (Lillard and Willis, 1997). Secondly, a large share of inter-vivos 
transfers relative to bequests supports the altruistic model because it allow parents to support 
children when needy, in addition to potentially help minimizing the family´s tax bill or 
overcome borrowing constraints for the recipient (Bernheim et al., 1985). Inter-vivos 
transfers are also arguably less efficient as leverage to ensure children fulfill their part of the 
exchange in a strategic interaction. 
                                                
38 Traditionally, large stem families, and child parent co-residence have been highly valued in China and regarded as the 
preferred living situation by elderly. Recent literature however, suggest that children move earlier away to form nuclear 
families. Yan (2010) suggests that this is a development also valued by parents, quoting statements such as shunxin 
(happiness/satisfaction) and fangbian (convenience) as reasons for elderly living alone (see part 3.4). 
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Empirical evidence regarding the two types of transfer is somehow contested. Tomes (1981) 
rejected the importance of inter-vivos transfers, expect among most wealthy, while Cox 
(1987) find that more than 60% of transfers are made inter- vivos. This is comparable to 
Gale and Scholz (1994) who find inter-vivos transfer to be only somewhat smaller than 
bequests. Laferrère (1992) looks at the directions of inter-vivos transfers and present data 
that downwards transfers (inheritance, gifts and financial help) are ten times higher than 
upwards. This suggests either low upward altruism, or upward services in the shape of care 
or time rather than wealth transfers. 
3.4 Intergenerational Transfers in China 
As pointed out in chapter 2, intentional bequest and transfer motives have been given little 
focus in the literature on Chinese saving and wealth accumulation. There is, however, a 
broad literature of intergenerational transfers in China from a sociological, anthropological 
or historical perspective. Confucian teaching on intergenerational interactions in China is 
based on filial piety and that family members are connected through mutual interdependence 
over their lifetime. This corresponds well to the large flow of transfers identified in the 
literature, mostly upward from adult children to parents, but also downward from parents to 
adult children at different stages of life. In this part will I briefly present the Chinese family 
as viewed from a social anthropological perspective, before I review relevant literature on 
intergenerational transfers in China.  
3.4.1 The Chinese Family 
The tradition for self-reliance within the family is strong in China, and literature on 
intergenerational interaction often depicts the Chinese family as a “corporate organization” 
with pooling of income and common budget and properties. 
“The individual exists for the sake of perpetuating his (or husbands) family. 
Instead of the family being created to serve need of individual. At higher 
level, individual families exists to perpetuate the descent line, not the other 
way around” Baker (1979). 
This view leaves little room for individual life-cycle consideration in wealth accumulation, 
rather proposing that intergenerational savings shall be the sole motivation for saving.  
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On the other hand, alongside economic development a modern view of the Chinese family, 
with liberation of economic activities and focus on private lifestyles, has become more 
important (Hansen and Svarverud, 2010). To the degree that this change is accompanied by a 
shift in the economic decision making in the households, from being determined by the 
utility of the “organization” to the utility of the individual, this could also involve a shift 
from an altruistic model to a selfish like-cycle model in explaining the accumulation of 
wealth.  
According to Yan (2010b), also the traditions of co-residence are changing. The parent-son 
relationship has traditionally has been regarded as the superior and for parents to live alone 
in elderly life would be regarded disgraceful. In later years, however, Yan argues for a 
“nuclearization” of the family and a gradual change towards husband-wife relationships as 
the most central. He notes that while it used to be normal for the newlywed to life with the 
groom´s parents, they now quickly move out to set up their own home. This means that 
many elderly have to adapt to an individual lifestyle in an empty nest family. However, he 
argues, many ”strategize the move so that they can maintain a good relationship with their 
married sons and can eventually move back into the latters´ family when they become too 
old to take care of themselves” (Yan, 2010, p.69). This view is supported by Hansen and 
Svarverud (2010), who claim that individuals “make residence arrangements to meet their 
individual needs, but family remains the sole source of elderly support” (p. 20) 
In regard of wealth participation in the family, there has been a change from conventional 
wealth participation, fenjia, to the modern system, dangua. In fenjia, the family estate would 
be divided equally among married sons, and the old parents would live with one of them in a 
stem family. The division would be delayed to as late as possible, usually to the retirement 
or death of household head (Yan, 2010). Since the 1960s however, the danguo system has 
become more prevalent. Here, the earlier married sons leave the household, and the youngest 
son stay after marriage to form a stem family. This son will also be entitled to inherit the 
house and land areas. The estate is therefore not available to participation among elder sons 
who only are entitled to rationed grain, personal belongings and savings from wedding gifts. 
Wedding gifts can however be substantial, and are described as the most important pre-
mortem inheritance for children. Cash are normally not divided, but retained by the elderly 
for their own financial security. Yan (2010) claims that even after the liberalization of the 
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housing and de-collectivization of farm land in the 1990s, family division practices remain 
largely the same, however more complicated.  
3.4.2 Intergenerational Transfers in China 
Available data on intergenerational transfers in China corresponds to the historical 
importance of the family as a unity for self-reliance and security. The large majority of this 
data however, focus on upward transfers and the support of elderly parents. Children are 
largely expected to take care of their elderly parents, and in many rural areas children are the 
only old-age security available. Parental old-age care is also made an obligation for children 
by being signed in to law39. Silverstein et al. (2006) use survey material40 to find that nearly 
all parents have received upward transfers from at least one child. The same authors find that 
nearly half of all elderly also received help or care from their children. Although providing 
data on three types of upward transfers (monetary, instrumental and labour), only child-care 
service from the grandparent is considered as downward repayment. 
Literature on downward transfers suggests that large transfers are related to specific events, 
in particular marriage Yan (2003), and Cong (2008) suggest that failure of parents to provide 
expected inter-vivos transfers would affect the child’s decision to provide old age support. 
Transfers can also be expected in relation to children’s migration from rural to urban areas, 
either monetary transfers as startup funds or child care of grandchildren.  
Also among the papers which have looked into the motivation behind intergenerational 
transfer in China, focus has been mostly on motivation for upward monetary transfers and 
old-age care from adult children to parents. For example did Secondi (1997) test if the core 
value of filial piety in the Chinese family implies large altruistically motivated transfers. 
Conversely, he found a positive correlation between transfers amounts and the recipient’s 
income, and also that elderly parents often provide child care in exchange for upward money 
                                                
39 The Chinese Marriage Law states that ”Children shall have the duty to support and assist their parents (…) If Children 
fail to perform their duty, parents who are unable to work or have difficulties in providing for themselves shall have the 
right to demand support payments from their children” (Chapter 3, Article 21; Consulate-General of the People’s Republic 
of China in New York, 2003) 
40 Silverstein used data from the Study of Older Adults in Anhui Province, conducted in 2001 by the Population Research 
institute of Xi´an Jiaotong University and University of Southern California. 
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transfers. Both findings suggesting at least partly exchange motivated transfers. On the other 
hand, Cai et al. (2006) find support for altruistic motives for upward transfers at low income 
levels when considering the transfer-income differentials. They use the China Urban Labour 
Survey for 2001 and 2002, and find a 0.2 Yuan increase in transfers for a 1 Yuan increase in 
recipient income as long as recipient income was under half of the urban poverty line. 
However, they found but no such effect for recipient income twice the poverty line and 
above. 
Most of the papers on intergenerational transfers in China seem to suffer from a lack of 
relevant household data. Both Secondi (1997) and Cai et al. (2006) use broad measures for 
transfers including transfers made by both non-residing family members and friends. This 
does not permit them to separate between intergenerational and intragenerational transfers, 
family and non-family transfers, or distinguishing the behaviour of co-residing and non-
residing offspring. Several recent papers, including Banerjee et al. (2010) have used micro 
data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudal Study (CHARLS) to documents that 
Chinese parents depend largely on children for old age support. Even though CHARLS does 
contain more detailed information on transfers received by the household heads, it does 
neither report income level of children – a key factor for making inferences about motives 
for private transfers (Cox, 1987) - or savings motives of the elderly. The CHIPS survey by 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science admittedly includes a question of savings 
motivation, asking respondents to prioritize between life-cycle and transfer motives 
including bequests and inter-vivos transfers to children. However, as we have seen from the 
theory, such information does not suffice to test the bequest motive towards life-cycle 
motives. As reviewed in the former section, in the field of social anthropology there has also 
been an interest in intergenerational relations and interaction, focusing much on changes in 
family size, household composition and wealth partition. However, quantifiable economic 
data are lacking from most of these surveys.  
In sum, both economic and anthropological literature seem to agree that transfer and care 
from adult children to parents is a large part of old-age support and intergenerational transfer 
in China. Less is known about downward transfers from parents and especially whether 
upward transfers are part of an exchange and contingent in bequest, inheritance or other 
transfers from the parents. Relying either on aggregate data or broad survey data it is 
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difficult to answer whether transfers are consistent with the life-cycle model or whether they 
indicate that important aspects of wealth accumulation are neglected by this model.  
In interpreting limited data, many authors seem to more of less arbitrary choose whether to 
apply estimated amounts of transfer wealth to life-cycle motives or not. This thesis provides 
more comprehensive data on both saving motives and two-way intergenerational transfers in 
China. The next chapter will describe the sample- and survey design more in detail.  
3.5 Research Question and Hypothesis 
Based on the theory and empirical findings presented in part 3.2 and 3.3, and the existing 
literature and survey material on intergenerational transfer in China above, I will seek to 
answer the following research questions: “To what extent is there an intentional transfer 
motive behind the savings behaviour of Chinese elderly?” and “Are intentional 
intergenerational transfers in China motivated by altruistic or strategic behaviour?”. 
In order to answer research question number one I first present data on the extent of both 
downward inter-vivos transfers and intentional bequests in China. This will give an 
indication of the amount of wealth transferred, or intended to be transferred, from elderly 
parents to adult children. Next, I consider the role of intentional bequests and transfers as 
savings motives for elderly Chinese. In particular, I will contrast the intentional transfer 
motive with saving for elderly-life income and health expenditures. To account for the 
difficulty of separating accidental and intentional bequests I present the results from scenario 
based questions where saving for bequests is contrasted directly with saving for life-cycle 
motives.    
Inter-vivos transfers and intentional bequests can however be made on the basis of both 
altruistic behavior and strategic exchange. The second empirical objective of this thesis is 
therefore to test the hypothesis that: the motive for intergenerational transfers in China is 
related to strategic intergenerational exchange rather than altruism. In order to distinguish 
between these motives we will consider transfer-income differentials as discussed in part 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. In addition, we test directly for downward transfers and intentional bequests 
as exchange for i) upward service provision and elderly care provided by adult children ii) 
regular financial support to retired parents from adult children, ii) parent child co-residence. 
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Much of the data presented will to my knowledge be first of its kind for China. Although the 
methods applied here will be simple, using descriptive and correlational data to describe the 
core findings of the survey, I hope to show the potential of the data material and inspire 
interested readers to work on the dataset more in debt in the future. 
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4. Methods 
A consistent survey- and sample design is important for a survey to produce valid and 
unbiased results. This chapter will present relevant theory, and lay out how a set of 
interrelated decisions was taken in order to achieve a research design appropriate to the 
purpose of this study. This includes the methods of data collection, the writing and testing of 
the questionnaire, and the sample design itself.  
The first section presents the background for the overall choice of research design and 
research method. We also discuss some of the fundamental limitations and challenges 
following our choice of research design. In part 4.2 we discuss how we assured survey 
validity and accurate measurement, and in part 4.3 we present how we solved questions 
regarding representation and sampling. 
4.1 Research Design and Method  
4.1.1 Research Design  
Depending on the knowledge about the area of research and the ambition one has in regard 
of the analysis there are three main types of research designs applicable to a research 
question. An explorative design is used in situation with scarce prior knowledge about the 
topic in order to gain new ideas and insights that can serve as basis for further research 
(Saunders, 2009). This often includes literature and case studies, or qualitative interviews 
with key informants. Little formal theory is required and the research design is often 
inductive in that the data drives the model development. Descriptive design is used when one 
has a general understanding of the area of research and wish to describe this situation. 
Typically one seeks to establish the level of given variables, or the relationship between two 
or more variables using panel or cross sectional studies. This requires more formal theory 
than an explanatory approach, and that the author formulate testable hypothesis in form of 
proposition. Still, with a descriptive design, one is mostly limited to the study of correlation 
between variables and is not appropriate for studying a cause-effect relationship. For this 
purpose, one need to develop a causal research design involving an experiment where 
explanatory variables are manipulated in order to test any effect on the dependent variable. 
Moving from exploratory to explanatory research design also tend to involve a more 
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quantitative approach with the phenomena being represented by data in numbers rather than 
words.  
The intention of this project has been to gather data on the extent and motivation for 
intergenerational transfers in China. Given the relatively large international literature on 
intergenerational transfers, their motives and relation to saving reviewed in chapter 3, the 
variables of interest are clearly defined. We have therefore applied a descriptive research 
design, using cross sectional study in order to measure the extent of these variables in China 
where there so far has been scarce empirical work on this issue. This research approach 
poses two general challenges. First, by rejecting a more exploratory approach we might 
loose out on theoretical constructs or certain variables particular to China. On the other hand, 
by choosing a relatively broad number or constructs and variables of focus in the study, we 
were also unable to perform a limited experiment to prove a causal relationship between 
particular variables. Our ambition for proving causals relationships or performing formal 
tests for saving- or transfer motives is therefore modest. 
4.1.2 Research Method 
Modigliani (1988) presents three methods for measuring the importance of a bequest motive 
and estimating transfer wealth, and he contrasts the use of direct survey material to aggregate 
methods such as 1) inferring the stock of inherited wealth by aggregating annual flows of 
bequests, and 2) subtracting estimated (non-inherited) life-cycle wealth from an independent 
estimate of total wealth41. Survey was found to be the appropriate method for this thesis for 
several reasons. First, our research questions go beyond identifying and estimating the 
transfer wealth, and also ask for the motivations for transfers and bequests. Such information 
is largely inaccessible using aggregate estimation methods. Secondly, given our dependence 
on micro data, a survey would be the only viable method for eliciting balanced information 
of the preferences of a large population. Thirdly, household survey data on private wealth 
                                                
41 Life-cycle wealth can be defined in a simple manner as the accumulated net surplus of earnings over consumption. 
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accumulation is still limited for China, especially considering bequests and intra-family 
transfers42.  
A survey can be a powerful tool to describe the situation and the preferences of a larger 
population. This does however rely on two crucial characteristics of the study: 1) that the 
answers given accurately describe the respondent and 2) that the persons participating in the 
survey has characteristics similar to the larger population. The first issue can be referred to 
as “measurement of constructs”, and the second as “description of population 
characteristics” (Groves et al., 2009). Figure 6 in Appendix A shows the successive steps in 
the survey process, illustrating how aspects regarding the survey- and sample design can 
introduce mismatches between the successive steps, and ultimately cause errors in the survey 
statistic. We will discuss the upper section in figure 6, how we assured survey validity and 
accurate measurement, in part 4.2, and then the lower section, how we solved questions 
regarding representation and sampling, in section 4.3. 
4.2 Survey Design 
In this part we will first present general threats to the quality of the data gathered, and then 
how choices of data collection method and instrument design affect the quality of the data.  
4.2.1 Survey Validity, Reliability and Response Bias 
This section briefly introduce the general concepts of survey validity, reliability and 
response bias. These will serve as useful reference points for the further discussion in this 
chapter as they relevant to several aspects of the measurement instruments. 
Survey Validity 
Groves et al. (2009) refer to validity as being a function of the correlation between the 
response of a respondent and her true value for the construct we seek to measure. This means 
that the validity of a survey concerns the degree to which findings are really about what they 
appear to be, and the treat to validity applies to several parts of the research and 
                                                
42 See part 3.4 for a review on relevant literature and surveys for China.  
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measurements. Gripsrud et al. (2004) points out that in order to ensure internal validity it 
must be a consistent link between the theoretical concepts and their operationalization in the 
survey. Furthermore is it important that the measurement instruments covers the entire scope 
of the theoretical concepts.  
Reliablity 
The reliability of survey questions is a measurement of the variability of answers over 
repeated conceptual trials (Groves et al., 2009). That is, it measures the extent of which one 
would get the same results if the study were repeated, either with the same or other methods. 
Reliability does not necessarily involve validity because a measure may be reliable and 
precise, and get consistent results over many trials, even if it is not measuring the correct 
theoretical concepts. Groves et al. present two methods for assessing the reliability of the 
survey: repeated interview with the same respondents or using multiple indicators of the 
same theoretical constructs for which the expected value should be the same.  
The Response Bias 
Both validity and reliability is concerned with the answers to questions by an individual 
respondent. The response bias on the other hand is concerned with errors associated with 
questions when there is a systematic deviation away from respondents’ true value. Such 
systematic under- or overreporting differs from survey validity because the correlation 
between responses and true values may not be effected if all respondents tend to misreport to 
the same extent (Groves et al., 2009). Response bias is mostly a problem for summary 
statistics like sample means, and often occurs for example as underreporting for questions 
involving socially undesirable traits. 
4.2.2 Data Collection Method  
The choice of data collection method lay the foundation for the questionnaire design, and has 
significant implications for the both the costs and possible errors in surveys (Gripsrud et al., 
2004; Groves et al., 2009). In this section we briefly introduce criteria that should be 
considered when choosing the data collection method, before we present the method chosen 
for this survey and its consequences. 
Normal data collection methods include telephone interviews, postal surveys that are 
returned by the respondent, different kinds of face-to-face interviews, and a range of 
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computer assisted data collection methods including fully computer-administered web-
surveys. Groves et al. (2009) argue that different methods of data collection vary along 5 
main dimensions: interviewer involvement, level of interaction with the respondent, degree 
of privacy for the respondent, which channels of communication that are used and the degree 
of technology at use. These dimensions should be considered individually, and the 
appropriate method chosen in accordance with the scope of the survey, including the number 
of questions, their content and complexity. The availability of sampling frames may also 
influence the method chosen43. Mail- or telephone surveys require available lists of e-mail 
addresses or telephone numbers, while face-to-face interviews often are most appropriate for 
area sampling frames.  
Data Completeness and Accuracy 
We chose to conduct personal face-to-face interviews with the respondents. In general, face-
to-face interviews have been found both to boost response rate and provide more accurate 
information44 (Gripsrud et al., 2004). Within the range of face-to-face interview methods, 
including central location tests and intersection in the field, we chose to conduct personal 
visits at the respondents’ home, with the interviewers reading the questionnaire out loud to 
the respondent. This gives a high degree of respondent-interviewer interaction, and leaves 
the interviewer with a large amount of control over the measurement process. High 
interviewer involvement is regarded an advantage if questions are complex and need 
explanation, or if the survey design is so that the respondents need assistance in order to 
navigate through the questionnaire.  
In our case, given the elderly target population, and the content and complexity of the 
questions, we could expect a large item-nonresponse rate and corresponding error with a 
self-administered survey or digital- and telephone assisted surveys45. First, interviewers 
                                                
43 The sampling frame constitute the operational population from whom we theoretically is able to reach each respondent 
within the target population. Ideally, the sampling frame list all units in target population, but more often sampling frame is 
more imperfectly linked to the target population (Groves et al., 2009). See section 4.3 for a presentation of the sampling 
procedure in this survey. 
44 The response rate is defined as the rate of eligible possible respondents that accepts to participate in the survey.  
45 Item-nonresponse refers the failure to obtain data for one or more of the questions in the survey because the respondent 
refuses to answer or is unable to do so. The consequences of nonresponse are discussed closer in section 4.3.4. 
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would not be there to help when the respondents do not understand the question. Second, the 
respondents might not follow the instructions in the questionnaire when self administering 
the survey, and third, interviewers would not be there to encourage respondents to provide 
an answers when initially reluctant to do so. We encouraged interviewers to involve when 
necessary to explain complex questions and answer respondents concerns. In addition, by 
reading out questions loud and supporting visually by showing questions and alternatives we 
aimed to increase the comprehension of the respondent.  
On the other hand, the degree of interaction of the interviewer also affects the degree of 
privacy offered to the respondent. The presence of an interviewer means that the respondents 
loose control over the information they provide. The impact and potential bias of lost privacy 
is regarded to increase when asking for sensitive information or information that is generally 
regarded as desirable or undesirable (Groves et al., 2009).  
Data Collection Method and Coverage 
An interviewer who explains the purpose and introduces the survey is also important to 
motivate participation in the first place and reduce unit non-response46. In addition, the 
combination of area probability frames and face-to-face interviews is regarded as the gold 
standard in terms of coverage of the household population (Groves et al., 2009). There is 
however a substantial higher cost related to this combination than other methods because 
interviewer administered surveys require a trained, equipped and motivated staff in need of 
supervision.  
Moreover, because of the difficulty of obtaining population lists for our target population, 
face-to-face interviews turned out to be the only viable solution to achieve a balanced 
sample of a large number of elderly. Given our area based sampling method (presented in 
section 4.3), we also relied heavily on the interviewers compliance in order to implement the 
sampling procedure at household level. We used professional local interviewers that were 
thoroughly trained in the area sampling procedures. They were also informed about the 
purpose of the survey as a whole, and the separate parts of the questionnaire.  
                                                
46 Unit nonresponse refers to an eligible person chosen to be interviewed who is unavailable or refuses to participate at all.  
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4.2.3 Survey Development and Pilot Interviews 
The questionnaire itself was developed with guidance and input from the professors within 
the KOV research group, processors specializing in the Chinese society, and Chinese friends 
and contacts including the research assistants at Fudan University and Antai School of 
Management in Shanghai. It was important to work closely with Chinese contacts during the 
survey development to ensure that the concepts developed also could be transferred correctly 
to a Chinese context.  
The actual translation from English to Mandarin was done by two independent parties, and 
ultimately compiled by a third translator in discussion with myself. Finally, the market 
research company, Hycon, made their comments and final changes to the Mandarin version. 
Pilot testing was carried out with 23 respondents in late March. This was an important test of 
whether the research instruments and translation worked as expected. The pilot test was 
carried out in a group of respondents with similar characteristics of the target population, and 
all interviews were carried out in a manner simulating the data collection method planned for 
the final survey. Respondents were however mostly chosen conveniently as desired by the 
research assistants, not implementing any structured sampling procedure. Still, through the 
pilot test we were able to test the efficacy of contact and screening procedures, 
communication about the survey, methods for respondent consent and cooperation, in 
addition to the length and effectiveness of the survey itself in a live condition. For all pilot 
interviews, the research assistants compiled a short report including the respondents’ 
reflections on what they thought the instrument was about, what problems they found 
completing the instrument and so on.  
Various changes were implemented subsequent to the pilot interviews. Because many 
respondents was reported to become inpatient and unwilling to cooperate at the last parts of 
survey, we adjusted the length and excluded detailed questions regarding consumption and 
saving behaviour. We also adjusted questions regarding health condition, expenditures and 
insurance. In regard of income, we separated questions asked to retired and working 
respondents, asking less detailed questions about current income to retired respondents.  
For questions regarding savings and net wealth, most respondents in the pilot did not report 
to possess types of assets such as stocks, funds or government bonds. These assets types 
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were therefore lumped together in the final survey, but not excluded. This was to assure that 
also types of wealth hold presumably by high wealth respondents were included in order to 
avoid a downward bias in the data for high income and high wealth respondents.  
Because of low degrees of data completion in many questionnaires, we also decided to 
include screening questions regarding what type of information respondents were willing to 
share in the final survey. Respondents unwilling to share detailed information regarding their 
economic situation would then be excluded47.  
Furthermore, some of the scenario-based question asked had been mistaken in the pilot as to 
describe real life insurance products48. This could have caused a serious bias if respondents 
were reluctant to answer because they mistakenly regarded the questions as a sale- or 
marketing approach for real products. We therefore changed the formulation of the scenario 
based questions, making the examples more abstract and focusing more trade off between a 
bequest motive and life cycle saving. Changes were also made to make the survey more 
user-friendly so that the interviewers more efficiently could guide respondents through the 
measurement tools.  
4.2.4 Questionnaire design 
Survey Content 
The intention of the survey was to offer detailed and comprehensive data on the economic 
situation and saving behaviour for elderly in China, and in particular on the extent and 
motivation of intergenerational transfers. The surveys are included in Appendix G (English 
version) and Appendix H (Chinese version). 
The survey tool administered in each household included the following sections: 
- A screening part where respondents were excluded if i) they were not eligible within the 
defined target population ii) they fell outside the designated quotas for age or employment 
                                                
47 Details about these screening questions, including a discussion of the costs and benefits of the procedure, is included in 
part 4.3.4. 
48 The scenario based-survey questions and their purpose is presented in the next section. 
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status iii) if they were not the main financial decision maker, and iv) if they were not willing 
to provide private financial information such as income, transfers or savings.  
- Personal information and demographics. 
- Information on work and income, including pre-retirement employment and income 
information for retired respondents. For married respondents, the couple was regarded as 
retired if the main economic contributor was retired.  
- Saving behaviour and net wealth.  
- Information on the availability, participation and benefits of pension programs for both the 
respondent and his or her spouse (if any). We also asked questions about personal savings 
for elderly life income and their main sources of post-retirement income. 
- Information on the availability, participation and benefits of health insurance programs. We 
also gathered information on respondents’ health care expenditures, and asked whether they 
were putting aside money for future health care expenditures. 
- Detailed information on each of the respondent´s children, in addition to information on 
upward and downward monetary and asset transfers, intergenerational service provision and 
co-residence. This is the main part of the survey instrument, and gives unique information on 
the extent of intergenerational transfers and their motives. 
- Housing arrangements and real estate wealth. We gather data on house ownership, value, 
and past, current and intended housing arrangements in order to better understand the role of 
co-residence and housing arrangements in capital accumulation of elderly. We also ask about 
preferred living arrangements during retirement.  
- Hypothetical and scenario-based question on bequests and saving motives. 
Ensuring Valid and Reliable Answers 
The validity and reliability of the survey depend to a large extent on how the questions are 
formulated. First, the questions should be formulated as easy as possible so that all 
respondents understand the content. Any ambiguity in the questions involves a risk that 
respondents answers to their own interpretation of the question, rather than what we seek to 
measure (Gripsrud et al., 2004). We aimed at decreasing the number or unnecessary 
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complicated words and concepts when designing the questionnaire. Furthermore, we carried 
out the necessary investigations to ensure that questions were relevant both to respondents in 
Shanghai and Chengdu, for example by including a comprehensive list of both urban and 
rural social security and health insurance schemes. 
Desirability Bias 
We focused on avoiding leading questions that give the respondent an indication of what 
answer he or she should choose. This includes avoiding any “censoring effect” in which 
some answers may be regarded as wrong or correct (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005). Still, 
we regard this treat to validity as strong, especially when asking for intergenerational 
transfers, service provision or bequests. We can expect that most people seek to overestimate 
the amount of wealth and assistance given to others, and play down the amount received. We 
emphasized the respondent’s confidentiality in order to diminish such effects. We also 
formulated questions that are prone to such a bias in more general and less personal terms. 
An example of this is question 8.1: Do you agree with the following statement? ”Parents 
should always seek to leave as large bequests as possible to their children”. Furthermore, 
we avoided direct questions on transfer motives, such as not asking directly for a strategic or 
altruistic transfer motive. The main reasons for this is that asking people to admit strategic 
use of wealth might indeed yield social desirable responses49.  
Aggregation of Concepts 
While putting much effort in to making the survey as short as possible, we also sought to 
avoid generalizing and aggregating concepts to a level where respondents hardly could 
answer accurately. We kept questions on income and transfers largely disaggregated, and 
used short time horizons where possible to help the respondent answer accurately. Still, we 
also made sure not to exclude more rare events where relevant. An example of this is to also 
ask for transfers that take place yearly in order not to exclude important yearly events for 
intergenerational gifts such as for example the spring festival.  
                                                
49 Data presented by Warneryd (1999) give an indication of this bias. He reports answers to questions about motives for 
leaving bequests gathered in the Center Savings Project at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, and find that only 16.2% 
of parents who say they would like to leave a considerable bequest to their children admits this to be contingent on their 
children to take good care of them when they are old.  
  
46 
Implicit Assumptions 
Another possible treat to the quality of many of the measurement instruments was implicit 
assumptions made by the respondents. This involves questions where the consequences of 
the choice not are made clear, and thus leaves to the respondent which consequences that are 
considered and not. For example did we in the scenario-based questions make use of 
commitment devices such as “locked boxes” in addition to state the trade-offs explicitly. 
Failure to clarify the consequences of the respondent´s choices can involve that not all the 
respondents respond to the same question, something that will weaken the validity and 
reliability of the survey (Gripsrud et al., 2004). 
Question Order 
Preceding questions tend to shape the respondents’ attention towards a certain type of 
information. If we use specific questions first, and then ask general questions later this may 
imply that memories and associations with a specific situation will affect how general 
questions are answered (Diamond, 2000). There is also evidence that respondents tend to 
seek consistency in their answers, and that answers in early questions affect how they behave 
later (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). We asked most fact based questions in the start of 
the survey, while questions that required the respondents to consider a hypothetical situation 
or reveal their preferences were asked later. 
Closed Questions 
We used exclusively closed questions in the questionnaire. This might have constrained the 
respondents, but also reminded them of alternatives not thought about at first. Open 
questions would have been less leading, but also harder for the respondent to interpret. Three 
reasons in particular were important when deciding to use closed questions. First, as 
presented in part 4.1, the concepts and variables to be measured in the survey were clearly 
defined so that there was less need for a qualitative approach with open questions. Second, in 
order to use the data material for future testing and estimations we would benefit from as 
standardized answers as possible. Indeed, answers to open ended questions could have 
introduced a possibly large processing error when editing and coding the responses. Third, 
respondents might have failed to consider all aspects of the concept we wanted to measure, 
for example in regard of the strategic interaction with their children or the components of 
intended bequests. 
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Designing Alternatives and Scales 
The success of closed questions is largely contingent on the development of scales and 
alternatives that prevent biased answers. First, we made all efforts in order to include all 
possible answers in the list of alternatives. If the opinion of the respondent is not listed, she 
will be forced to select an answer not fully applicable injuring the reliability and validity of 
the survey (Diamond, 2000). We therefore also gave the possibility to provide information 
manually, or answer “other”, for most of the questions. Respondent were given the option of 
answering “don't know” if they did not have a particular view about the question. This was 
to avoid guessing or random answers that would affect the validity of the survey negatively. 
We still encouraged respondents to give estimations of central variables in order to avoid 
that “don't know” was used as an easy option leading to loss of valuable information. We 
worked closely with research assistants in China, both before and after the pilot interview to 
ensure comprehension and relevance of all alternatives also in the Chinese setting. 
The order of the alternatives might affect the answers through the primacy effect or the 
recency effect (Diamond, 2000). The primacy effect is that respondents remember best the 
first information exposed for, while the recency effect refers to the ability to remember the 
last seen information. In order to correct for this we altered the order of the alternatives for a 
subsample in the pilot survey, without finding any effect. 
Strategic Survey Questions 
We asked three scenario-based questions to complement direct questions about respondents’ 
saving motive. We use these survey instruments to help resolve the identification problem 
between precautionary saving for “self insurance” and bequest-motivated saving (see part 
3.2.2). Strategic survey questions are thought-experiments concerning behavior in 
contingencies, with a relative high level of information (Ameriks et al., 2011).  
In the first and second question (Q 8.6 and Q 8.7, Appendix G/H), we ask respondents 
whether they would like to participate in 1) a life annuity program and 2) a health insurance 
program. The only cost presented is that participation in programs will make respondents 
unable to leave any bequests to their heirs because all wealth ultimately will accrue to the 
programs whether or not any contingencies occur. If capital accumulation is primarily 
motivated by uncertainty regarding longevity or unexpected health care expenses these 
programs should be attractive. On the other hand, if these concerns are secondary to a 
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bequest motive one would expect respondents to be reluctant to participate. As we learned 
from the pilot survey, a significant challenge in asking these question was that the health- or 
annuity insurance offered might be regarded as real product being marketed, making 
respondents reluctant to indicate interest in them. We took two measures to solve this 
problem. First, we abstracted the examples so that they would resemble less any real life 
saving or insurance product50. Secondly, we underlined clearly that the questions were 
purely hypothetical and did not represent any real life saving or insurance products. We also 
put these questions last in the survey in order to avoid that any doubt over the motives of the 
survey would affect other answers. 
The third scenario-based question (Q 8.8) is an adapted version of a question developed by 
Ameriks et al. (2011, p. 534) in order to estimate the strength of a bequest motive relative to 
a parameter for “public care aversion” among American elderly. We re-apply a similar 
survey instruments in order to elicit preferences regarding bequest motives as opposed to 
saving for future health care. As in Ameriks et al., we make use of “locked boxes” to 
provide a commitment device, and thus overcome the problem that wealth can be kept for 
both precautionary and bequest motives at the same time. We then give the respondent a 
hypothetical prize money windfall of 100,000 Yuan51 and ask them to divide it between a 
“health care locked box” and a “bequest locked box”. By stating that one year of health care 
costs 50,000 Yuan we introduce a trade off between two year of health care for the elderly 
couple and the value of leaving bequests to their children. This third question has one clear 
methodical advantage over the two first scenario-based questions in that the windfall of prize 
money to be allocated does not resemble an actual saving product. 
                                                
50 An obvious cost of abstracting is that is might be more difficult for the respondents understand and relate to the problems 
presented. On the other hand, because of the interviewer administered interviews, interviewers would make sure the 
respondent understood the problem before answering, The interviewers would also clarify any concerns raised by the 
respondent. In addition, the last part of the survey provides data on the degree of understanding and collaboration of each 
respondents, allowing us to exclude those who had problems relating to the scenarios. 
51 1 Yuan equals about 0.95 Norwegian Kroner. 
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4.3 Sample Design 
The theoretical population of the survey consist of all single (divorced or widowed) persons 
and married couples in China aged 50 years or older that have at least one adult child aged 
18 years or older. In order to develop a viable sampling procedure we have focused on a 
geographical subset of this population, and we designated 4 areas in China to constitute the 
target population, Urban and Rural Shanghai and Urban and Rural Chengdu52. Within these 
four areas we conducted a multistage random cluster sampling of smaller areas.  
At household level we performed a non-random quota sampling in order to ensure a 
sufficient number of eligible respondents within the resource constraints of the project. 
Scarce availability of reliable lists of persons or addresses, combined with a narrowly 
defined target population, made perfect probability sampling difficult at the last stage of 
sampling. In order to decrease the sampling bias we used random geographical locations and 
pre-determined “random walk” travel patterns when conducting the door-to-door 
interviews53.  
This section describes the procedures of the sampling techniques applied and the screening 
of respondents in detail. We will also present relevant theory of sampling methods and 
discuss the costs and benefits of the chosen procedures in light of this theory. First, we 
discuss regional inequalities in China that motivated the selection of the four designated 
regions for sampling. Then, in 4.3.2 we briefly go through probability and nonprobability 
sampling, before we present the sampling procedures that we applied in section 4.3.3. In 
4.3.4 we discuss the problem of non-response. 
                                                
52 The target population of the survey includes everyone that the study would like to say something about. In section 4.3.2 
we discuss the reasons for choosing these 4 regions.  
53 An alternative option would be to list all housing units in each cluster in order to conduct an area probability sample. 
This would however require much more resources than we had available. First we would need a complete list of housing 
units in all sampled clusters. Secondly, using a call back procedure required by a probability sample approach, we would 
use large resources revisiting ineligible because of the rare target population of this survey and the lack of information on 
age and family structure in the housing units.  
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4.3.1 Regional Inequalities  
We designated four areas in China for sampling, Urban and Rural Shanghai and Urban and 
Rural Chengdu in Sichuan province54. These four areas were chosen in order to take into 
account the large regional inequalities in China, not only between urban and rural areas, but 
also between the prospering coastal east and the inland regions in the west. The differences 
across regions apply to several economic and social variables relevant to this survey. A 
broader indicator of income developed by the OECD (2002) that encompasses GDP, 
personal income, pensions, housing subsidies and health care, education and unemployment 
benefits find the differential between urban and rural regions to be more than 4 to 1. The 
same report also point out that the urban/rural differences and the divide between coastal and 
inland provinces often overlap, since most western regions are essentially rural (OECD, 
2002, p. 682). This is also true for Shanghai and Sichuan. In 2009 did 17,020,000 people, or 
88.6 per cent of Shanghai’s total population of 19,210,000 live in urban areas, while only 
11.4 per cent lived in rural areas. In Sichuan, 38.7 per cent of the total population lived in 
urban areas55.  
Shanghai is regarded as the most successful city in China, and is the largest city by 
population and the commercial centre of mainland China. It is also the richest city in China 
with a per capita net income for urban households in 2009 of 28837 Yuan. This is the 
highest per capita income in urban China. Rural Shanghai has a per capita net income of 
12482 Yuan, and this is the highest among rural regions. In comparison, the per capita net 
income in urban and rural Sichuan is 13839 Yuan and 4462 Yuan. The national averages for 
urban and rural areas are 17174 Yuan and 5153 Yuan56. 
There are also notable social and demographic dissimilarities between the regions. The 
percentage of illiterate persons to the total population aged over 15 years is 3.81 per cent in 
                                                
54 Map 1 in Appendix B show the geographical location of Chengdu (Sichuan) and Shanghai. 
55 All statistical data in this section is retrieved from the databases of the National Bureau of Statistics for 2009 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/) unless stated otherwise. 
56 Also the household yearly consumption expenditure in urban and rural Shanghai was the highest in mainland China at 
20992 Yuan and 9804 Yuan, compared with 10860 Yuan and 4141 Yuan in urban and rural Sichuan. The national averages 
were 12264 Yuan and 3993 Yuan. 
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Shanghai and 9.17 per cent in Sichuan. The national average is 7.10 per cent. Life 
expectancy is an average of 74.9 years in Shanghai and 66.3 years in Sichuan. The old 
dependency ratio in Shanghai and Sichuan were similar at 17.97 and 17.28 per cent, both 
above the national average at 13.24 per cent. 
450,000 persons contribute to the rural basic pension system in Shanghai, which is 20.5 per 
cent of the total rural population, compared to only 6.2 per cent rural Sichuan. These 
statistics correspond to the statistics on social security for rural China as a whole. In general 
the provision of public pension benefits to rural elders has been very limited, with only 
around 9.2 per cent of rural retired receiving benefits from any public program in 2007 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2007)57. Moreover do only 5 per cent of rural elderly receive 
some kind of pension from a former employer compared to close to 80 per cent for urban 
retired (OECD, 2011). In urban Shanghai, 58.8 per cent contribute to public pension 
schemes, and in urban Sichuan 31.1 per cent. 
Health insurance has gone from being more or less nonexistent before 2003 to cover large 
parts of the population today. In urban areas the Urban Employee Medical Insurance and the 
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance dominate (Hong et al., 2011). The Urban 
Employee Medical Insurance is given mainly through the employer while the Urban 
Resident Basic Medical Insurance is a public program provided in order to reach also the 
non-employed. In rural areas, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme has grown in the last 10 
years to become a nationwide health insurance program in China. Still, regional differences 
remain large since it is regional governments who are responsible of setting user fees, 
premiums and reimbursements rates (Hong et al., 2011). According to the 2009 data from 
National Bureau of Statistics, 93 per cent were covered by the urban medical care in 
Shanghai, compared to only 38.1 per cent in urban Sichuan.  
                                                
57 For rural areas in China there are two main public pensions schemes; One old-age insurance plan with voluntary 
contributions and one non-contributory scheme, with defined benefits for a segmented group of rural elders depending on 
the county of residence (Hong et al., 2011). 
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4.3.2 Probability and Nonprobability Sampling  
Different methods of sample selection can broadly be categorized within two categories; 
probability and nonprobability sampling. Probability sampling involves that the respondents 
are selected in such a way that every member of the designated population has an actual and 
known positive probability to be selected, a feature that allows for analysis to determine 
possible bias and sampling error. This requires a complete sampling frame or “study 
population” which lists all elements in the target population and from which the researcher 
apply a random selection mechanism58. Unequal probability of selection for some members 
of the population can be corrected applying weights. These features do not apply for 
nonprobability samples. Such samples will normally to some extent be selected based on the 
judgement of the researchers, and therefore increase uncertainty when using the data to 
represent the population. Nonprobability samples can be chosen as a result of mere 
convenience, as in convenience samples, or on the basis of more systematically developed 
criteria. The drawbacks of nonprobability sampling are substantial. Findings may not be 
valid because the selection process may lead to underrepresentation of parts of the 
population, and does not provide rules for inferring results about the population. 
Despite their flaws, nonprobability techniques for sampling can be useful and appropriate in 
certain situations, and are often the only methods available. First, for a range of specialist 
populations is it nearly impossible to construct a complete list of the sampling frame from 
which one can draw a probability sample. Second, in explanatory or descriptive studies, 
where one seek to establish whether a phenomena exist or not, information from a 
nonprobability sample could serve as a useful basis for further research (Groves et al., 2009). 
Both the arguments above apply to this survey. In particular did we not succeed in obtaining 
a population list with good coverage from which to draw a probability sample of the target 
population. We worked through several instances including both private and official research 
                                                
58 Normal probability sampling techniques are: i) simple random sampling, where all members of the population are listed 
and selected with equal probability of selection, ii) systematic sampling, where members of the population are listed and 
selected at equal intervals, iii) stratified sampling, where each member of the population is assigned to a group from which 
simple random samples are drawn, and iv) cluster sampling, which involves assigning members of the population to 
clusters, select clusters randomly, and include all the members from selected clusters in the sample. This can also be done 
over several stages.  
  
53 
institutions, and city level or regional registers. All were either reluctant to provide 
information, or did not have the necessary information of age, family status or even accurate 
contact information. We therefore had to work with an area sampling approach and screen 
respondents in order to locate respondents with the desired characteristics. 
By diverging from a perfect probability sample technique we increased the risk of biased 
sample statistics and lost the possibility to estimate the standard error from one realization of 
the sample design. Still, it should be noted that bias from coverage, nonresponse or 
measurement errors also exist in probability samples. The unique threat to nonprobability 
samples is therefore often the sampling bias (Groves et al., 2009). We tried to decrease this 
threat by applying a statistical rule rather than giving discretion to interviewers though a 
random walk procedure at household level. 
4.3.3 Sampling Procedure 
The sampling procedure was designed so that all elderly over 50 years in one of the four 
designated regions in theory had a chance of being selected for interviewing. The final sample 
does still not have the characteristics of a perfect probability sample. This is both because of  
cluster effects resulting from selecting all units to be sampled within given geographical areas, 
and because of the quota sampling implemented at household level, with no call backs on 
unavailable respondents. This section describes the sampling procedure in detail and 
discusses some direct treats to the survey quality. 
Cluster Sampling 
The specific geographical locations where we performed the door-to-door interviews were 
chosen randomly in a multistage cluster technique. As a starting point, we used the districts 
within the four designated regions, and divided each of these districts into mutually 
exclusive subareas (clusters) with similar populations and identifiable boundaries. One of 
these clusters were then selected randomly for each district for last stage sampling59. 
This procedure involves choosing groups of sample elements jointly rather than choosing 
respondents from the sample frame directly. The largest error source from this approach is 
                                                
59 See “Quota-based Sampling” for a description of the sampling technique at household level. 
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patterns of normal resident segregation that tells us that poor people tend to live next by poor 
people and the other way around. Even though we used a random walk procedure to avoid 
neighbouring households to be sampled, the area cluster effect might still be substantial. This 
includes that sampling variances of the clusters (the variance of means on test statistics 
across the clusters) can be expected to be larger than across individual respondents if we had 
sampled them directly form the sampling frame (Groves et al., 2009).  
In order to decrease the threat of large cluster effects, some districts within in the four 
regions were excluded from the random sampling stages on basis of available data on 
income and wealth (real estate). For urban and rural Chengdu we used data on “per capita 
income of rural and urban residents” from the National Bureau of Statistics. We excluded the 
top four and bottom four of the of the 14 districts compromising rural Chengdu and kept the 
six areas of Pixian, Gonglai, Dayixian, Dujiangyan, Xindu and Xinjinxian for sampling. For 
the five districts compromising urban Chengdu we excluded the richest and poorest area, 
keeping the areas of Qingyang, Junniu and Wuhou for sampling. The average per capita 
income of the residents in the six areas designated in rural Chengdu is 10560 Yuan, 
compared to 29980 Yuan for the three urban areas. Due to lack of access to reliable 
household income data for Shanghai, we used average cost of real estate per square meter to 
select areas for sampling. For rural Shanghai we excluded the poorest and the two richest 
areas and kept Rural Baoshan, Rural Jiading, Rural Songjiang, Fengxian and  Jinshan for 
multistage sampling. For urban Shanghai we excluded the 3 richest and the 4 poorest areas, 
keeping Xuhui, Hongkou, Yangpu, Zhabei and Putuo for multistage sampling. The average 
cost of real estate per square meter for the urban areas selected for sampling is 25280 Yuan, 
compared to 12583 Yuan for the rural areas. Appendix B provides an overview over the 
districts selected for sampling in urban and rural Shanghai and Chengdu60. 
Quota-based Sampling 
In each designated district we selected a random subarea (cluster) where we performed a 
quota-based door-to-door sampling. Quota sampling is a structured form of nonprobability 
                                                
60 Table 6 in Appendix B provides a complete list of the designated districts for sampling in rural and urban 
Chengdu. Map 2 and Map 3 in Appendix B show the geographical location of the districts in rural and urban 
Chengdu. Table 7 in Appendix B provides a list of the designated districts for sampling in rural and urban 
Shanghai, and Map 5 and Map 4 show their geographical location. 
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sampling, and includes interviewing given subgroups of the population so that they match 
assigned sample proportions. This is similar to the stratified probability samples, but unlike 
probability sampling with call-back, quota sampling conceals problems of nonresponse61: In 
the case of a household unit where no one were at home, or with no eligible respondents, the 
interviewer simply moved on to the next unit until the desired number of interviews in that 
cluster was conducted. We had a desired number of 600 respondents altogether, with 150 
respondents to be sampled in each region equally distributed over the designated districts. 
This means that a minimum of 20 and maximum of 30 respondents should be sampled from 
each cluster until a total of 150 eligible respondents were chosen in each region62. In 
addition, we set quotas for the proportion of retired respondents (between 60 and 70 per cent 
in each cluster), and age (at least 5 per cent from each 5-year age group). This ensured the 
desired number of interviews, with the right subsets of respondents. Still, because of no call 
back on unavailable respondents, the procedure might have caused underrepresentation of 
respondents that were difficult to reach. We sought to decrease this sample bias by removing 
any discretion on behalf of the interviewer in regard on choosing respondents through the 
implementation of a random walk procedure at the last stage of sampling63.  
Random Walk Procedure 
The interviewers were instructed to follow strict travel patterns from randomized starting 
points until the quotas for that cluster was completed. In each cluster one street was drawn at 
random from a listing of the streets in that cluster. This street would then serve as a starting 
point for a random walk. The remaining households in that cluster were then selected using a 
random walk procedure in order to avoid vicinal household to be sampled and to avoid any 
discretion on behalf of the interviewer in selecting respondents. Households were chosen at a 
right-principle. The interviewer would walk down the designated street from where the street 
starts, turn right at the first corner and enter the next street. The first house/flat/apartment at 
                                                
61 Call-back refers to the procedure of revisiting respondents that are assigned to be interviewed until one either obtain the 
interview or is refused by the respondent. 
62 The number of respondents to be sampled in each cluster depended on the number of districts assigned for sampling 
within each region. For urban Chengdu, we only selected the three districts Qingyang, Junniu and Wuhou for sampling, 
meaning that 50 respondents would be interviewed in each cluster. 
63 Sudman (1976) even argues for a “probability sample with quota” where a quota sample within a specific geographical 
location and with a travel pattern to follow by the interviewer can approximate probability sample. 
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the right hand would be selected for sampling. If the respondent was ineligible, or rejected to 
participate, the interviewer would turn right out from out from the housing unit and select 
the neighbouring housing unit at the right hand side. If an interview was completed 
successfully, five household units on the right hand would be skipped before the sixth again 
was selected for sampling. For dead-end roads, the interviewer would turn and continue to 
sample household units on her right hand. After completing two interviews, a new starting 
point would be chosen within the cluster for a new random walk. This was in order to 
decrease the sampling effect resulting from homogeneity between respondents within the 
same neighbourhoods.  
Screening of Respondents 
A screening procedure was performed in the start of each interview in order to identify 
eligible respondents. Given the focus in the survey on intergenerational transfers, elderly 
with children aged below 18 were excluded. This was because we considered expenses and 
transfers to children below 18 years as a part of the parents’ own consumption. Furthermore, 
children below 18 are not expected to have the option of living apart from their parents. All 
households with no persons over 50 years were also excluded. We wanted data both on 
working and retired elderly, and in order to enforce the quota of between 30 and 40 per cent 
working respondents in each region all working respondents in a region were rejected after 
successfully completing 40 per cent of the total 150 interviews in that region with working 
respondents. Furthermore, in order to ensure that we got sufficient data also on the eldest 
part population, we implemented a quota of minimum 10 per cent of respondents over 65 
years in each region. For married respondents, we interviewed the main financial decision 
maker in the elderly couple. Finally, we also screened respondents that were unwilling to 
provide personal financial information. This is discussed further in the last paragraph in 
section 4.3.4 below. 
4.3.4 Nonresponse  
Nonresponse in a survey can occur at two levels. A person chosen to be interviewed may 
refuse to participate at all, or the interviewer might fail to obtain data on one or several 
survey measurements in the survey because the respondent refuse to answer or is unable to 
do so. The first type of nonresponse is termed unit nonresponse and the latter item 
nonresponse (Groves et al., 2009). 
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Nonresponse error arises both at unit and item level when respondent data from an excluded 
sample unit differs from those of the full sample. This could for example occur if 
respondents who do not wish to participate in the survey, or answer a particular question, 
differ from the sample average on variables such as being more affluent or less likely to give 
transfer wealth to children. This means that there are two forces that contribute to a 
nonresponse bias for the sample mean. The proportion of eligible sampled respondents for 
which data is not collected, and the difference between respondent and non-respondent mean 
(Groves et al., 2009). High response rate surveys (or high data completion) can thus have 
high non-response bias and the other way around, depending on how distinctive the non-
respondents are from the entire sampling frame. Anyhow, all else equal, higher response rate 
both at the item and unit level will reduce risk of non-response bias.  
As described in section 4.2, we applied a face-to-face interviewing with skilled interviews in 
order to decrease the non-response rate and help respondents to provide complete answers. 
Still, a large number of respondents who were not at home or rejected to participate in the 
survey, and Table 8 in Appendix C provide an overview of the non-response in Shanghai 
and Chengdu. 
In regard of item non-response, there is no obvious strategy for coping with missing items. 
Rather than imputing estimated values, we have chosen to perform a casewise deletion of 
missing values. This involves deleting a case (row) for which there are missing data for any 
of the variables in the relevant analysis being conducted. For example, if the respondent fails 
to provide the amount of one out of several types of downward transfers, the respondent will 
be excluded from the lists of cases for total downward transfers. The same applies if we are 
regressing the amount of transfer on a set of regressors for which data is missing for one or 
more of the variables. Missing value for one or more items means that the other items are 
ignored for that case. From the point of view of inference however, this practice constitutes 
an adjustment rather than an exclusion of data. By looking only at the cases for which we 
have complete data, the casewise deletion of data method involves assigning the average 
value from all the completed cases to the missing cases. In other words, we assume that the 
average values obtained from respondents who answered all relevant questions apply also to 
those who left out some questions. This assumption is not unproblematic. For example may 
respondents with particularly high or low values for economic data be reluctant to answer. 
Whatever imputation method used however, this remains speculation. 
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In order to avoid large number of unit nonresponse on sensitive content in the survey we 
screened respondents who where unwilling to provide personal financial information. In the 
screening section we asked if the person would be willing to provide financial information 
such as income, transfers and savings (Q Ex 3 in Appendix G/H). All respondents who 
answered that they would not like to provide such information were excluded. Furthermore, 
we asked two questions about economic information in the screening section, household 
income and total savings (Q Ex 1 and Q 7.1), and we excluded all respondents who was not 
willing to provide this information. This was done for main two reasons. First, result from 
the pilot survey showed large number of item nonresponse for many of the questions of main 
interest in the survey. Given our resource constraints, similar results in the full survey would 
make us unable to gather a large sample with satisfactory data completeness. Secondly, 
respondents unwilling to provide financial information would constitute a possible large bias 
by providing unreliable data. The cost of this screening, is however also significant. By 
screening eligible respondents we incur a possibly large sampling bias given that the 
excluded respondents differ from the sample average on central variables in the survey. 
Table 8 in Appendix C provide an overview over the number of respondents excluded at the 
various stages of screening. 
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5. Findings 
This chapter will present findings from the survey relevant for answering the research 
questions proposed in section 3.5. First we will present detailed data on intergenerational 
transfers from the old generation to adult children. Subsequently, we will use direct survey 
data on transfer motives and discuss whether the downward transfers and bequests identified 
translate into a transfer motive for saving. The survey data also offers a good starting point 
for testing the motivations for transfer more formally. This will be done in in section 5.3 by 
considering the determinants of both the probability of transfer and the transfer amounts of 
bequests and inter-vivos transfers. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents descriptive data on the sample of elderly respondents. After describing 
the variables that will be used in the empirical part of thesis, we start by providing 
descriptive data on general socioeconomic factors for the sample in section 5.1.2. This will 
give a general overview over the respondents, their households, and their wealth and income. 
Then, in 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 we describe the basis for an intentional transfer motive for saving 
among the respondents. First, in 5.1.3 we present detailed data on downward 
intergenerational transfers and intended bequests, and in 5.1.4 we contrast this with stated 
motives for savings. In order to understand the relative importance of bequest motives we 
will present findings from strategic survey questions where respondents are asked to make a 
trade off between downward bequests and other saving motives.   
5.1.1 Variables 
In this section, we describe the variables used in the empirical part of the survey. 
Personal Information 
RETIRED is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent and his or her spouse (if 
any) are regarded as retired, and 0 if they are working64. AGE is the age of the respondent, 
                                                
64 To distinguish between working and retired respondents we used information on whether the main economic contributor 
of the elderly couple was retired or not. 
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the main economic decision maker in the elderly couple, and FEMALE equals one if the 
respondent is a woman. MARRIED is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is 
married and zero otherwise. For marries respondents, all data on income, saving and 
transfers is for the elderly couple as an economic unit. CHILDREN and 
GRANDCHILDREN is the number of children and grandchildren of the respondent. 
RURALSHANGHAI, URBANSHANGHAI, RURALCHENGDU and URBANCHENGDU 
is regional dummies that equal one if the respondent live in that region. 
Wealth and Income 
SAVINGS is the total savings of the respondent and his or her spouse (if any). This include 
cash holdings, deposits in financial institutions, private savings associations (Rotating 
savings and credit associations), face value government bonds / treasury bills, stocks / funds, 
but excludes accumulated contributions to pension systems and excludes real estate. 
OWNHOUSE is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent or his or her spouse (if 
any) own their own dwelling. OWNRE equals one if they also own other real estate. 
REALEST2 is the value of the total holding of real estate. 
INCOME is total monthly current income for working respondents and their spouses (if 
any). This includes net monetary income, monetary value of consumption from farming and 
other self-production, and the value of any income received in kind, but exclude any 
monetary or in-kind transfers from children65. Current income for retired respondents is 
measured in a separate variable, RCINCOME, which also include pension benefits. 
PRINCOME is the pre-retirement income of retired respondent and his or her spouse (if 
any). This is measured by the average monthly income prior to retirement, and includes the 
same income components as INCOME. SAVING is the net saving per month as reported by 
the respondent.  
                                                
65 This is in order to avoid endogenous variables in the equations estimated in section 5.3 when we use the income 
differential between parent and children to test an altruistic transfer motive. Financial and in-kind transfers from children to 
parents are measured in the variables UPFIN and UPNM. 
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PENSION1 is a dummy that equals one if the respondent or his or her spouse (if any) 
contribute or receive benefits from a pension program, and PENSION is the total (expected) 
monthly benefit payments from the pension system. 
CHILDINCOME is the average net yearly income of the respondent´s children. This include 
all monetary income, consumption from farming and self-production, and income in-kind, 
but excludes transfers from parents.  
Downward Bequests and Inter-Vivos Transfers 
BEQ – BEQ3 are dummy variables for the bequest motive. Respondents were asked, for 
every child, if they would you prefer leaving as large a bequest as possible to this child. The 
options were: 1) Yes, definitely, 2) To some extent, 3) Unsure, 4) No, not to a large extent, 
and 5) No, not at all. The dummy variable BEQ equals one if the respondent answered 1) or 
2) for at least one of their children. BEQ2 includes also 3) Unsure, and BEQ3 equals one for 
all positive answers 1-4. 
MBEQ is the total amount of monetary bequests intended to be given by parents to their 
children. NMBEQ is the total value of intended non-monetary bequests, excluding real 
estate. DRE is the value of real estate intended for children66. TBEQ is the total amount of 
monetary and non-monetary bequests that parents report they intend to leave to their 
children, excluding real estate (sum of MBEQ and NMBEQ). RETBEQ also include real 
estate (sum of MBEQ and RENMBEQ). 
DWED1 is a dummy variable that equal one if the parents have given or intend to give 
financial transfers to children at their wedding DHOUSE1 and DEDU1 equal one if the 
parents have given or intend to give financial support in order to cover housing expenses for 
children, or financial support for the education of children over 18 years. DFIN1 is a dummy 
variable that equal one if the respondent provide any other financial support to adult 
children. DWED, DHOUSE, and DEDU is the total value of transfer that are given or 
intended to be given at the wedding, or in order to cover housing- and educational expenses 
                                                
66 The value of real estate is included if the parents have responded that they are planning to leave their house to one of 
their children. We have controlled for parents not owning their own dwelling. DRE2 also include the value of other real 
estate than their current dwelling that is owned by parents who have responded that they will leave their house to one of 
their children.  
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for children over 18 years. DIVT1 is a dummy that equals one if the parents have provided 
or intend to provide any of type of inter-vivos transfer to their children, and DIVT is the total 
value of inter-vivos transfers given or intended to be given by parents to their children.  
DTRANSFER is the total downward transfers given, or intended to be given, by parents to 
adult children. This includes both inter-vivos transfers and intended monetary and non-
monetary bequests, but excludes real estate (sum of TBEQ and DIVT). DRETRANSFER 
also include real estate. 
Co-residence, Upward Transfers and Elderly Care  
CORES is a dummy variable that equal one if the parents live with at least one of their adult 
children. CORES2 equal one if the parents either live with at least one of their adult children 
or plan to move in with them.
CHILDASSIST measure the assistance the parent receive from children in daily activities 
such as household chores, shopping, meal preparation, laundry, financial management and so 
on. Respondents report frequency of assistance provided, and we have translated this into 
number of days of assistance per year. The variable equals 365 if the parent receive 
assistance every day, 100 for almost every day, 52 for every week, 12 for monthly and 6 for 
more seldom than monthly. The variable equals 0 for parents who do not receive any 
assistance from their children. 
UPFIN1 is a dummy that equal one if parents receive regular financial support from at least 
one of their children. UPFIN is the total monthly amount of financial support that the parents 
receive. This include financial help with daily expenditures, covering specific costs (such as 
insurance or medical care) or paying bills. 
CHILDGENDER is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has at least one male 
child. CHILDINC is the average monthly net income of the respondent´s children. Income 
here includes all monetary income, consumption from farming and self-production, and 
income in-kind, but excludes transfers from parents.  
HEALTH_OOP is the fraction of health care expenses paid out of pocket as reported by the 
respondent. HEALTH_SPENDING is the yearly average health care expenditures of the 
respondent and his or her spouse (if any). 
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5.1.2 Descriptive Profile 
This section gives a brief socioeconomic overview of the sample. 600 respondents 
completed the final survey and according to the sample quotas, 150 of these were from each 
of the 4 regions67. The average age of the respondents was 60.67 years and 61 per cent was 
retired. The average age was highest in the Urban Shanghai, and lowest in Urban Chengdu, 
but the differences between the 4 regions in not significant at a 5% significance level68. With 
respect to household status, 90 per cent were couples, while only 10 per cent single69. 
Overall, the respondents have an average of 1.52 children and 1.31 grandchildren, with 
significantly less in Urban Shanghai than the three other regions. Half of the respondents co-
reside with their adult children, most in Rural Chengdu with 59 per cent. 
Wealth 
Average monetary savings is 39,670 Yuan, but the median is only 7,500 Yuan70. 90 per cent 
report to own their own dwelling, and 8 per cent also owns other real estate. The total 
average value of real estate holdings per respondent is 800,441 Yuan. This ranges from 
1,580,000 in Urban Shanghai, to 101,333 in Rural Chengdu71. This confirms real estate as 
the single most important contributor to wealth held by elderly Chinese, much due to the 
rapid increase in housing prices after the privatization of the property market and allocation 
of property rights in the 1990s. The effect is particularly large in urban areas.  
                                                
67 A complete overview of relevant descriptive statistics for each of the four regions can be found in Table 10 in appendix 
D. Table 9 in Appendix D shows the number of respondents sampled in each district within the 4 regions, and information 
on age and employment status.   
68 Using a two-proportion z-test with 0-hypothesis “not equal” for each relation. This procedure is followed for all 
proportion tests if not mentioned otherwise. For tests of variable means for continuous variables we use an unpaired ttest on 
the equality of means unless mentioned otherwise.  
69 Of the 10% that is single, 8% is widowed and 2% divorced. 
70 Total monetary savings includes cash holdings, deposits in financial institutions, private savings associations (Rotating 
savings and credit associations), face value government bonds / treasury bills, stocks / funds, but exclude accumulated 
contributions in pension systems and exclude real estate. 
71 We can expect these numbers to be somewhat underreported because many elderly to some extent failed to accurately 
estimate the current market value of real estate in China, especially in urban areas.  
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Income 
Average monthly net income for the working respondents in the full sample was 3,321.50 
Yuan, approximating the median of 3,500 Yuan72 . Pre-retirement income for retired 
respondents was 1,814.08 Yuan, not adjusted for inflation. Reported current income by 
retired respondents was at 3,178 Yuan per month including pension benefits but excluding 
transfers from children. Net saving per month for the entire sample is reported at 334.39 
Yuan73.  
Social Security 
92 per cent of the full sample report that they are contributing to or receiving pension 
benefits from some form of pension system. The (expected) monthly pension benefits for 
those respondents are 1,763.61 Yuan. The difference is considerable between regions. All 
respondents in urban areas report taking part in a pension system, with an average monthly 
benefit of 3,177.01 Yuan. In Rural Chengdu, only 74 per cent take part in a pension system, 
and the average monthly benefits for these respondents are 659.68 Yuan. 
Reported fraction of health care expenses paid out of pocket is 25 per cent at average in the 
sample, and yearly average health care expenditures is 1,149.83 Yuan. Rural Chengdu lags 
behind with 738.33 Yuan, while average spending in all the other regions is more than 1,200 
Yuan. 
5.1.3 The Extent of Intergenerational Transfers 
In this section we look in detail at the extent of downward inter-vivos transfers and intended 
bequests in the sample.  
Inter-vivos Transfers 
Table 1 shows the share of respondents that have provided or are planning to provide inter-
vivos transfers to at least one of their adult children. 98 per cent of respondents provide some 
kind of inter-vivos transfer to at least one of their children. Most respondents, 97 per cent, 
                                                
72 Income includes wages, unemployment compensation, consumption from farming and other self-production, income in-
kind, and other monetary transfers and subsidies, excluding transfers from children. 
73 Also the oldest age group, over 65 years, reported an average net saving per month of 190.72 Yuan. 
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provide financial support for the wedding of their children, and this is consistent in all four 
regions. 44 per cent of all respondents provide financial support for the education of children 
after 18 years of age, but this proportion vary greatly across regions, with 77 per cent in 
urban Shanghai compared to only 15 per cent in rural Chengdu74. 32 per cent in the total 
sample state that they provide financial help for housing expenses or housing purchase of 
adult children, and 29 per cent provide de financial support other than transfers related to 
housing, wedding or education to at least one of their adult children.  
Table 1: Share of Respondents Providing Inter-vivos Transfers. Share of 
respondents that have provided, or are planning to provide, financial support for the 
education of children over 18 years (dedu1), financial support in order to cover 
housing expenses for children (dhouse1), financial transfers to children at their 
wedding (dwed1), or any other financial support to adult children (dfin1). divt1 is the 
share of respondents have provided or are planning to provide any type of inter-
vivos transfers to their children. 
Region dedu1 dhouse1 dwed1 dfin1 divt1
Urban&Shanghai 0.77 0.35 0.94 0.29 0.98
Rural&Shanghai 0.47 0.52 0.97 0.33 0.99
Urban&Chengdu 0.35 0.19 0.98 0.27 0.99
Rural&Chengdu 0.15 0.23 0.97 0.29 0.97
Total 0.44 0.32 0.97 0.29 0.98  
Figure 1 shows the amounts of major inter-vivos transfers made from parents to their adult 
children, averaged over all respondents and separated in to i) financial transfers to children at 
their wedding ii) financial support in other to cover housing expenses or house 
purchase/down payment of mortgage, and iii) financial support for the education of children 
over 18 years. 
                                                
74 There is a controversy about including educational expenses on children above 18 years in the measurement of 
intergenerational transfers. Modigliani excludes such transfers arguing that children that study still are dependents, while 
we follow Kotlikoff (1988) who include expenses for the education of adult children and argue that the value of the 
resources transferred matters more than the form of transfer. 
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Figure 1: Amounts of major inter-vivos transfers made from parents to their 
adult children, averaged over all respondents. 
 
Bequests and Devise 
Table 2 presents data on bequest motives, and show the proportion of respondents that would 
like to leave as large bequest as possible to at least one of their children. The bequest dummy 
variables show that for the full sample, 49.3 per cent of elderly have a strong bequest motive, 
stating that they definitely or to some extent would like to leave as large bequests as possible 
to at least one of their children. If we also include parents that say they are unsure about 
leaving as large bequests as possible, the number rises to 71 per cent75. The bequest motive 
seems to be somewhat stronger in the Shanghai area than in Chengdu with the proportion of 
respondents with a strong bequest motives being significantly larger at a 5 per cent level in 
both the Shanghai areas compared to Chengdu. 
                                                
75 This is close to results in the 1998 Survey on Consumer Finances in the US where nearly half of the respondents replied 
that it was important or very important for them to leave inheritance to their surviving heirs (Gale and Scholz, 1994). The 
same survey finds that 30% expects to receive inheritance, and nearly 50% said they would give a sizeable estate to others. 
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Table 2: Bequest Motive. Beq show the proportion of respondents that would like 
to leave as large bequest as possible to at least one of their children. beq2 includes 
respondents who are unsure about leaving as large bequests as possible, and 
beq3, the weakest measure for a bequest motive, include respondents who answer 
”not to a large extent”. dre1 is the proportion of the respondents who own their own 
dwelling and state that they would like to leave to leave this estate to their children. 
 
Table 2 also shows the proportion of the respondents who own their own dwelling and state 
that they would like to leave to leave this estate to their children (dre1). This applies to a 
significantly larger fraction of the respondents in Rural Chengdu than in Urban Shanghai. In 
addition, 8 per cent of the respondents also report owning real estate other than their current 
dwelling and 41 per cent of these bought this for the sole purpose of transfer to children. As 
expected, the size of real estate holdings and intended transfer are large and vary 
significantly across regions. 
Figure 2 shows the total average amounts parents find it appropriate give to their children in 
monetary and non-monetary bequests, averaged over all respondents. We have also included 
the average value of the dwelling of those respondents that intent to leave their house to one 
of their children (dre1). Real Estate 2 includes also the value of other real estate than the 
respondent´s dwelling that will be left to children. The size of real estate transfers relative to 
other types of bequests illustrates the inflation of the value of real estate as a part of elderly’s 
wealth following the privatization of the property market and the allocation of property 
rights in the 1990s. The steep increase in real estate prices, in particular in urban areas, has 
also contributed to make real estate the single most important wealth component that is 
transferred between generations in China. 
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Figure 2: Bequest Amount. Total amounts of monetary and non-monetary 
bequests, averaged over all respondents. 
 
Total Downward Transfers 
The total value of downward inter-vivos transfers and intended bequests amounts to 
191,723.52 Yuan per respondent excluding real estate transfers, and 972,619.80 all in all. 
Table 3 shows the size of total downward transfers relative to respondents’ yearly net total 
income. Total intended transfers average at 6.19 times yearly net income for the entire 
sample excluding real estate, and 29.68 times yearly net income if we include also intended 
real estate transfers. These findings correspond to those by Menchik and David (1983), who 
found average bequests to be about 6 times average yearly earnings for the eldest age 
group76. 
                                                
76 Menchik and David assembled a data-base on actual bequests and actual income and earnings using filed tax returns 
from Wisconsin from the period 1946 to 1964.  
  
69 
Table 3: Size of total downward transfers relative to respondents’ yearly net total 
income. RE Transfer includes intended transfers of real estate. 
Region Transfer RE-Transfer
Urban&Shanghai 5.22 39.09
Rural&Shanghai 7.81 38.16
Urban&Chengdu 5.12 29.73
Rural&Chengdu 6.57 14.53
Total 6.19 29.68  
Figure 3 shows the relative contribution of the various types of transfer to total transfers. 
Even if we exclude the value of dwellings and other real estate intended for children, 
intended bequests account for nearly 60 per cent or the total downward transfers from  
parents. This corresponds to findings of Gale and Scholtz (1994), who find inter-vivos 
transfers to be somewhat smaller than bequests in the United States.  
Altogether, the downward transfers described in this part make a good measure of the wealth 
held by elderly parents for intended intergenerational transfers. Indeed, by providing data 
both on inter-vivos transfers and stated intentional bequest we offer a more comprehensive 
measure of transfer wealth than most other papers on the topic. First, most inter-vivos 
transfers are excluded from many papers, most notably from the seminal papers of Kotlikoff 
and Summers (1981) and Modigliani (1988) because of lack of adequate data. Second, many 
papers exclude, or express large uncertainties regarding bequests as part of intentional 
transfer wealth because they rely on aggregate data, or survey data from recipients (Gale and 
Stoltz, 1994; Hurd and Mundaca, 1989). In addition, these detailed survey data on 
intergenerational transfers offers a good starting point for testing the motivations for transfer 
more in detail. This will be done by considering determinants for the both probability of 
transfer and transfer amounts in section 5.3. 
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Figure 3: Relative contribution of the various types of transfer to total downward 
transfers from elderly parents to adult children. Intended transfers of real estate are 
excluded. 
 
5.1.4 Intentional Transfer Motive for Saving 
What is the relative importance of future downward transfers in the capital accumulation of 
elderly? The large absolute amounts of downward transfers identified above might lead us to 
expect transfer motives to rank high among household´s saving motives. Figure 4 however, 
tells another story. It displays the primary saving motives indicated by respondents, and 
shows that nearly 90 per cent of the respondents indicate the life-cycle- and precautionary 
motives; “Ensuring income throughout retirement” and “Buffer against unexpected health 
expenditures” as their most important saving motive. This corresponds to similar findings on 
direct questions of saving motives both in the US (Gale and Scholz, 1994), Japan (Horioka, 
2001) and China (Liane, 2010). Only 9 per cent in our sample cite transfer motives (inter-
vivos transfers or bequests) as their primary saving motive77.  
                                                
77 The same pattern applies for the second most important saving motive, where 10% of the respondents indicate transfer 
motives. 
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Figure 4: Primary Saving Motive. 
 
The theory presented in part 3.2 and 3.3 however, presents possible explanations for this 
seemingly contradictory evidence.  
First, Dynan et al. (2002) and Lockwood (2012) present models that are based on altruism 
but also include uncertainty, either of longevity (Lockwood, 2012) or health shocks and 
other contingencies (Dynan et al., 2002). These models reconcile the observed importance of 
bequests with declared focus on precautionary saving. We will consider both these 
arguments below by presenting data from scenario based survey questions where 
respondents are forced to make a trade off between precautionary saving motives, and 
bequests.  
Secondly, if transfers are made as parts of a strategic interaction with children, the transfers 
themselves may be made out of selfish life-cycle considerations (see part 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). In 
such a situation, primary savings motives such as “income throughout retirement” or 
precaution do not need to be contradictory to large transfers. We will consider such strategic 
interaction in the section 5.3 
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Bequest Motive and Precaution  
Figure 5 presents the answers to a scenario-based question (Q8.8) where we seek to estimate 
the strength of the bequest motive relative to saving for future health care expenses. As in 
Ameriks et al. (2011), we make use of a “locked box” to provide a commitment device, and 
thus overcome the problem that wealth can be kept for both precautionary and bequest 
motives at the same time. More explicitly, by providing respondents with a hypothetical 
windfall of 100,000 Yuan in prize money, and stating that one year of health care costs 
50,000 Yuan, we introduce a trade off between two years of health care for the elderly 
couple and the value of leaving bequests to their children.  
90 per cent would place 50 per cent or less of the 100,000 Yuan windfall in the long-term 
care (LTC) box, and the mean amount is 33113 Yuan. Only 4 per cent would keep the entire 
windfall for future health case expenses. Rural Chengdu (Table 11, Appendix E) appear to 
have an especial propensity towards an intentional bequest motive with an average amount 
of only 21180 Yuan put in the LTC box, and none respondents indicating more than 50 per 
cent. The mean for retired respondents is slightly higher than for working, but the difference 
is not significant at a 5 per cent level. There is no particular pattern over the age distribution. 
These results indicate that bequest motives are more important to respondents than what 
seems to be the case when respondents are asked to rank saving motives directly. Together, 
the findings support the proposition of Dynan et al. (2002) of a dual role of savings, both as 
future bequests and as a precautionary buffer against health shocks or other contingencies. 
She argues that if wealth not is absorbed by a contingency such as a health shock, it will be 
available for transfer or bequests. These bequests are valued high enough for the parents to 
keep large amounts of wealth for their cause, but not higher than that they will be retrieved 
for own use in the case of expensive heath shocks or other contingencies. 
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Figure 5: Relative Strength of Bequest Motive.  
 
Bequest Motive and Annuities  
Table 4 shows the results of another scenario-based question. Here, respondents are asked to 
make a trade off between a life-cycle motive and a bequest motive for holding wealth 
throughout retirement (Q8.6). In this short scenario, respondents were asked about their 
willingness to participate in a pension program and annuitize their wealth at no cost. Thereby 
they would remove any risk of uncertain longevity and be given the opportunity to maximize 
their consumption until their time of death. 
Table 4: Relative Strength of Bequest Motive 2. Tabulated answers to question 
8.6. Respondents were asked about their willingness to participate in a pension 
program and annuitize their wealth at no other costs than giving up the possibility of 
leaving bequests. 
Shanghai'
Urban
Shanghai'
Rural
Chengdu'
Urban
Chengdu'
Rural
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Base=All(Respondents 600 150 150 150 150
Yes，(I(would(definitely(participate 1% = 1% = 1%
Yes，(I(would(likely(participate 8% 3% 2% 15% 11%
I(am(indifferent(between(participating(and(not 7% 11% 3% 9% 6%
No，(I(would(likely(not(participate 40% 55% 41% 37% 28%
No，(I(would(definitely(not(participate 44% 31% 53% 39% 53%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Top2 9% 3% 3% 15% 13%
Bottom2 84% 85% 94% 76% 81%
Total
City
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84 per cent of the total sample would “likely not” or “definitely not” participate78. Even if 
we restrict the sample to those who indicate that their primary motives of saving is to ensure 
income throughout retirement, 82.5 per cent would still “likely not” or “definitely not” 
participate. More than half of the respondents would “definitely not” participate in rural 
Chengdu, a significantly larger proportion than in the urban areas both in Shanghai and 
Chengdu79.  
Also these findings indicate that bequest motives are important reasons for many elderly to 
hold wealth throughout retirement. Moreover, seen together with the findings in Figure 4 
(Primary Saving Motive), the findings correspond well with the proposition of Lockwood 
(2012) that it is favourable to hold large amounts of wealth for private transfers even for 
elderly primarily preoccupied with securing elderly life income as long as they have a 
bequest motive80.  
The theory in chapter 3 suggests two main reasons why a bequest motive may keep elderly 
from annuitizing wealth or putting aside more of their wealth for personal insurance. First, 
parents may have altruistic preferences and attach value to downward transfers because of 
shared utility. Secondly, parents may regard transfers and bequests to children as a more 
secure source of post retirement income or elderly care, through upward transfers in a 
strategic exchange, than a formal pension program. This will be tested in part 5.3. 
5.2 Strategic or Altruistic transfers 
The findings in 5.1.4 suggest that a bequest motive might be an important reason for elderly 
Chinese to hold large amounts of wealth throughout retirement. This corresponds to the large 
amounts of intergenerational transfers and intended bequests from the old generation 
                                                
78 The letters in the Table 4 illustrate the results of a two-proportion z-test with 0-hypothesis “larger than” for each relation 
at a 5 per cent level. For example have a significantly larger proportion of respondents in both urban and rural Chengdu 
answered “Yes, I would likely participate” than in urban and rural Shanghai. 
79 There are several possible measurement errors connected with these scenario-based question. These, and other possible 
sources of errors in the survey statistics is discussed thoroughly in chapter 4. 
80 See part 3.2.2. 
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identified in 5.1.3. In this section we will test formally for the motivation behind these large 
downward transfers and the apparent transfer motive for savings. 
We have presented two main theories for transfers that also are consistent with the 
preferences revealed in the survey data above. First, large savings might be held by elderly 
primarily because of an altruistic transfer motive, but also serve a role as self insurance to be 
retrieved for own consumption in given states of the world. Another explanation for the 
revealed importance both of intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving can be that 
risk sharing happens in direct interaction with children as proposed by the strategic exchange 
model presented in section 3.3.2. In this case, wealth is held throughout retirement mainly in 
order to repay children for elderly life care or financial support, and is not necessarily based 
on an altruistic motive. In this section, we test whether intentional bequests and inter-vivos 
transfers are based on such a strategic transfer motive rather than altruism. 
The survey uncovered substantial upward transfers and service provision from adult children 
to their parents. More than 65 per cent of the respondents report to receive some kind of 
assistance from their children in daily activities, and nearly 50 per cent of the respondents 
co-reside with their children. In addition do more than 60 per cent of the retired respondents 
report to receive regular financial transfers from their children. If we also include non-
monetary gifts and in-kind transfers, the number rises to 87 per cent.  
In this chapter we focus on the retired part of the sample and test whether downward 
transfers and bequests are contingent in such reciprocal transfers or services from children. 
This would imply that downward transfers and bequests are part of a strategic 
intergenerational exchanged based in personal life cycle considerations rather than altruism. 
5.2.1 Empirical Framework 
We use two basic models for the analysis, one OLS-model for the transfer amount, and one 
logit-model for the transfer motive defined as the probability of the parent having a bequest 
motive. We test directly the proposition of perfect altruism in (11) by considering the income 
differential between donor and recipient as an explanatory variable for downward transfers. 
In addition, we test directly for the three types of strategic interaction presented in part 3.3.3: 
i) upward service provision and elderly care, childassist ii) financial support to retired 
parents, upfin, and iii) intergenerational co-residence, cores.  
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Exchange need not be contemporaneous, and repayments held as bequest may indicate that 
wealth is held as leverage to ensure that children fulfil their part of a strategic interaction. 
Therefore, we test separately for amounts of inter-vivos transfers and bequest as dependent 
variables. We also perform a separate estimation for the probability of parents having a 
bequest motive. We do not estimate a model for the probability of providing inter-vivos 
transfers because close to all respondents report providing their children with some kind of 
inter-vivos transfers. In addition, we do not consider the transfer of the respondent´s current 
dwelling or other real estate as part of the intended bequest amount. This is because elderly 
parents hardly can adjust the amount of this transfer according to the extent of services and 
upward transfers provided by their children.   
The literature presented in chapter 3 indicates that demographic variables matter for 
intergenerational interaction, and we include indicators for marital status, age, number of 
children and grandchildren, and child gender. Pre-retirement income for retired parents is 
included in addition to current income as a control variable in the vector C. A 
comprehensive measurement of parental income is important to avoid that incomplete data 
on donor income cause a bias other explanatory variables. We use the natural logarithm of 
all continuous variables in order to decrease sensitivity to outliers, and improve the 
interpretation of the coefficients81. We limit the sample in this part to the retired respondents, 
and we have deleted all cases with missing values for any of the variables included in the 
estimations. All variables included in the estimation are described in detail in section 5.1.1. 
The OLS estimation model for the downward transfer amounts is 13   𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! = 𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐! +   𝛽!𝑢𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑛! +   𝛽!𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡! +  𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠! +   𝛽!  𝐶! +   𝜖!  
and is estimated for total amount of downward transfers, total amount of downward inter-
vivos transfers and total intended amount of bequests. Households are indexed as i.  
                                                
81 Subsequent to a study of scatter plots for the most relevant variables, and substantial testing and failing with various 
functional forms, we consider the logarithmic relationship to fit best into a linear regression model. 
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We also estimate the bequest decision as the probability of a respondent to leave bequest by 
using the following logit-model 14 Prob beq! = 1 = 𝛿! +   𝛿!𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒! + 𝛿!𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐! +   𝛿!𝑢𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑛! +   𝛿!𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡! +  𝛿!𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠! +   𝛿!  𝐶! + 𝜖!     
Both the altruism and exchange model predict a positive effect for parental income on 
transfer amount and bequest decision, 𝛽!and 𝛿!: under altruism the parent will transfer 
more the poorer children are relative to the parents and under the exchange regime increased 
income will increase demand for child services. On the other hand, while the altruism model 
predicts a negative effect of child income for transfer amounts  𝛽!, the exchange model 
allows for positive effect given that a transfer occurs. The intuition is that the child require 
higher prices from the parent to be compensated for the services provided because the 
child’s marginal utility of consumption decreases with income82. For the probability of 
bequest in (14), the relationship should be inverse, and 𝛿! negative, if increased income lead 
to an increased opportunity cost in providing a particular service. The child’s supply price 
may then rise to a level at which she prices herself out of the bargaining arrangement with 
the parent in order to be compensated for the first unit of services (Cox, 1987). 
The exchange model predicts a positive relationship between upward services and a transfer 
motive. Applying the basic exchange model to all types of exchange thus predicts positive 
coefficients 𝛽! to 𝛽! and 𝛿!  to  𝛿!. An altruistic model would predict no relation: Parents 
harbour intergenerational altruism towards their offspring and wish to transfer wealth 
whether or not the children provide something in return83.   
5.2.2 Estimates 
In this section we present the findings from the model estimations in Table 5 and discuss 
them in light of the literature presented in part 3.3. First, we use the income-transfer equation 
                                                
82 Cox (1987) show that such a positive relationship between child income and downward transfer amounts is 
consistent with the exchange model only if the elasticity of services in regard of the implicit price is less than unity in 
absolute value. 
83 Positive coefficients for child services could also imply a relation of mutual altruism between the generations. The tests 
for direct exchange therefore need to be complemented with the estimates on income-transfer differentials in order to reject 
the altruistic model. This is discussed further in section 5.2.3. 
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in (11) to test the pure altruistic motive for transfers. Our findings cast doubt on the altruistic 
model, but are consistent with an exchange model for intergenerational transfer. 
Subsequently, we therefore test directly for the three types of strategic exchange. 
Income-transfer Differentials 
We observe a positive relation on child income and downward transfers that cast doubt on 
the altruism model. As reviewed in part 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the altruistic model predicts a 
negative coefficient for recipient’s earnings both for probability of transfer (regression 4) 
and transfer amount (regression 1-3), while the exchange model allow for a positive 
coefficient in the amount regression. The effect is positive for all types of downward 
transfers, and significant for all but bequests84. A 10 per cent increase in child income is 
related to a 1.66 per cent increase total downward transfers received, and as much as a 2.7 
per cent increase in total inter-vivos transfers. We also observe a positive and significant 
effect for parental pre-retirement income, but this is compatible both with the exchange 
model and with altruism. Under the exchange regime, increased income-level will increase 
demand and payments for child services and under altruism the parent will transfer more to 
relatively poorer children.  
The pure altruism model, testable by the income-transfer differentials in (11), predicts that a 
one per cent increase in recipient income, coupled by an equal decline in donor income 
should, reduce transfers by one per cent. Under the null hypothesis of altruism the 
coefficient for child income less the coefficient for parental earnings should therefore sum to 
-1. The actual estimate for the log of child income less the log of current parental income is 
0.34, and the hypothesis of perfect altruism is therefore rejected85.  
To gain further insights into the nature of a possible strategic intergenerational exchange we 
test directly for child assistance, co-residence, and financial support to retired parents as 
predictors of the probability and amount of downward transfers and bequests. 
                                                
84 A positive relationship between recipient income and transfer amount have also been presented in other empirical 
investigations into intergenerational transfers. See for example Cox (1987), Shelton and Sueyoshi (1995) and Cox et al. 
(1998). 
85 The Wald test statistic is 72.21, and the 0-hypothesis for altruism is rejected at all normal significance levels. 
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Elderly Care and Assistance 
The exchange model presented by Cox (1987) predicts that assistance and services provided 
from children to their elderly parents are positively related to downward transfers and 
bequests. Outside the basic model, repayment need not be contemporaneous and transfers 
can be held as bequest to ensure bargaining power over children (Bernheim et al., 1985) or 
be given as lump sum inter-vivos transfer if children face liquidity constraints or taxation 
favour early transfers (Lillard and Willis, 1997; Cox and Jimenez, 1990).  
We find support for strategic exchange involving elderly life care and assistance from 
children. Parents that receive assistance from children several days a week give on average 
16 per cent higher total transfer to their children compared to respondents who do not 
receive any assistance from their children. A change from zero to 100 in childassist give a 
per cent change in total downward transfer of 100 ∗ 100 ∗   𝑒!.!!"# − 1 = 16.01%. The 
effect is significant at a 7% significance level. The effect is also significant for inter-vivos 
transfers, but not for bequest amounts. There is a positive but non-significant effect for the 
probability of parents receiving transfers holding a bequest motive in regression (4) 86.   
These findings indicate that parents reward children that provide assistance and elderly care. 
Indeed, rather than consuming these services in the market, many elderly seem to rely on 
children for elderly care, and hold wealth throughout retirement in order to compensate them 
accordingly through increased bequests or lump-sum inter-vivos transfers. Together with 
positive coefficient for child income, this finding indicates that parents have a somewhat 
inelastic demand for child services, and choose to compensate children for their services 
even as the price increases with child income. 
Intra-Family Annuity Markets 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) suggested that downward transfers from parents were 
contingent in regular financial support from adult children in order to share the parent’s 
longevity risk. We find no support for this theory in the full sample of retired respondents. 
Indeed, for the explanatory variable of financial support to retired parents, upfin, we observe 
                                                
86 Increasing childassist from zero to 100 we would expect to see a 16.6 per cent increase in the odds of the parents holding 
bequest motive: 𝑒!.!!"## − 1 ∗ 100 = 1.16614   
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a weak negative relation both for the probability of bequest and for the value of total down 
transfers.  
The negative coefficients however, are largely due to relatively high downward transfers 
from parents to children that are not providing any financial support. If we exclude these 
“non-events” and restrict the sample to those retired respondents that receive financial 
support from children, the coefficient for upfin turns positive and significant (Table 12, 
Appendix F). We observe that financial support to parents increase the probability of a 
bequest motive substantially (regression 4), and furthermore that a 10 per cent increase in 
monthly financial support to retired parents relate to nearly 3 per cent increase in total 
downward transfers on average (regression 1). The relationship is positive and significant 
both for inter-vivos transfers and for bequests.  
These findings correspond well with the strategic model for intergenerational transfers 
presented in part 3.3.2: Altruistic parents will provide large transfer to children whether or 
not they provide something in return. In this case, the child’s participation constraint is not 
binding and the child does not enter into an exchange with the parent. Less altruistic parent 
however, provide unconditional transfers that are so small that the child is better off entering 
into a strategic exchange. This imply those parents who transfer wealth to their children even 
though they do not receive income support can be regarded as altruistic, while those parents 
who receive financial support have entered a strategic exchange with their children. A closer 
investigation in to the characteristics of the two groups reveal that the altruistic group, a bit 
less than 40 per cent of the retired sample, has a significantly higher income level than the 
non altruistic group87. This confirms findings in the literature that altruism is strongest 
among the most affluent (Brown and Weisbenner, 2002) 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) suggested that all downward transfers should be left as bequests 
to enhance parent bargaining power over children. We find a significant positive relationship 
both in the equation for bequests and inter-vivos transfer in Table 12 in Appendix F, with the 
coefficient in the inter-vivos equation being about two thirds of that in the bequest 
                                                
87 We use a two sample unpaired mean comparison ttest of the monthly net income in the two groups,and find the 
difference in means to be significant at any popular significance level. 
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equation88. The relationship between upward transfers and downward inter-vivos transfer 
can be explained by children that require to be paid party up front to enter the strategic 
exchange, liquidity constraints for children at early stages of life, or favourable taxation for 
inter-vivos transfers.  
Co-residence 
The coefficient for co-residence is negative and insignificant in all 3 estimation models for 
transfer amount in Table 5. We do observe a positive relationship between co-residence and 
the probability of the respondent having a bequest motive, but neither this effect is 
significant. These findings reject the hypothesis that co-residence is part of a strategic 
intergenerational exchange. Also other findings in the survey confirm this conclusion. When 
asked for the ideal living arrangement for a retired couple at good health, as much as 74 per 
cent answered “couple only”89. Moreover, among the retired respondents who co-reside with 
their children nearly 85 per cent own the dwelling themselves, and in only 7.6 per cent of the 
cases do retired respondent life in the dwelling of one of their children. 
As we saw in part 5.1, it seems that the steep increase in real estate prices have inflated real 
estate holdings as a part of elderly´s wealth after the privatization of the property markets 
and allocation of property rights in the 1990s. Few adult children are therefore capable of, or 
required to, provide housing for their parents, and the trend is rather that children co-reside 
with parents in the dwelling of the retired couple. Indeed, as we saw in section 5.1.3, 
downward transfers to support children’s housing expenses, in addition to direct transfers of 
real estate purchase, are among the largest contributors to total downward intergenerational 
transfers.  
Additional Findings 
From the logit-estimation in regression 4, we observe that respondents with many children 
are less like to have a bequest motive. Still, the OLS regressions for transfer amount 
indicated that parents with more children provide more transfers and bequests to their 
                                                
88 A 10 per cent increase in regular financial support from children is related to a 1.98 per cent in total inter-vivo transfers, 
and a 3.05 per cent increase in total intended bequests. 
89 Asked for the ideal living arrangement for a single retired person however, the corresponding number was 40 per per 
cent, with 48 per cent stating that they would prefer living with children. 
  
82 
children given that a transfer occurs90. Furthermore, we observe no significant effect on 
downward transfer on having a male child, and can thus reject the theories presented both by 
Banerjee et al. (2010) and Wei and Zhang (2011) that child gender is important for saving 
behaviour and transfer of wealth within the family. In particular, this finding oppose that of 
Wei and Zhang, who predict higher saving and downward transfers by households with sons 
in China because they compete for a spouse through wealth in a marriage market with an 
imbalanced sex ratio. Although the coefficient of childgender in regression 2 and 3 suggest 
that a male child is related to a small increase in inter-vivos transfer and a decrease in 
intended bequests, the coefficients are not significant, and we do not observe a clear 
relationship between male children and intergenerational transfers in general.  
                                                
90 Still, the total transfers does far from double for each child. The marginal effect of one extra child on total transfers is 100 ∗   𝑒!.!"# − 1 = 40.64% 
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Table 5: OLS estimates for the Natural Logarithm of (1) Total Downward 
Transfers, (2) Total Downward Inter-vivos Transfers, (3) Total Bequests, and Logit 
estimates for (4) Bequest Motive 
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5.2.3 Limitations of the Empirical Analysis 
There are a several sources of errors in the estimation models in this chapter. In addition to 
the measurement error of the variables (discussed in chapter 4), the coefficients may be 
biased because of two main reasons. First, if explanatory variables relevant for transfer 
amount or the bequest motive is omitted from the model, and secondly, if the amount of 
downward transfers or the existence of a bequest motive have a causal effect at least one of 
the explanatory variables and we have reverse causation. Both these situations would cause 
one or more of the included covariates to correlate with the error term in the estimation 
models and possibly distort all the estimates of the model. 
There are several likely candidates to omitted variables in the estimation models. First, by 
not considering transfer recipients at an individual level we are not able to control for 
individual characteristics of children. This does however not bias the included explanatory 
variables if the coefficients of the omitted variables are zero, so that they do not affect 
transfer amounts of the probability of bequests, or if the omitted variable is uncorrelated with 
the included explanatory variables. In regard of child characteristics however, we regard the 
analysis as especially sensitive for omitted child characteristics causing biased coefficients 
for the regressors childinc, upfin, cores, grandchildren and childgender. This would be the 
case if an omitted variable correlate with any of these variables in addition to affecting 
downward transfers separately. Child age and education amongst others are likely 
candidates. They are for example likely to affect for example childinc, presumably 
negatively, and might also have a separate effect on downward transfers amounts or the 
probability of bequests. If we assume also this effect to be negative, both for age and 
education, it would involve a negative bias in childinc, and that the positive effect of child 
income on downward transfer is even larger than estimated. These assumptions are of course 
uncertain and need to be tested formally in order to assess the reliability of the estimations in 
the model91.  
                                                
91 We could, for example, also assume that liquidity constrained children with more education would have a higher 
expected income and desired consumption, and therefore an increased demand for ”intergenerational loans” from their 
parents. 
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A possible source of reverse causation in the models is the effect of inter-vivos transfers on 
the explanatory variable for child income. First, financial support for the education of 
children over 18 years of age, which is included in the dependent variable for downward 
inter-vivos transfers divt, is likely to have an effect on child income, making childinc a 
possible endogenous variable. An instrument variable approach could have remedied this 
potential bias. This would require an instrumental variable that is strongly correlated to child 
income but not to parental transfers for higher education. Child capability or skills could be a 
possible candidate, but we had no relevant proxies to measure this. Secondly, we may expect 
that inter-vivos transfer in the past directly inflate current income of children. In order to 
decrease such effects however, we clearly communicated to the respondents that all 
monetary and in-kind transfers from parents should be excluded in the measurement of child 
income. 
Another possible objection to the results of the analysis in section 5.3 is that the coefficients 
for child assistance and financial support could reflect mutual altruism or reverse causality 
rather than exchange. First, the model could suffer from reverse causality in that parental 
altruism cause children two provide them with more transfers because they know that they 
will receive large transfers later. Second, the model could also suffer from an omitted 
variable bias in that child altruism affect the amount provided by both generations. This last 
error could possibly have been corrected for example by using a proxy variable for upward 
transfers. For such a proxy variable to be effective it would need to be correlated with child 
services or financial support, but not with altruism. A variable for distance could be a likely 
candidate for child services if we assume that there is no link between geographical 
closeness and affectionate or altruistic family bonds. The use of such a proxy would however 
make interpretation of the result more difficult.  
A strength of the current the analysis is that we do not only rely on direct tests of reciprocal 
intergenerational exchanges, but support the conclusion of an exchange motive by the 
positive effect of child income on transfers. This is a more discriminatory test for transfer 
motives than direct exchange observations. It is also important to stress that although the 
analysis in this chapter overall support the exchange model for family transfers, these two 
models are likely to be operative together and the empirical analysis performed here has not 
attempted to uncover which one predominates at the margin. Our findings cast doubt on the 
strong form of perfect altruism, but also identify large downward transfers that are not 
contingent in reciprocal actions from children. 
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6. Conclusion and Implications 
In this chapter we give an overview over the main findings of the thesis and review the 
limitations of the study. Ultimately we discuss the implications of the findings. 
6.1 Findings and Main Arguments 
We have found evidence for a strong intentional transfer motive in the saving behaviour of 
Chinese elderly. Furthermore we have found that the extensive inter-vivos transfers and 
intended bequests fits better to an exchange model of intergenerational transfers, than to an 
altruistic model. In this section we restate the research questions of the thesis and go through 
the main arguments for our answers. 
RQ1: To what extent is there an intentional transfer motive behind the saving 
behaviour of Chinese elderly? 
We found evidence for a strong intentional transfer motive in the saving behaviour of 
Chinese elderly.  
First, we have established that elderly in China hold substantial amount of wealth motivated 
by future downward intergenerational transfers. Even if we exclude transfers of real estate, 
the respondents report to transfer more than 6 times their yearly net income on average. 
Although the absolute amounts of transfers vary substantially across the various regions, the 
transfer-income multiplier is consistent across all regions in the sample. Real estate remains 
the single most important contributor to wealth held by elderly Chinese, and this is also 
reflected in the share of real estate in total intergenerational transfers. This is much due to 
the large housing windfalls following privatization of the property market and allocation of 
property rights in the 1990s, especially in urban areas. Rapidly rising housing prices have 
contributed to a steep increase in the real value of these windfalls. If we include real estate 
transfer, total downward transfers and intended bequests amount to 29 times yearly net 
income. Section 5.1.3 give a detailed overview over the various components of the total 
intergenerational transfers. 
Secondly, we argued that these large downward transfers from the old generation also 
translate into a considerable intentional transfer motive for saving. Despite of the fact that 
less than 10 per cent of the sample cited transfer motives as their primary motive for saving, 
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we found that most respondents were reluctant to trade away the possibility of leaving 
bequests, even in exchange for elderly life income security and health insurance.  
Based on the theory presented in chapter 3, we proposed two explanations for these 
contradictory findings. One explanation based on an altruistic model, where elderly hold 
wealth throughout retirement primarily because of an altruistic motive, but at the same time 
make use of the savings as self-insurance to be retrieved in the case of longer than expected 
longevity or future contingencies such as health shocks. Another possible explanation, not 
related to an altruistic model, is that risk sharing happens in direct interaction with children, 
and that wealth is held throughout retirement mainly in order to repay children for elderly 
life care or financial support and risk sharing.  
Triggered by the curiosity regarding the contradictory findings above, we formulated the 
second research question as:  
Research Question 2: Are intentional intergenerational transfers in China motivated 
by altruistic or strategic behaviour? 
We rejected the pure altruistic model, and found some support for two of the three proposed 
types of intergenerational exchange. 
First, we found a positive relationship between child income and downward transfer 
amounts. This rejects the altruism hypothesis and is consistent with intergenerational 
exchange.  
We also tested three types of intergenerational exchange directly. First, we found a positive 
relationship between downward transfers and elderly-care provided by adult children to 
retired parents. Furthermore, we found that the amount of periodic financial support to 
retired parents is significantly correlated to the amount of bequests and inter-vivos transfers 
provided by parents. The effect is largest for intended bequests, suggesting that parents hold 
wealth until the time of death in order to enhance bargaining power over children in an intra-
family annuity market as proposed by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). This effect is however 
limited to those households where retired parents receive financial support from children. 
For the entire sample we find a negative relation between financial support from children 
and downward transfers, largely due to high downward transfers to children that are not 
providing any financial support. This suggests that for a substantial number of elderly, 
altruistic concerns exceed precautionary ones, and decisions regarding bequests and inter-
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vivos transfers are not related to upward financial support. For others however, children are 
used as a mean to secure income throughout retirement and required to enter into a strategic 
exchange with parents in order to ensure future downward transfers.  
Lastly, we find no evidence for co-residence between children and parents being related to 
neither the probability of bequests nor the transfer amounts. This is consistent with other 
findings in the survey indicating that elderly parents value living separately from their 
children as long as they are economically capable of doing so92. 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations to this study. Most importantly there are a number of sources 
for error to the survey statistics themselves as discussed in section 4.2 and 4.3. These can be 
separated in to errors connected with the representation of the target population on one hand, 
and errors related the measurement instruments on the other.  
First, there are apparent errors in the representation of our target population due to the time 
and resource constraints of the project. These include sampling errors and both unit- and 
item nonresponse errors. The most severe source of error in regard of representation is our 
lack of success in creating complete population list of the sampling frame from which we 
could draw a probability sample. Moreover, because we did not revisit sampled respondents 
that were unavailable we have a substantial number of unit non-response, causing a possibly 
large error in survey statistics if the difference between respondents and non-respondents is 
large. Because of screening procedures that eliminated respondents unwilling to co-
operate or to provide sensitive information we have relatively low levels of item non-
response. The screening also helped to obtain more accurate data on sensitive questions from 
the respondents. There is however a risk for a substantial bias concerning those respondents 
who were turned away. Inclusion of all sampled respondents would however not remove the 
risk of biased survey statistics. In the pilot survey we included respondents reluctant to 
provide sensitive information, resulting in a large number of item nonresponse, high 
                                                
92 Admittedly, the issue of co-residence and housing deserve more attention than was possible to include in this thesis. The 
dataset also include detailed information on house ownership, value, and past, current and intended housing arrangements. 
This data may be valuable in order to better understand the role of co-residence and housing arrangements in capital 
accumulation of elderly. 
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variance and many outliers on central variables. Due to the length of the survey and the in-
person interview method, we thus concluded that there was too large a cost involved in 
interviewing respondents unwilling to cooperate. 
Secondly, there are possible errors related to the measurement of the variables. Although we 
made an effort to ensure that the measurement instruments were relevant in a Chinese 
setting, and three individual parties were involved in the translation, uncertainties remain 
whether the translation conveyed accurately the intended meaning of the questions. 
Furthermore, by using a closed question questionnaire we run the risk of constraining the 
respondents and oversee important variables. This also introduced threats to the quality of 
the survey instruments including the use of scales and development of alternatives. Much of 
the data gathered was especially vulnerable to measurement errors between the true values of 
respondents and the measured value. An example of this is that the data may suffer from 
respondents over-reporting wealth they create self and the amount they give to other – and 
under-reporting what is given to them.  
There are also several sources of error for the coefficients in the estimation models in section 
5.3. Most importantly there are several likely candidates for omitted variables including 
child age and education. There might also be a reverse causality causing endogenous 
explanatory variables. For example may parental altruism affect upward transfers from 
children, or parental investments in the education in children might have caused their income 
to rise. 
6.3 Discussion and Implications 
The findings presented above provide new and interesting insights into the saving behaviour 
of the old generation in China. Most studies reviewed in chapter 2 reject or do not consider a 
transfer motive at all. Indeed, Modigliani and Cao (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2010) argue 
that parental saving should decrease with the number of children because adult children 
provide elderly with income security trough large upward transfers93. Our data confirm that 
                                                
93 In the last paragraph in chapter 2, we posed the question of whether children in this way serve as a mean for saving and can be
considered a substitute for life-cycle savings, or whether children could be a motivation for saving themselfes through strategic 
exchange or altruism.
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adult children provide income security and old age support to retired parents. However, we 
also find that those children require to be compensated through increased bequests or larger 
lump sum inter-vivos transfers for their wedding, housing purchase or education. This 
indicates that parents are required to hold large savings throughout elderly life, even if they 
largely depend on children for support and services. It can also explain why so many elderly 
report income security and precaution as their main saving motives at the same time as they 
transfer large parts of their wealth to children. In addition, because most of the downward 
transfers identified ultimately are motivated by the insurance needs and life-cycle 
considerations of the old generation, it may not be likely for savings to decrease substantially 
even if the bequest motive should disappear, for example as a result of a confiscatory estate 
or gift tax. 
The fact that we largely reject altruism, and find supportive evidence for a strategic motive 
behind intergenerational transfers also carry other important implications. It is often argued 
that with the existence of substantial private transfers, the benefits of public programs on 
recipients might be less than expected if they provoke crowding out of private transfers. As 
showed in 3.2 however, the degree of crowding out of private transfer will depend if they are 
altruistically or strategically motivated. While altruistic donors would decrease transfers to 
relatives who benefit from more government aid, strategic transfers might increase with 
recipient income. This means that in an extreme case, strategic private transfers can reinforce 
rather than offset public transfers (Cox and Rank, 1992). In general, much of the interest in 
altruistic models for wealth accumulation and intergenerational transfers is founded in the 
fact that such models may produce a neutrality result in which any governmental 
intergenerational transfers funded by borrowing will be neutralized by adjustments in private 
transfers. By rejecting the pure altruism hypothesis we also reject such a ”Ricardian 
Equivalence” conclusion, despite identifying significant amounts of bequests. This implies 
that public income redistribution may indeed affect the distribution of economic welfare.  
The ability to make a sound judgement on altruism, and thus discuss the implications of the 
neutrality result surpass the potential of many other investigations in to bequests and 
intergenerational transfers, such for example the accounting exercises performed in the 
seminal papers of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and Modigliani (1988). These papers are 
not very useful for testing the significance of the neutrality result because they do not reveal 
whether altruism or other motives are behind the transfers. 
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Lastly, large inter-vivos transfers and bequests are also likely to affect the inequality of 
wealth distribution in China. Even when motivated by intergenerational exchange, we have 
found that absolute transfer amounts are strongly related both to donor and recipient income, 
and recipient dependence on these transfer may contribute to reduce the income mobility in 
the Chinese society. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Error Sources in the Survey and Sample Design 
Figure 6: A sketch of the successive steps in the survey process, and possible mismatches 
leading to error in the survey statistics.  
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Appendix B: Districts Selected for Sampling 
Table 6: Per capita income (in Yuan) of urban and rural Residents in districts at 
county level, Chengdu (2010). Areas marked green were designated for sampling. 
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 
DISTRICT
PER CAPITA 
INCOME 
(YUAN)
Rural Areas
Total Average 10,626¥       
Longquanyi 13,376¥       
Qingbaijiang 13,162¥       
Xindu 12,607¥       
Wenjiang 11,864¥       
Jintang 11,370¥       
Shuangliu 10,971¥       
Pixian 10,779¥       
Dayixian 10,566¥       
Pujiangxian 9,885¥         
Xinjinxian 9,790¥         
Dujiangyan 8,797¥         
Pengzhou 8,689¥         
Gonglai 8,621¥         
Chongzhou 8,486¥         
Urban Areas
Total Average 30,231¥       
Jinjiang 35,277¥       
Qingyang 32,222¥       
Jinniu 29,574¥       
Wuhou 28,144¥       
Chenghua 25,937¥        
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Table 7: Average cost of real estate per square meters in urban and rural Shanghai, 
2010 (in Yuan). Districts marked green were designated for sampling.  
Source: Hycon Research 
DISTRICT REAL ESTATE COST (YUAN)
Urban Shanghai
Jingan 43,100¥            
Changning 36,600¥            
Huangpu 36,400¥            
Xuhui 30,000¥            
Hongkou 26,700¥            
Urban1Pudong 25,000¥            
Yangpu 24,100¥            
Zhabei 23,000¥            
Putuo 22,600¥            
Urban1Minhang 21,400¥            
Urban1Baoshan 21,000¥            
Urban1Jiading 20,800¥            
Urban1Songjiang 19,700¥            
Rural Shanghai
Rural1Minhang 20,300¥            
Baoshan 18,200¥            
Rural1Jiading 16,000¥            
Rural1Songjiang 14,900¥            
Fengxian 11,900¥            
Jinshan 8,200¥              
Chongming 6,300¥               
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Map 1: Map of China showing the geografical location of Chengdu (Sichuan) and 
Shanghai. Source: Google Maps. 
 
Map 2: Map showing the designated districts for sampling in rural Chengdu (blue), 
and the excluded districts (red). Source: Google Maps. 
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Map 3: Map showing the designated districts for sampling in urban Chengdu (blue), 
and the excluded districts (red). Source: Google Maps. 
 
 
Map 4: Map showing the designated districts for sampling in urban Shanghai (blue), 
and two out of the seven excluded districts (red). The remaining five excluded areas 
does not appear on the map. Source: Google Maps. 
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Map 5: Map showing the designated districts for sampling in rural Shanghai (blue), 
and the excluded districts (red). Source: Google Maps. 
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Appendix C: Overview of Screening and Non-response 
Table 8: Overview of sampled persons not completing the survey. 
Chengdu Shanghai
Non-.Response
Refuse&to&participate 862 1529
Not&at&home 331 1230
Withdraw&during&Interview 31 89
Total.Non.Reponse 1224 2848
Excluded.During.Screening
Q"1.1:"Not"over"50"years 21 983
Q"1.3:"No"Children"over"18"Years 14 126
Q1.4a:"Area"of"Resience"Outside"Designated"Region 21 156
Q"Ex1:"Unwilling"to"Answer"Question"on"Household"Income 19 0
Q"Ex2:"Financial"Decision"Maker"not"at"Home 16 30
Q"Ex3:"Unwilling"to"Provide"Sensitive"Information 0 0
Q"7.1:"Unwilling"to"Answer"Question"on"Total"Savings 43 356
Total.Exclusions.During.Screening 134 1651   
Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9: Number of respondents sampled in each district, age and employment 
status. 
Shanghai'
Urban
Shangh
ai'Rural
Chengd
u'
Cheng
du'
50355 56360 61365 65'

Workin
g
Retire
d
(A) (B) (C) (D) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
Base=All(Respondents 600 150 150 150 150 169 160 122 149 236 364
Pudong(district 20 20 = = = 6 7 5 2 12 8
Zhabei(district 25 25 = = = 10 8 4 3 11 14
Xuhui(district 25 25 = = = 6 7 6 6 11 14
Yangpu(district 30 30 = = = 14 8 3 5 7 23
Putuo(district 25 25 = = = 5 11 5 4 9 16
Hongkong(district 25 25 = = = 6 9 4 6 9 16
Baoshan(district 32 = 32 = = 8 5 11 8 12 20
Fengxian(district 27 = 27 = = 11 8 3 5 16 11
Jinshan(district 29 = 29 = = 8 7 5 9 13 16
Jiading(district 35 = 35 = = 6 5 7 17 7 28
Songjiang(district 27 = 27 = = 10 7 3 7 12 15
Qingyang(district 51 = = 51 = 14 13 12 12 22 29
Wuhou(district 54 = = 54 = 14 13 12 15 15 39
Jinniu(district 45 = = 45 = 11 12 10 12 23 22
Dayi(district 20 = = = 20 5 6 4 5 8 12
Pixian(district 29 = = = 29 8 7 7 7 12 17
Xindu(district 29 = = = 29 9 6 7 7 8 21
Xinjin(district 26 = = = 26 6 7 6 7 13 13
Dujiangyan(district 28 = = = 28 7 8 6 7 11 17
Gonglai(district 18 = = = 18 5 6 2 5 5 13
Total 600 150 150 150 150 169 160 122 149 236 364
Total
City Age Employement'
Status
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics on selected socioeconomic variables for the full 
sample, by region. See section 5.1.1 for description of variables. 
Region	   Variable	   Mean	   p50	   Standard	  
Deviation	  
N	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
UrbanShanghai	   retired	   0.61	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   age	   59.14	   58	   6.77	   150	  
	   children	   1.18	   1	   0.46	   150	  
	   grandchild~n	   0.62	   0	   0.93	   150	  
	   cores	   0.55	   1	   0.5	   150	  
	   female	   0.61	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   married	   0.92	   1	   0.27	   150	  
	   savings	   93,318.33	   30,000.00	   208335.48	   150	  
	   ownhouse	   0.75	   1	   0.43	   150	  
	   ownre	   0.12	   0	   0.33	   150	  
	   realest2	   1.58E+06	   750000	   2.07E+06	   150	  
	   income	   4,651.69	   3,800.00	   2,164.50	   59	  
	   princome	   2,549.45	   1,750.00	   2,319.17	   91	  
	   rcincome	   5,831.32	   5,500.00	   3,091.35	   91	  
	   saving	   773.15	   100	   1,137.48	   149	  
	   pension1	   1	   1	   0	   150	  
	   pension	   3,177.01	   3,750.00	   1,511.29	   149	  
	   health_oop	   0.23	   0.2	   0.13	   150	  
	   health_spe~g	   1,243.24	   750	   1,497.15	   148	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
RuralShanghai	   retired	   0.6	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   age	   61.29	   61	   7.12	   150	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   children	   1.65	   2	   0.7	   150	  
	   grandchild~n	   1.57	   2	   0.94	   150	  
	   cores	   0.39	   0	   0.49	   150	  
	   female	   0.51	   1	   0.5	   150	  
	   married	   0.91	   1	   0.28	   150	  
	   savings	   25,941.67	   7,500.00	   34,366.92	   150	  
	   ownhouse	   0.92	   1	   0.27	   150	  
	   ownre	   0.07	   0	   0.25	   150	  
	   realest2	   819051.72	   375000	   1.44E+06	   145	  
	   income	   3,294.58	   1,900.00	   2,656.25	   60	  
	   princome	   1,572.22	   750	   1,735.33	   90	  
	   rcincome	   2,920.00	   2,500.00	   1,922.41	   90	  
	   saving	   151.33	   0	   452.54	   150	  
	   pension1	   0.95	   1	   0.21	   150	  
	   pension	   1,459.62	   1,750.00	   977.63	   143	  
	   health_oop	   0.29	   0.2	   0.19	   150	  
	   health_spe~g	   1,293.92	   750	   1,624.57	   148	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
UrbanChengdu	   retired	   0.6	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   age	   61.39	   60	   7.44	   150	  
	   children	   1.64	   1	   0.75	   150	  
	   grandchild~n	   1.5	   1	   1.12	   150	  
	   cores	   0.45	   0	   0.5	   150	  
	   female	   0.69	   1	   0.46	   150	  
	   married	   0.85	   1	   0.35	   150	  
	   savings	   19,251.67	   7,500.00	   29,150.10	   150	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   ownhouse	   0.97	   1	   0.16	   150	  
	   ownre	   0.07	   0	   0.26	   150	  
	   realest2	   706166.67	   375000	   959183.52	   150	  
	   income	   3,270.83	   3,500.00	   2,263.04	   60	  
	   princome	   1,770.00	   1,750.00	   1,417.04	   90	  
	   rcincome	   2,876.11	   2,500.00	   1,635.58	   90	  
	   saving	   359.33	   0	   939.52	   150	  
	   pension1	   1	   1	   0	   150	  
	   pension	   1,466.33	   1,750.00	   971.39	   150	  
	   health_oop	   0.24	   0.2	   0.13	   150	  
	   health_spe~g	   1,329.39	   750	   1,310.94	   148	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
RuralChengdu	   retired	   0.62	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   age	   60.86	   60	   6.32	   150	  
	   children	   1.59	   1	   0.67	   150	  
	   grandchild~n	   1.55	   1	   1.03	   150	  
	   cores	   0.59	   1	   0.49	   150	  
	   female	   0.57	   1	   0.5	   150	  
	   married	   0.91	   1	   0.28	   150	  
	   savings	   20,166.67	   7,500.00	   30,227.00	   150	  
	   ownhouse	   0.97	   1	   0.18	   150	  
	   ownre	   0.05	   0	   0.21	   150	  
	   realest2	   101333.33	   75,000.00	   124412.6	   150	  
	   income	   2,026.32	   1,900.00	   1,365.26	   57	  
	   princome	   1,371.24	   900	   922.98	   93	  
	   rcincome	   1,123.92	   900	   899.75	   93	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   saving	   56.67	   0	   264.3	   150	  
	   pension1	   0.74	   1	   0.44	   150	  
	   pension	   659.68	   400	   597.57	   111	  
	   health_oop	   0.24	   0.2	   0.18	   150	  
	   health_spe~g	   738.33	   250	   1,209.00	   150	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	   retired	   0.61	   1	   0.49	   600	  
	   age	   60.67	   60	   6.97	   600	  
	   children	   1.52	   1	   0.68	   600	  
	   grandchild~n	   1.31	   1	   1.08	   600	  
	   cores	   0.5	   0	   0.5	   600	  
	   female	   0.59	   1	   0.49	   600	  
	   married	   0.9	   1	   0.3	   600	  
	   savings	   39,669.58	   7,500.00	   111788.17	   600	  
	   ownhouse	   0.9	   1	   0.3	   600	  
	   ownre	   0.08	   0	   0.27	   600	  
	   realest2	   800441.18	   375000	   1.45E+06	   595	  
	   income	   3,321.50	   3,500.00	   2,347.27	   236	  
	   princome	   1,814.08	   1,500.00	   1,726.52	   364	  
	   rcincome	   3,178.09	   2,500.00	   2,649.80	   364	  
	   saving	   334.39	   0	   827.33	   599	  
	   pension1	   0.92	   1	   0.27	   600	  
	   pension	   1,763.61	   1,750.00	   1,419.98	   553	  
	   health_oop	   0.25	   0.2	   0.16	   600	  
	   health_spe~g	   1,149.83	   750	   1,435.76	   594	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Appendix E: Trading off Health Care and Bequests 
Table 11: Tabulated answers to question 8.8: ”Suppose you win a prize of 100,000 
Yuan and have to divide it between a bequest locked box and a long-term care 
locked box. Money placed in the bequest box cannot be accessed over your 
lifetime, but will be passed on in whole to your beneficiaries upon death. Money in 
the long-term care box can be accessed only to pay for health care (costing 50,000 
Yuan a year) for the respondent (and spouse if applicable), and will not be available 
to bequeath. How much of the 100,000 Yuan would you put in the long-term care 
box?” 
 
Shanghai'
Urban
Shanghai'
Rural
Chengdu'
Urban
Chengdu'
Rural
Base=All(Respondents 600 150 150 150 150
0(Yuan((0%) 13% 8% 18% 7% 20%
10，000(Yuan 11% 7% 5% 15% 18%
20，000(Yuan 14% 11% 11% 14% 21%
30，000(Yuan 17% 17% 11% 22% 19%
40，000(Yuan 14% 10% 5% 21% 19%
50，000(Yuan((50%) 22% 34% 37% 11% 4%
60，000(Yuan 3% 1% 3% 7% >
70，000(Yuan 1% 2% 1% 1% >
80，000(Yuan 1% 1% 1% 1% >
90，000(Yuan * > > 1% >
100，000(Yuan((100%) 4% 9% 8% > >
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Mean 33113.33 41673.33 38320 31280 21180
Total
City
 
Appendix F: Restricted Sample Estimates 
Table 12: OLS estimates for Natural Logarithm of (1) Total Downward Transfers, (2) Total 
Downward Inter-Vivo Transfers, (3) Total Bequests, and Logit estimates for (4) Bequest 
Motive. Sample restricted to cases where upfin > 0. 
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Appendix G: Survey Questionnaire, English Version 
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SCREENING PART 
 
Q 1.1 What is your year of birth? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
Note: Must 50 years old or above 
 
 
Q 1.2 What is you gender? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Male 1  
 Female 2  
 
 
Q 1.3 Do you have children born 1993 and earlier? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2 Terminate 
Note: Only those that are born 1962 and earlier AND have children born 1993 and earlier will be interviewed. 
 
 
Q 1.4a Where are you currently living? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Urban Shanghai 1  
 Rural Shanghai 2  
 Urban Chengdu 3  
 Rural Chengdu 4  
 Other Area 5 Terminate 
 
 
Q 1.4b Please name the city district where you are currently living. [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
Note: At most 50 samples in each district. 
 
 
Q Ex 1 Could you please let me know your current monthly household 
income? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <1,000 1  
 <1,500 2  
 <2,000 3  
 <2,500 4  
 <3,000 5  
 <3,500 6  
 <5,000 7  
 <7,500 8  
 <10,000 9  
 <20,000 10  
 >20,000 11  
 
 113 
 
Q Ex 2 Who would you say the main financial decision maker, you or your 
spouse? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Only myself 1  
 I would involve and have higher influence on decision 2  
 I would involve and have less influence on decision 3 Terminate 
 Others do that 4 Terminate 
 
Q Ex 3 Some of the questions will ask about private financial information 
such as income, transfers and savings., The data will be provided 
anomynously, and we guarantee that the data will be used for researh 
purposes only and not identifiable at individual level. Would you like to 
attend this interview? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2 Terminate 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 7.1 What is the value of your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s 
total) total savings, excluding accumulated contributions in pension 
systems and excluding real estate? [SA] 
Note: Total savings includes cash holdings, deposits in financial 
institutions, private savings associations (Rotating savings and credit 
associations), face value government bonds / treasury bills, stocks / 
funds 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 1,000 2  
 <2,500 3  
 <5,000 4  
 <10,000 5  
 <50,000 6  
 <100,000 7  
 <250,000 8  
 <500,000 9  
 <1,000,000 10  
 <1,500,000 11  
 <2,000,000 12  
 > 2,000,000 13  
 Refuse 14 Terminate 
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PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 1.5 Where is your place of birth? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
    
 Current Urban Shanghai 1  
 Current Rural Shanghai 2  
 Current Urban Chengdu 3  
 Current Rural Chengdu 4  
 Another urbanarea 5  
 Another rural area 6  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 1.6 What is your current Hukou status? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
    
    
 Current Urban Shanghai 1  
 Current Rural Shanghai 2  
 Current Urban Chengdu 3  
 Current Rural Chengdu 4  
 Another urban area 5  
 Another rural area 6  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 1.7 What is your marital status? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Married and living with spouse 1 Ask Q1.7.1 
 Living with partner (not married) 2 Ask Q1.7.1 
 Married but not living with spouse (for reasons such as working away 
from home, long term hospitalization or stay in elderly care 
institution) 
3 Ask Q1.7.1 
 Separated 4 Skip to Q2.1 
 Divorced 5 Skip to Q2.1 
 Widowed 6 Skip to Q2.1 
 Never married 7 Skip to Q2.1 
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[If 1 - 3 in Q 1.7, ask Q 1.7.1] 
Q 1.7.1 What is the main occupation of your spouse? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Farmer 1 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Work in family firm 2 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Non-farmer business owner (not family firm) 3 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Work in a private firm (Chinese) 4 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Work in a state owned enterprise (SOE) 5 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Work in an international company 6 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Government official / civil servant 7 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Military 8 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Housewife / househusband 9 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Retired 10 Ask Q1.7.1.1 
 Unemployed 11 Ask Q1.7.1.1 
 Disabled 12 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 Other, please specify________ 13 Skip to Q1.7.2 
 
 
[If 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1, ask Q 1.7.1.1 – Q 1.7.1.2] 
Q 1.7.1.1 From what year have your spouse been retired or unemployed? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[If 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1, ask Q 1.7.1.1 – Q 1.7.1.2] 
Q 1.7.1.2 What was the former occupation of your spouse? Please choose the 
highest ranked position that applies. [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Farmer 1  
 Work in family firm 2  
 Non-farmer business owner (not family firm) 3  
 Work in a private firm (Chinese) 4  
 Work in a state owned enterprise (SOE) 5  
 Work in an international company 6  
 Government official / civil servant 7  
 Military 8  
 Housewife / househusband 9  
 Unemployed 10  
 Disabled 11  
 Other, please specify________ 12  
 
 
[If 1 - 3 in Q 1.7, ask Q 1.7.2] [If 4 - 7 in Q 1.7, directly choose 1 in 1.7.2]  
Q 1.7.2 Who is the main economic contributor, you or current your spouse? 
[SA] 
Note: Economic contributions include income / pension benefits, in-
kind transfers and self-production. 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Respondent 1  
 Spouse 2  
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WORK AND INCOME 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 2.1 What is your main occupation? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Farmer 1 Skip to Q2.1.1 
 Work in family firm 2 Skip to Q2.1.1 
 Non-farmer business owner (not family firm) 3 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Work in a private firm (Chinese) 4 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Work in a state owned enterprise (SOE) 5 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Work in an international company 6 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Government official / civil servant 7 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Military 8 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Housewife / househusband 9 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Retired 10 Ask Q2.1.2 
 Unemployed 11 Ask Q2.1.2 
 Disabled 12 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 Other, please specify________ 13 Skip to Q2.1.4 
 
 
[If 10 or 11 in Q2.1, ask Q 2.1.2] 
Q 2.1.2 From what year have you been retired or unemployed? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[If 10 or 11 in Q2.1, ask Q 2.1.2] 
Q 2.1.3 What was your former occupation? Please choose the highest ranked 
position that applies. [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Farmer 1  
 Work in family firm 2  
 Non-farmer business owner (not family firm) 3  
 Work in a private firm (Chinese) 4  
 Work in a state owned enterprise (SOE) 5  
 Work in an international company 6  
 Government official / civil servant 7  
 Military 8  
 Housewife / househusband 9  
 Unemployed 10  
 Disabled 11  
 Other, please specify________ 12  
 
[If respondent or spouse is a farmer or work in family firm , ask Q 2.1.1] 
[If 1 or 2 in Q 2.1 or Q1.7.1, ask Q 2.1.1] 
Q 2.1.1 Do you or your spouse own the majority of the farm / family firm? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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Scenario 1:[If main economic contributor is retired/unemployed, ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.4a What was your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) pre-
retirement/pre-unemployment total yearly gross (before tax) monetary 
income? [SA] 
Note: Monetary income include wages, bonuses, earnings from self-
employment, unemployment compensation, and other monetary 
transfers and subsidies 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[If main economic contributor is retired/unemployed, ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.4b What was your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) pre-
retirement/pre-unemployment monthly average monetary net (after 
tax) income? [SA] 
Note: Monetary income includes wages, bonuses, earnings from self-
employment, unemployment compensation, and other monetary 
transfers and subsidies. 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
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[If main economic contributor is retired/unemployed, ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.5 What was your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) average 
monthly monetary value of consumption from farming and other self-
production? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 (no self production) 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[If main economic contributor is retired/unemployed, ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.6 Did you (or if applicable: your or your spouse) receive any of the 
following income in-kind? Please choose all that apply. [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Regular free meals / meal subsidy 1 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 Transportation / Public transportation subsidy 2 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 Company car 3 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 Free housing 4 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 Housing subsidy 5 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 Other in-kind subsidies or support 6 Ask Q2.1.6.1 
 No 7 Skip to Q 2.1.7 
 
 
[If 1-6 in Q 2.1.6, ask Q 2.1.6.1] 
Q 2.1.6.1 
(2.1.6a) 
What was the total average monetary value per month of income you 
(or if applicable: your and your spouse) received in-kind? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 750 4  
 < 1,000 5  
 < 2,500 6  
 < 5,000 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 < 20,000 10  
 < 30,000 11  
 > 30,000 12  
 Refuse 13  
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[If main economic contributor is retired/unemployed, ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 10 or 11 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.7 What is your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) current 
total net monthly income? This excludes pension benefits, and 
transfers from children. [SA] 
Note: Total income here includes wages (from part time jobs etc), 
unemployment compensation, consumption from farming and other 
self-production, income in-kind, and other monetary transfers and 
subsidies. 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse   
 
 
Scenario 2: 
[If main financial contributor is not retired or unemployed, ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.8a What is your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) current 
total yearly gross (before tax) monetary income? This excludes 
pension benefits, and all transfers from children. [SA] 
Note: Monetary income include wages, bonuses, earnings from self-
employment, unemployment compensation, and other monetary 
transfers and subsidies. 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
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[If main financial contributor is not retired or unemployed, ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.8b What is your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) monthly 
average monetary net (after tax) income? This excludes pension 
benefits, and transfers from children. [SA] 
Note: Monetary income include wages, bonuses, earnings from self-
employment, unemployment compensation, and other monetary 
transfers and subsidies 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[If main financial contributor is not retired or unemployed, ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.9 What is the average monthly monetary value of your (or if applicable: 
your and your spouse’s total) consumption from farming and other 
self-production? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 (no self production) 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
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[If main financial contributor is not retired or unemployed, ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[If 1 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q2.1] or [If 2 in Q 1.7.2: 1-9 or 12-13 in Q 1.7.1] ask Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.10 Do your (or if applicable: your or your spouse) receive any of the 
following income in-kind? Please choose all that apply. This 
excludes in-kind transfers from children. [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Regular free meals / meal subsidy 1 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 Transportation / Public transportation subsidy 2 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 Company car 3 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 Free housing 4 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 Housing subsidy 5 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 Other in-kind subsidies or support 6 Ask Q2.1.10.1 
 No 7 Skip to Q 3.1a 
 
 
[If 1-6 in Q 2.1.10, ask Q 2.1.10.1] 
Q 2.1.10.1 
(2.1.10a) 
What was the total average monetary value per month of income you 
(or if applicable: your and your spouse) receive in-kind? This 
excludes in-kind transfers from children. [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 750 4  
 < 1,000 5  
 < 2,500 6  
 < 5,000 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 < 20,000 10  
 < 30,000 11  
 > 30,000 12  
 Refuse 13  
 
 
PENSION 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 3.1a What type of pension program do you contribute to/receive? Please 
choose all that apply. [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Governmental pension program 1  
 Pension program provided by your employer 2  
 Commercial pension 3  
 Rural pension 4  
 Other pension system 5  
 No pension system 6  
 Not sure if contribute to / receive payments from pension system 7  
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[Ask Q 3.1b only if 1 - 3 in Q 1.7] 
Q 3.1b What type of pension program do your spouse contribute to/receive? 
Please choose all that apply. [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Governmental pension program 1  
 Pension program provided by your employer 2  
 Commercial pension 3  
 Rural pension 4  
 Other pension system 5  
 No pension system 6  
 Not sure if contribute to / receive payments from pension system 7  
 
 
[If 1-5 in Q 3.1a or Q 3.1b, ask Q 3.1.1] 
Q 3.1.1 How large are approximately your (or if applicable: your and your 
spouse’s total)  (expected) monthly pension benefits? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 150 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 7,500 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 > 15,000 10  
 I do not know 11  
 
 
[If 6 in Q 3.1a or Q 3.1b , ask 3.1.2] 
Q 3.1.2 What is your main reason for not taking part in a formal pension 
program? [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 I cannot / could not afford it 1  
 I do not need it 2  
 I do not know how to proceed to take part in a pension program 3  
 There are no suitable pension programs to take part in 4  
 I do not trust that I would receive the money I am entitled to through 
the pension systems 5 
 
 Never thought of it 6  
 Other reason 7  
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[Ask all] 
Q 3.2 Do you save / have you been saving for the specific purpose of 
elderly life income (in addition to any contributions to pension 
systems)? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
 
 
[If 1 in Q 3.2, ask 3.2.1] 
Q 3.2.1 How large fraction of your total savings  (in addition to accumulated 
contributions to pension systems) would you say is for the specific 
purpose of elderly life income? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 3.3 Do you agree with the following statement: “I believe that I am 
receiving / would receive the money I am entitled to through a 
governmental pension system?” [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Strongly agree 1  
 Agree 2  
 Neither agree nor disagree 3  
 Disagree 4  
 Strongly disagree 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 3.4 What do you regard as your main source of post-retirement income? 
If several, please mark the order of importance  [MA and rating] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Own savings / savings of spouse   
 Pension program   
 Transfer from children   
 Transfer from other family/relatives   
 Transfer from friends/others   
 Income of rent from real estate   
 Income from asset sales, real estate etc   
 Other, please specify_________   
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HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 4.1a Which health insurance scheme are you taking part in? [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Urban employee medical insurance 1  
 Urban resident medical insurance 2  
 New cooperative medical insurance 3  
 Government medical insurance 4  
 Private medical Insurance 5  
 Other medical insurance 6  
 No insurance 7  
 
 
[Ask Q 4.1b only if 1 - 3 in Q 1.7] 
Q 4.1b Which health insurance scheme is your spouse taking part in?  [MA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Urban employee medical insurance 1  
 Urban resident medical insurance 2  
 New cooperative medical insurance 3  
 Government medical insurance 4  
 Private medical Insurance 5  
 Other medical insurance 6  
 No insurance 7  
 
[If 1-6 in Q 4.1a or 1-6 in Q4.1b, ask Q 4.1.2] 
Q 4.1.2 At most, how much will your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s 
total) insurance approximately cover per year? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 1,500 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 20,000 7  
 < 50,000 8  
 > 50,000 9  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 4.2 At average, how large fraction of your costs for medical treatment and 
medicines do you pay out of pocket (costs that are not reimbursed)? 
[SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
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Q 4.2 At average, how large fraction of your costs for medical treatment and 
medicines do you pay out of pocket (costs that are not reimbursed)? 
[SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
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[Ask all] 
Q 4.3 What is your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) average 
yearly health care spending (including insurance premium)? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 1,500 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 20,000 7  
 < 50,000 8  
 > 50,000 9  
 Don't know 10  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 4.4 Do you save for the specific purpose of future health expenditures (in 
addition to any premium you pay through the health insurance)? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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[If 1 in Q 4.4, ask Q 4.4.1] 
Q 4.4.1 How large fraction of your total savings would you say is for the 
specific purpose of future health expenditures? [SA] 
Note: Stress that the respondent answers this question independent 
of the answer in Q3.2.1 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
 
 
FAMILY 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.1 How many children do you have? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
Note: At least 1. And please ask Q 5.2 – Q 5.23 for each kid. And record the answers for each kid in 
each question. 
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.2 Child #? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
CHILD BACKGROUND 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.3 What is this child’s year of birth? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.4 What is this child’s gender? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Male 1  
 Female 2  
 
 
 
 
[Ask all] 
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Q 5.4b What is the child’s biological relationship to you? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Biological child of you and your current spouse 1  
 Biological child of you only 2  
 Biological child of your spouse only 3  
 Not biological child of you or your current spouse 4  
 
  
 129 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.5a Where does the child live?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Same household 1  
 Different household, same village/neighbourhood 2  
 Different village/ neighbourhood, same county/city 3  
 Different county/city in this province 4  
 Different province 5  
 Abroad 6  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.5b Does this child live in an urban or rural area?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Urban area 1  
 Rural area 2  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.6 What Hukou status does this child hold?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Urban 1  
 Rural 2  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.7 What is the highest level of education completed by this child?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Illiterate 1  
 No formal education but capable of reading or writing 2  
 Elementary school 3  
 Middle school 4  
 High school 5  
 Vocational school 6  
 Two-/Three-Year College / Associate degree 7  
 Four-Year College / Bachelor’s degree 8  
 Post-graduate, Master’s degree 9  
 Post-graduate, doctoral degree/Ph.D. 10  
 Other, specify________ 11  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.8 What is the child’s marital status?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Married and living with spouse 1  
 Living with partner (not married) 2  
 Married but not living with spouse (for reasons such as working away 
from home, long term hospitalization or stay in elderly care 
institution) 
3  
 Separated 4  
 Divorced 5  
 Widowed 6  
 Never married (living alone) 7  
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[Ask all] 
Q 5.9 How many boys does the child have? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.10 How many girls does the child have? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[If > 0 in 5.9 or 5.10, ask Q 5.10.1] 
Q 5.10.1 Do you (or if applicable: you and your spouse) receive any assistance 
with daily tasks or financial help from the children of this child, your 
grandchildren?  [SA] 
Note:  
Assistance includes household chores, shopping, meal preparation, 
laundry, financial management, etc. 
Financial help include help with daily expenditures, covering specific 
costs (such as insurance or medical care) or paying bills. 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, assistance and financial help 1  
 Yes, financial help 2  
 Yes, assistance with daily tasks 3  
 No 4  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.11 What is the child’s main occupation? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Farmer 1  
 Work in family firm 2  
 Non-farmer business owner (not family firm) 3  
 Work in a private firm (Chinese) 4  
 Work in a state owned enterprise (SOE) 5  
 Work in an international company 6  
 Government official / civil servant 7  
 Military 8  
 Housewife / househusband 9  
 Retired 10  
 Unemployed 11  
 Disabled 12  
 Student 13  
 Other, please specify________ 14  
 
 
[If 1 or 2 in Q 5.11, ask Q 5.11.1] 
Q 5.11.1 Does the child own the (majority) of the farm / family firm? [SA] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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[Ask all] 
Q 5.12 What is the total yearly net income of this child? [SA] 
Note: Income here includes all monetary income, consumption from 
farming and self-production, and income in-kind. This excludes 
transfers from parents.  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 Refuse / Don´t Know 12  
 
 
CHILD ATTENTION 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.13 How often do you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) see, or have 
contact by phone, text, mail etc. with this child? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Every day 1  
 Almost every day 2  
 Weekly 3  
 Monthly 4  
 Every three months 5  
 Yearly 6  
 No contact 7  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.14 Does this child provide assistance to you (or if applicable: you or your 
spouse) in daily or other activities? [SA] 
Note: Assistance includes household chores, shopping, meal 
preparation, laundry, financial management, etc. 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, every day 1  
 Yes, almost every day 2  
 Yes, weekly 3  
 Yes, monthly 4  
 More seldom than monthly 5  
 No assistance 6  
 Refuse 12  
 
  
 133 
CHILD - PARENT TRANSFERS 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.15 Do you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) receive any financial 
help from this child? [SA] 
Note: Financial help include help with daily expenditures, covering 
specific costs (such as insurance or medical care) or paying bills. 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, regularly 1  
 Yes, unregularly 2  
 No 3  
 
 
[If 1 or 2 in Q 5.15, ask Q 5.15.1] 
Q 5.15.1 
(5.15a) 
What is the average monthly amount of financial help you (or if 
applicable: you and your spouse totally) receive from this child?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 50 1  
 < 100 2  
 < 250 3  
 < 500 4  
 < 750 5  
 < 1000 6  
 < 1500 7  
 < 2,500 8  
 < 5,000 9  
 < 10,000 10  
 > 10,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.16 Do you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) receive any regular non-
monetary gifts (for spring festival etc.) or in-kind transfers (such as 
provision of free meals, consumption goods etc.) from this child? This 
excludes housing, and assistance in daily activities. [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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[If 1 in Q 5.16, ask Q 5.16.1] 
Q 
5.16.1(5.1
6a) 
What is the average yearly value of the non-monetary gifts and in-kind 
transfers you (or if applicable: you and your spouse totally) receive 
from this child? This excludes housing.  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 20,000 8  
 > 20,000 9  
 Refuse 10  
 
 
PARENT - CHILD TRANSFERS 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.17 Have you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) provided / are you 
planning to provide financial help covering housing expenses for this 
child after 18 years of age? [MA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, have provided financial help for housing purchase / down 
payment mortgage 1  
 Yes, planning to provide financial help in housing purchase / down 
payment mortgage 2  
 Yes, have been helping paying rent 3  
 Yes, planning to help with paying rent 4  
 No 5  
 
 
[If 1-4 in Q 5.17, ask Q 5.17.1] 
Q 5.17.1 
(5.17a) 
What is the approximate total value of the (planned) financial help 
covering housing expenses for this child after 18 years of age? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 < 2,000,000 9  
 > 2,000,000 10  
 Refuse 11  
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[Ask all] 
Q 5.18 Are you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) planning to contribute / 
have you contributed with financial support for the wedding of this 
child? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, have contributed 1  
 Yes, planning to contribute 2  
 Yes, will probably contribute 3  
 No, have not and will not contribute 4  
 
 
[If 1-3 in Q 5.18, ask Q 5.18.1] 
Q 5.18.1 
(5.18a) 
Approximately how much have you / are you planning to contribute in 
total for the wedding of this child? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1,000 2  
 < 2,500 3  
 < 5,000 4  
 < 10,000 5  
 < 50,000 6  
 < 100,000 7  
 < 250,000 8  
 < 500,000 9  
 > 500,000 10  
 Refuse 11  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.19 Have you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) been contributing / are 
you contributing with financial support for the education (tuition etc.) of 
this child after 18 years of age? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, I have contributed 1  
 Yes, I am planning to contribute 2  
 Yes, I will probably contribute 3  
 No, I have not and will not contribute 4  
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[If 1-3 in Q 5.19, ask Q 5.19.1] 
Q 5.19.1 
(5.19a) 
What is the approximate total value of the financial support for the 
education of this child after 18 years of age? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 < 2,000,000 9  
 > 2,000,000 10  
 Refuse 11  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.20 Do you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) provide any financial 
help to this child, excluding housing expenses, and expenses related 
to wedding or education? [SA] 
Note: With financial help we mean help with daily expenditures, 
covering specific costs (such as insurance or medical care) or paying 
bills. 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, regularly 1  
 Yes, unregularly 2  
 No 3  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.21 Would you prefer leaving as large a bequest as possible to this child? 
[SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, definitely 1  
 To some extent 2  
 Unsure 3  
 No, not to a large extent 4  
 No, not at all 5  
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[If 1-4 in Q 5.21, ask Q 5.21.1] 
Q 5.21.1 
(5.21a) 
What would you regard as an appropriate amount to leave in 
monetary bequest for this child?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 2500 3  
 < 5,000 4  
 < 10,000 5  
 < 50,000 6  
 < 100,000 7  
 < 250,000 8  
 < 500,000 9  
 <1,000,000 10  
 < 2,000,000 11  
 > 2,000,000 12  
 Refuse 13  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.22 Are you planning to leave your house to this child? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 5.23 What would you regard as an appropriate value of non-monetary 
bequest for this child, excluding you house?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 > 1,000,000 9  
 Refuse 10  
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HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.1 Please specify your current living arrangement.  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 If Single, ask following items:   
 Single person household 1  
 Single with child/children 2  
 Single with parents 3  
 Single with child/children and parents 4  
 Single with siblings 5  
 Nursing home 6  
 Other, specify 7  
 If Couple, ask following items:   
 Couple alone 8  
 Couple with respondents child/children 9  
 Couple with respondents parents 10  
 Couple with parents of spouse 11  
 Couple with children and parents 12  
 Couple with his or her siblings 13  
 Other, specify 14  
 
 
[If not currently living with children, ask Q 6.1.1] 
Q 6.1.1 Are you planning to live with your children sometime in the future?  
[SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, will move in with child, child # (if applicable) 1  
 Yes, will probably move in with child, child # (if applicable) 2  
 Yes, child will move in with me/us, child # (if applicable) 3  
 Unsure 4  
 No 5  
 
 
[If 1 or 2 in Q 6.1.1, ask Q 6.1.1.1] 
Q 6.1.1.1 Are you planning to contribute financially to house purchase / housing 
expenses when moving in with children?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, 100% 1  
 Yes, more than 50% 2  
 Yes, less than 50% 3  
 No 4  
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[Ask all] 
Q 6.2 Who owns the house in which you currently are residing?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Myself / Spouse 1  
 Children, child # 2  
 Parents 3  
 Siblings 4  
 Employer / Former employer 5  
 Rent house 6  
 Government 7  
 Other: specify 8  
 
 
[If 2-4 or 8 in Q 6.2, ask Q 6.2.1 and Q 6.2.2] 
Q 6.2.1 Did you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) contribute financially to 
the purchase of this house?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, 100% 1  
 Yes, more than 50% 2  
 Yes, less than 50% 3  
 No 4  
 
 
[If 2-4 or 8 in Q 6.2, ask Q 6.2.1 and Q 6.2.2] 
Q 6.2.2 Are you you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) paying rent to the 
owner?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, market rent 1  
 Yes, below market rent 2  
 No 3  
 
 
[If 6 in Q 6.2, ask Q 6.2.3] 
Q 6.2.3 Who pays the rent?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Myself / Spouse 1  
 Children 2  
 Parents 3  
 Siblings 4  
 Employer / Former employer 5  
 Government 6  
 Other: specify 7  
 
 
[If 2 – 6 in Q 6.2.3, ask Q 6.2.3.1] 
Q 6.2.3.1 Are you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) paying rent (subletting)?  
[SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, market rent 1  
 Yes, below market rent 2  
 No 3  
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[Ask all] 
Q 6.3 What is the estimated value of the house?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 25,000 1  
 < 50,000 2  
 < 100,000 3  
 < 250,000 4  
 < 500,000 5  
 < 1,000,000 6  
 < 2,000,000 7  
 < 3,500,000 8  
 < 5,000,000 9  
 < 7,500,000 10  
 < 10,000,000 11  
 >10,000,000 12  
 Refuse 13  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.4 [if not 6 in Q 6.2:] What would be the monthly rental cost if you 
where to rent the house?  [SA] 
 
[if 6 in Q 6.2:] How much is the monthly rent? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.5 Have you ever changed living arrangement?  [SA] 
Note: Change in “living arrangement” here mean change in 
household members or change of the dwelling itself. 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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[If 1 in Q 6.5, ask Q6.5.1 – Q6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.1: When did you last change living arrangement (year)? [OE] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[If 1 in Q 6.5, ask Q6.5.1 – Q6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.2 What was your previous living arrangement? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 If Single, ask following items:   
 Single person household 1  
 Single with child/children, specify child # 2  
 Single with parents 3  
 Single with children and parents, specify child # 4  
 With siblings 5  
 Nursing home 6  
 Other, specify 7  
 If Couple, ask following items:   
 Couple alone 8  
 Couple with respondents child/children, specify child # 9  
 Couple with respondents parents 10  
 Couple with parents of spouse 11  
 Couple with children and parents 12  
 Couple with his or her siblings 13  
 Other, specify 14  
 
 
[If 1 in Q 6.5, ask Q6.5.1 – Q6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.3 Who owned the house, or covered the majority of the housing 
expenses in your previous living arrangement?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Myself / Spouse 1  
 Children 2  
 Parents 3  
 Siblings 4  
 Employer / Former employer 5  
 Government 6  
 Other: specify 7  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.6 Do you (or if applicable: you or your spouse) own other real estate?  
[SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes 1  
 No 2  
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[If 1 in Q 6.6, ask Q 6.6.1 – Q6.6.2] 
Q 6.6.1 What is the value of this real estate?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 50,000 1  
 < 100,000 2  
 < 250,000 3  
 < 500,000 4  
 < 1,000,000 5  
 < 2,000,000 6  
 < 3,500,000 7  
 < 5,000,000 8  
 < 7,500,000 9  
 < 10,000,000 10  
 >10,000,000 11  
 Refuse 12  
 
 
[If 1 in Q 6.6, ask Q 6.6.1 – Q6.6.2] 
Q 6.6.2 What is the main purpose of this real estate?  [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Bought for children, child # 1  
 2nd home / vacation house 2  
 Business purposes 3  
 Pure investment 4  
 Other: Specify 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.7 What do you see as the ideal living arrangement for a retired couple 
at good health? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Couple only 1  
 With child/children 2  
 With parents 3  
 With children and parents 4  
 With siblings 5  
 Nursing home/elderly care centre 6  
 Other, specify 7  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 6.8 What do you see as the ideal living arrangement for a retired single 
person at good health? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Alone 1  
 With child/children 2  
 With parents 3  
 With children and parents 4  
 With siblings 5  
 Nursing home/elderly care centre 6  
 Other, specify 7  
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SAVINGS BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
 [Ask all] 
Q 7.3a What is the total value of the bequests you have received from your 
parents and grandparents? [SA] 
 
a) Total monetary bequests: 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 50,000 7  
 < 100,000 8  
 < 250,000 9  
 < 500,000 10  
 < 1,000,000 11  
 > 1,000,000 12  
 Refuse 13  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 7.3b What is the total value of the bequests you have received from your 
parents and grandparents? [SA] 
 
b) Total value of non-monetary bequests: 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 50,000 7  
 < 100,000 8  
 < 250,000 9  
 < 500,000 10  
 < 1,000,000 11  
 < 2,000,000 12  
 > 2,000,000 13  
 Refuse 14  
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[Ask all] 
Q 7.4 What is your (or if applicable: your and your spouse’s total) monthly 
saving / de-saving? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 - 30,000 (de-saving) 1  
 - 20,000 2  
 - 10,000 3  
 - 5,000 4  
 - 2,500 5  
 - 1,000 6  
 - 500 7  
 - 100 8  
 0 9  
 + 100 10  
 + 500 11  
 + 1,000 12  
 + 2,500 13  
 + 5,000 14  
 + 10,000 15  
 + 20,000 16  
 + 30,000(saving) 17  
 Refuse 18  
 
 
SAVING MOTIVES 
 
BEQUEST AND TRANSFER MOTIVES 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.1 Do you agree with the following statement? ”Parents should always 
seek to leave as large bequests as possible to their children”. [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, strongly agree 1  
 Yes, agree 2  
 Neither agree nor disagree 3  
 No, disagree 4  
 No, strongly disagree 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.2 Do you agree with the following statement? ”Parents should always 
seek to contribute as much as possible to the wedding of their 
children”. [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, strongly agree 1  
 Yes, agree 2  
 Neither agree nor disagree 3  
 No, disagree 4  
 No, strongly disagree 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
 145 
Q 8.3 Do you agree with the following statement? ”Parents should always 
seek to contribute as much as possible to the housing purchase of 
their children” [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, strongly agree 1  
 Yes, agree 2  
 Neither agree nor disagree 3  
 No, disagree 4  
 No, strongly disagree 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.4 Do you agree with the following statement? ”It would be harmful for 
the reputation of a family if the parent did not leave bequest, or 
provide any financial help for wedding or housing purchase of their 
children. [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, strongly agree 1  
 Yes, agree 2  
 Neither agree nor disagree 3  
 No, disagree 4  
 No, strongly disagree 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.5 What do you regard as your most important savings motive? Please 
prioritize if several apply. [MA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Buffer against unexpected health expenditures 1  
 Ensuring income throughout retirement 2  
 Real estate/ asset purchase 3  
 Leave bequest for children or grandchildren 4  
 Inter-vivo transfer for children’s or grandchildren’s education, 
wedding or housing purchase. 5  
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SCENARIO QUESTIONS: LONGEVITY AND HEALTH RISK MOTIVES 
 
Note: In the last questions we would like to know the respondents preferences in some hypothetical 
situations. These scenarios do not illustrate any real life situations or saving products. 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.6 Suppose you where offered a pension program were you would 
receive a fixed monthly payment for your entire lifetime. 
 
You would be required to invest all of your financial savings, future 
income and the value of your non-monetary assets in the pension 
program. This would make you unable to leave any bequests for your 
children and grandchildren.  
 
In exchange you would receive a secured monthly income equal to 
your total contribution divided by expected months (calculated from 
life-expectancy calculations). You would receive the secured monthly 
income independent of how long you live.  
 
In this scenario you can also assume that there will be no unexpected 
health expenditures (regardless if you participate in the pension 
program or not). 
 
Would you participate in this program? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, I would definitely participate 1  
 Yes, I would likely participate 2  
 I am indifferent between participating and not 3  
 No, I would likely not participate 4  
 No, I would definitely not participate 5  
 
 
[Ask all] 
Q 8.7 Suppose you were offered to participate in a health insurance 
programme.  
 
When sickness occurs throughout your lifetime, the insurance will 
cover all necessary hospitalization and medical expenses. 
  
You will not make any contributions to the programme, but all your 
savings and non-monetary assets will accrue to the insurance 
programme at the time of your death. This will make you unable to 
leave any bequests for your children and grandchildren.  
 
Would you participate in this programme?[SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, I would definitely participate 1  
 Yes, I would likely participate 2  
 I am indifferent between participating and not 3  
 No, I would likely not participate 4  
 No, I would definitely not participate 5  
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[Ask all] 
Q 8.8 Suppose you win a prize of 100,000 Yuan and have to divide it 
between a bequest locked box and a long-term care locked box.  
 
Money placed in the bequest box cannot be accessed over your 
lifetime, but will be passed on in whole to your beneficiaries upon 
death.  
 
Money in the long-term care box can be accessed only to pay for 
health care (costing 50,000 Yuan a year) for the respondent (and 
spouse if applicable), and will not be available to bequeath. 
 
How much of the 100,000 Yuan would you put in the long-term care 
box? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 Yuan (0%) 1  
 10,000 Yuan 2  
 20,000 Yuan 3  
 30,000 Yuan 4  
 40,000 Yuan 5  
 50,000 Yuan (50%) 6  
 60,000 Yuan 7  
 70,000 Yuan 8  
 80,000 Yuan 9  
 90,000 Yuan 10  
 100,000 Yuan (100%) 11  
 
 
INTERVIEWER OBSERVATION 
 
Note: To be filled in after interview 
 
[To all] 
Q 9.1 Were there other persons present under interview? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 No 1  
 Spouse 2  
 Parents 3  
 Children 4  
 Other 5  
 
 
[To all] 
Q 9.2 Did these persons (other than spouse) intervene? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Yes, a lot 1  
 Sometimes 2  
 No 3  
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[To all] 
Q 9.3 Did the respondent show understanding of the questions and was the 
respondent willing to answer? [SA] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 Not willing to cooperate, and did not show understanding 1  
 Understanding, but unwilling to cooperate 2  
 Willing to cooperate 3  
 Showed to some extend understanding and willingness to cooperate 4  
 Yes, showed large understanding and willingness to cooperate 5  
 
 
*notes: 
  
• ”Spouse” is also to include partner if currently co-residing as if married but not married (2 in 1.7) 
 
• For question listed below ”you and your spouse” will be asked if the respondent currently is married 
or living with partner as if married (1-3 in Q1.7) 
  
o 2.1.7 – 2.1.10.1 
o 3.1.1 
o 4.1.2 and 4.3 
o 5.10.1 
o 5.13 – 5.20 
o 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 
o 6.6 
o 7.1 – 7.4 
  
• For 2.1.4 – 2.1.6.1 ”you and your spouse” will be asked if the respondent was married or living with 
partner as if married pre-retirement. 
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Appendix H: Survey Questionnaire, Chinese Version 
 
2012.04 
 
有关老年人理财情况调查  
 
本项调查属自愿性调查  
 
问卷编号：           
 
 
一审阅卷: ____________ 质控: _____________ 二审复核: ___________ 输入: _____         
 
 
详细地址                                                                                                                             ; 
所在城市 ______________________ 国家 ________________ 邮政编码                      ; 
电话号码  ___________________________________________ 访问日期                      ; 
访问员姓名 __________________________________________ 访问员编号                     ; 
访问开始时间 ___________________ 结束时间 ____________ 共计分钟数                    ; 
访问员签名 复核: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
区域配额     性别    
上海城镇 (125) 1  男 1 
上海农村 (125) 2  女 2 
成都城镇 (125) 3    
成都农村 (125) 4    
年龄     主要收入者工作状态  
50-55岁 (至少 10%) 1  还在工作 (30-40%) 1 
56-60岁 (至少 10%) 2  已经退休 (60-70%) 2 
61-65岁 (至少 10%) 3    
65岁以上 (至少 10%) 4    
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甄别部分 
 
Q 1.1 您在哪一年出生? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
注意：必须大于等于 50岁 
 
 
Q 1.2 记录性别 [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 男 1  
 女 2  
 
 
Q 1.3 您有在 1993年及之前出生的孩子吗? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有 1  
 没有 2 终止  
注：本问卷只适用于在 1962年或之前出生，并且有 1993年或之前出生的孩子的人 
 
 
Q 1.4a 您现在居住在哪? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 上海城镇 1  
 上海农村  2  
 成都城镇  3  
 成都农村  4  
 其它地方 5 终止  
 
 
Q 1.4b 请指出您具体的居住地。（省、市、区、县） [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
注意：每个区县最多 50名被访者。 
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Q Ex 1 请问下列哪一项最好的描述了您的家庭月收入情况呢？ [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <1,000 1  
 <1,500 2  
 <2,000 3  
 <2,500 4  
 <3,000 5  
 <3,500 6  
 <5,000 7  
 <7,500 8  
 <10,000 9  
 <20,000 10  
 >20,000 11  
 
Q Ex 2 请问谁是您家中的主要财政支配决策者呢？您还是您的配偶？[单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 仅我本人 1  
 我会参与，并且有较高的影响决策权 2  
 我会参与，但是对于最终决策的影响不大 3 终止  
 其他人决策 4 终止  
 
Q Ex 3 问卷中可能会涉及到一些比较隐私的财务信息，比如收入、转移和储
蓄。我们保证所有的数据将被严格保密，仅供本次调研所用。请问您是
否愿意参加呢？ [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2 终止  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 7.1 您（如已婚，您和您的配偶）的储蓄总共是多少？（除去您为养老金缴
纳的费用和房产）[单选 ] 
注 : 这里的储蓄包括现金，在银行等金融机构中的存款，私人储蓄组织
（民间标会和信用社），国债、股票、企业债券等的面值。 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 1,000 2  
 <2,500 3  
 <5,000 4  
 <10,000 5  
 <50,000 6  
 <100,000 7  
 <250,000 8  
 <500,000 9  
 <1,000,000 10  
 <1,500,000 11  
 <2,000,000 12  
 > 2,000,000 13  
 据答 14 终止  
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个人信息 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 1.5 您的出生地在哪? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 目前的上海城镇 1  
 目前的上海农村 2  
 目前的成都城镇 3  
 目前的成都农村 4  
 另一个城镇 5  
 另一个农村 6  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 1.6 您现在户口所在地是哪? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 目前的上海城镇 1  
 目前的上海农村 2  
 目前的成都城镇 3  
 目前的成都农村 4  
 另一个城镇 5  
 另一个农村 6  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 1.7 您的婚姻状况是? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 已婚，且与配偶居住在一起 1 提问 Q1.7.1 
 与伴侣居住在一起 （但未经婚姻手续） 2 提问 Q1.7.1 
 已婚，但是与配偶不在一起居住（比如 一方在外地工作，或在养老
院或医院居住等） 
3 提问 Q1.7.1 
 分居 4 跳问 Q2.1 
 离婚 （目前单身） 5 跳问 Q2.1 
 配偶已过世 （目前单身） 6 跳问 Q2.1 
 从未结婚 7 跳问 Q2.1 
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[如果您在 Q1.7中选择了 1-3，请回答 Q1.7.1] 
Q 1.7.1 您配偶的主要职业是? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 农民 1 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 在家族企业中工作 2 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 自营业主 3 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 在私营企业（中国）中工作 4 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 在国有企业中工作 5 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 在外资企业中工作 6 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 政府官员或公务员 7 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 军人 8 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 家庭主妇（夫） 9 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 退休 10 提问 Q1.7.1.1 
 没有工作 11 提问 Q1.7.1.1 
 残疾，无劳动能力 12 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 其他，请注明________ 13 跳问 Q1.7.2 
 
 
[如果您在 Q 1.7.1中选择了 10或 11，请回答 Q 1.7.1.1 –  Q 1.7.1.2] 
Q 1.7.1.1 您的配偶是从哪一年开始退休/失业的? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[如果您在 Q 1.7.1中选择了 10或 11，请回答 Q 1.7.1.1 –  Q 1.7.1.2] 
Q 1.7.1.2 您配偶之前的（最高）职业是什么？ [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 农民 1  
 在家族企业中工作 2  
 自营业主 3  
 在私营企业（中国）中工作 4  
 在国有企业中工作 5  
 在外资企业中工作 6  
 政府官员或公务员 7  
 军人 8  
 家庭主妇（夫） 9  
 没有工作 10  
 残疾，无劳动能力 11  
 其他，请注明________ 12  
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[如果在 Q1.7中选择 1-3，提问 Q1.7.2] [如果 Q1.7中选择 4-7，直接在 1.7.2中圈选 1] 
Q 1.7.2 谁是家庭主要经济来源的贡献者，您还是您的配偶[单选 ] 
注：“经济贡献”在此包括工资、退休金、实物转让、自营生产收入 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 您 1  
 您的配偶 2  
 
 
工作及收入情况 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 2.1 您的主要职业是? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 农民 1 跳问 Q2.1.1 
 在家族企业中工作 2 跳问 Q2.1.1 
 自营业主 3 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 在私营企业（中国）中工作 4 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 在国有企业中工作 5 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 在外资企业中工作 6 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 政府官员或公务员 7 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 军人 8 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 家庭主妇（夫） 9 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 退休 10 提问 Q2.1.2 
 没有工作 11 提问 Q2.1.2 
 残疾，无劳动能力 12 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 其他，请注明________ 13 跳问 Q2.1.4 
 
 
[如果在 Q2.1中选择 10或 11，提问 Q2.1.2] 
Q 2.1.2 您是从哪一年开始退休/失业的? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
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[如果在 Q2.1中选择 10或 11，提问 Q2.1.2] 
Q 2.1.3 您之前的（最高）职业是什么? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 农民 1  
 在家族企业中工作 2  
 自营业主 3  
 在私营企业（中国）中工作 4  
 在国有企业中工作 5  
 在外资企业中工作 6  
 政府官员或公务员 7  
 军人 8  
 家庭主妇（夫） 9  
 没有工作 10  
 残疾，无劳动能力 11  
 其他，请注明________ 12  
 
[如果被访者或者他的配偶是农民，提问 Q 2.1.1] 
[如果 Q 2.1或者 Q1.7.1中选择选项 1或者 2，提问 Q 2.1.1] 
Q 2.1.1 您或您配偶农场/家族企业的（大部分）的所有权是否归你们所有? [单
选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2  
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情况 1： 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者已经退休或者没有工作，提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 10或 11] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择 10
或 11]，则提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.4a 您退休/失业前您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）每年总收入（税前）是
多少？ [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括工资、奖金、自营收入、失业补助金、及其
他补偿或补助金。 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者已经退休或者没有工作，提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 10或 11] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择 10
或 11]，则提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.4b 您退休/失业前（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）每月总收入（税后）是多
少? [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括工资、奖金、自营收入、失业补助金、及其
他补偿或补助金。  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答 12  
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[如果主要经济来源的贡献者已经退休或者没有工作，提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 10或 11] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择 10
或 11]，则提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.5 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）从务农或其他自产活动中平均每月获得
多少收益? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 (无自产收益) 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者已经退休或者没有工作，提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 10或 11] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择 10
或 11]，则提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.6 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）得到过下列哪些实物补贴？[多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 免费餐饮/餐饮补贴 1 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 交通/公共交通补贴 2 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 公司用车 3 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 免费住房 4 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 住房补贴 5 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 其他实物补贴或补助 6 提问 Q2.1.6.1 
 没有 7 跳问 Q 2.1.7 
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[如果您在 Q 2.1.6中选了 1-6中的一项或多项，请回答 Q 2.1.6.1] 
Q 2.1.6.1 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）每月收到的实物补贴平均价值多少? [
单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 750 4  
 < 1,000 5  
 < 2,500 6  
 < 5,000 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 < 20,000 10  
 < 30,000 11  
 > 30,000 12  
 据答 13  
 
 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者已经退休或者没有工作，提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 10或 11] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择 10
或 11]，则提问 Q 2.1.4 – 2.1.7 
Q 2.1.7 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）目前每月净收入是多少？（不包括养
老金和从子女处获得的任何收入转移）  [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括工资、奖金、失业补助金、农场及自营收
入、实物补贴及其他补偿或补助金。 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答   
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情况 2: 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者还没有退休或有工作，提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 1-9或 12-13] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择
1-9或 12-13]，则提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.8a 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）当前每年总收入（税前）是多少？
（不包括养老金和从子女处获得的任何收入转移）  [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括工资、奖金、自营收入、失业补助金、及其
他补偿或补助金。  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者还没有退休或有工作，提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 1-9或 12-13] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择
1-9或 12-13]，则提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.8b 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）当前每月税后总收入是多少？（不包
括养老金和从子女处获得的任何收入转移）  [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括工资、奖金、自营收入、失业补助金、及其
他补偿或补助金。  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 300 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 7,500 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答 12  
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[如果主要经济来源的贡献者还没有退休或有工作，提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 1-9或 12-13] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择
1-9或 12-13]，则提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.9 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）从务农或其他自产活动中平均每月获得
多少收益？ [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 (无自产收益) 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[如果主要经济来源的贡献者还没有退休或有工作，提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10] 
[如果在 Q 1.7.2选择 1，且 Q 2.1中选择 1-9或 12-13] 或者  [如果 Q 1.7.2中选择 2，且 Q 1.7.1中选择
1-9或 12-13]，则提问 Q 2.1.8 – 2.1.10 
Q 2.1.10 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）得到过下列哪些实物补贴? 不包括从
子女处得到的任何实物转移。 [多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 免费餐饮/餐饮补贴 1 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 交通/公共交通补贴 2 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 公司用车 3 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 免费住房 4 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 住房补贴 5 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 其他实物补贴或补助 6 提问 Q2.1.10.1 
 没有 7 跳问 Q 3.1a 
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[如果在 Q 2.1.10回答 1-6，则提问 Q 2.1.10.1] 
Q 2.1.10.1 您（或如已婚，您和您的配偶）每月收到的实物补贴平均价值多少？
不包括从子女处得到的实物转移。  [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 750 4  
 < 1,000 5  
 < 2,500 6  
 < 5,000 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 < 20,000 10  
 < 30,000 11  
 > 30,000 12  
 据答 13  
 
 
养老金 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 3.1a 您缴纳/获得下列哪种养老金. [多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 国家基本养老保险 1  
 企业为个人提供的养老保险 2  
 商业养老保险 3  
 农村社会养老保险 4  
 其他，请说明：________ 5  
 无养老金 6  
 不确定是不是缴纳/获得任何形式的养老金计划 7  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 1.7中选了 1-3，请回答 Q 3.1b] 
Q 3.1b 您的伴侣缴纳/获得下列哪种养老金？[多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 国家基本养老保险 1  
 企业为个人提供的养老保险 2  
 商业养老保险 3  
 农村社会养老保险 4  
 其他，请说明：________ 5  
 无养老金 6  
 不确定是不是缴纳/获得任何形式的养老金计划 7  
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[如果您在 Q 3.1a或 Q 3.1b中选了 1-5中的一项或多项，请回答 Q 3.1.1] 
Q 3.1.1 您（如已婚，您和您配偶）每月的养老金（预计）是多少? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 150 1  
 < 300 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 7,500 7  
 < 10,000 8  
 < 15,000 9  
 > 15,000 10  
 不知道 11  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 3.1a或 Q 3.1b中选了 6，请回答 Q 3.1.2] 
Q 3.1.2 您不加入以上选项中的养老金计划的主要原因是? [多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 我不够资金支付这些养老金计划 1  
 我不需要 2  
 我不知道该怎样才能加入 3  
 没有合适的养老金计划 4  
 我不相信我将会从政府的养老金体系中得到应得的养老金 5  
 从没有考虑过 6  
 其他原因_______ 7  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 3. 2 您是否为了养老而储蓄？（不包括您为养老金计划缴纳的费用）? [单
选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2  
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[如果您在 Q 3.2中选了 1，请回答 Q 3.2.1] 
Q 3.2.1 您觉得专门为了养老而做的储蓄占总储蓄的比例大概是多少？（不包括
您为养老金计划缴纳的费用）？ [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 3.3 您同意以下说法吗？“我相信我已经/将会能够从政府养老计划中拿到
属于我的那份钱。” [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 非常同意 1  
 同意 2  
 说不清 3  
 不同意 4  
 非常不同意 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 3.4 您认为您退休后的收入来源主要是？（先选出几种，然后根据每种的优
先顺序填入表格) [多选并排序 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 个人储蓄/配偶的储蓄   
 养老金   
 来自子女的补贴   
 来自其他亲属的补贴   
 来自朋友的补贴   
 出租房产的税收收入   
 出售房产等财产的收入   
 其他，请注明_________   
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健康与医疗 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 4.1a 您参与下列哪种医疗保险计划? [多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 城镇职工医疗保险 1  
 城镇居民医疗保险 2  
 新农村合作医疗保险 3  
 公费医疗 4  
 个人医疗保险 5  
 其他医疗保险，请指出：_______ 6  
 无 7  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 1.7中选了 1-3，请回答 Q 4.1b] 
Q 4.1b 您的配偶参与下列哪种医疗保险计划?  [多选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 城镇职工医疗保险 1  
 城镇居民医疗保险 2  
 新农村合作医疗保险 3  
 公费医疗 4  
 个人医疗保险 5  
 其他医疗保险，请指出：_______ 6  
 无 7  
 
 
[如果 Q 4.1a中选择 1-6，或者 Q4.1b中选择 1-6，提问 Q 4.1.2] 
Q 4.1.2 您（如已婚，您和您配偶）的医疗保险每年大约能覆盖多少医疗费用支
出? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 1,500 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 20,000 7  
 < 50,000 8  
 > 50,000 9  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 4.2 您为医疗费用而做的个人支出（不能报销的部分）占总医疗费用的多少
? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 4.3 您（如已婚，您和您配偶）每年在保健与医疗上的支出是多少？（包括
医疗保险缴纳费用） [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 1,500 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 20,000 7  
 < 50,000 8  
 > 50,000 9  
 不知道 10  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 4.4 您专门为了将来的医疗费用而储蓄吗？（除去为医疗保险缴纳的费用）
? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2  
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[如果您在 Q 4.4中选了 1，请回答 Q 4.4.1] 
Q 4.4.1 您觉得您为了将来的医疗费用而做的储蓄大概占您总储蓄的多少？? [
单选 ] 
注：请向被调查者强调，这个问题和 Q3.2.1 是独立的 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 <10% 1  
 <20% 2  
 <30% 3  
 <40% 4  
 <50% 5  
 <60% 6  
 <70% 7  
 <80% 8  
 <90% 9  
 <100% 10  
 
 
家庭情况 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.1 您有几个子女? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
注：至少 1个。针对每一个子女，提问 Q 5.2 – Q 5.23，并将每一个子女的答案写在相应题目边上。  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.2 子女编号? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
子女背景情况  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.3 这个子女的出生年份是? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.4 这个子女的性别是? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 男 1  
 女 2  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.4b 这个子女和您的亲缘关系是? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 您和您现在配偶的亲生孩子 1  
 只是您的亲生孩子 2  
 只是您配偶的亲身孩子 3  
 既不是您也不是您配偶的亲生孩子 4  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.5a 这个子女现在住在哪里?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 和我住在一起 1  
 和我不住在一起，但在同一个区/村 2  
 不在一个区/村，但在一个市/县 3  
 不在一个市/县，但在一个省 4  
 在不同的省 5  
 在国外 6  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.5b 这个子女是生活在城镇还是农村?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 城镇地区 1  
 农村地区 2  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.6 这个子女的户口所在地?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 城镇地区 1  
 农村地区 2  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.7 这个子女的文化水平?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 文盲 1  
 没接受过正规教育，但能读写 2  
 小学文凭 3  
 初中文凭 4  
 高中文凭 5  
 职业学校 6  
 两、三年制本科/大专文凭 7  
 四年制本科/学士学位 8  
 硕士文凭 9  
 博士文凭 10  
 其他，请说明：________ 11  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.8 这个子女的婚姻状况?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 已婚，且与配偶居住在一起 1  
 与伴侣居住在一起 （但未经婚姻手续） 2  
 已婚，但是与配偶不在一起居住（比如 一方在外地工作，或在养老
院或医院居住等） 
3  
 分居 4  
 离婚 （目前单身） 5  
 配偶已过世 （目前单身） 6  
 从未结婚（目前单身） 7  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.9 这个子女有几个儿子? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.10 这个子女有几个女儿? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[如果您在 Q5.9/5.10中的回答大于 0，提问 Q5.10.1] 
Q 5.10.1 您从这个子女的孩子，也就是您的（外）孙子女处得到日常生活帮助或
者经济资助吗？  [单选 ] 
注：  
“日常生活帮助”包括生活起居、购物、做饭、洗衣、管账，等等。 
“经济资助”在此包括日常开销的支付、特殊费用（如保险、医保等）
的缴纳、或账单的支付 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有，日常生活帮助和经济资助都有 1  
 有，只有经济资助 2  
 有，只有日常生活帮助 3  
 没有 4  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.11 这个子女的主要职业是? [单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 农民 1  
 在家族企业中工作 2  
 自营业主 3  
 在私营企业（中国）中工作 4  
 在国有企业中工作 5  
 在外资企业中工作 6  
 政府官员或公务员 7  
 军人 8  
 家庭主妇（夫） 9  
 退休 10  
 没有工作 11  
 残疾，无劳动能力 12  
 学生 13  
 其他，请注明________ 14  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 5.11中选了 1或 2，请回答 Q 5.11.1] 
Q 5.11.1 这个农场/家族企业的（大部分）的所有权是否归您的这个子女所有? [
单选 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.12 这个子女当前每年总收入税后大约是多少? [单选 ] 
定义：“收入”在此包括所有现金收入、务农及自营收入、以及实物
收入；但不包括父母的收入转移。  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 25,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 75,000 5  
 < 100,000 6  
 < 125,000 7  
 < 150,000 8  
 < 200,000 9  
 < 250,000 10  
 > 250,000 11  
 据答 12  
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子女关怀  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.13 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）和这个子女多长时间见一次面、通一次电
话、发一次短信或邮件等等? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 每天 1  
 几乎每天 2  
 每周一次 3  
 每月一次 4  
 每三个月一次 5  
 每年一次 6  
 没什么联系 7  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.14 这个子女对您或您的配偶提供日常生活上的帮助吗？[单选 ] 
注：“日常生活帮助”包括生活起居、购物、做饭、洗衣、管账，等
等。 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，每天都做 1  
 是的，几乎每天都做 2  
 是的，每周都做 3  
 是的，每月都做 4  
 有时候，但少于每月都做 5  
 没有任何帮助 6  
 据答 12  
 
 
子女 -父母收入转移  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.15 这个子女给过您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）经济资助吗? [单选 ] 
注：“经济资助”在此包括日常开销的支付、特殊费用（如保险、医
保等）的缴纳、或账单的支付 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有，经常 1  
 有，但不经常 2  
 没有 3  
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[如果您在 Q 5.15中选了 1或 2] 
Q 5.15.1 您（如已婚，您和您的配偶）平均每月从这个子女处获得多少金额的经
济资助?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 50 1  
 < 100 2  
 < 250 3  
 < 500 4  
 < 750 5  
 < 1000 6  
 < 1500 7  
 < 2,500 8  
 < 5,000 9  
 < 10,000 10  
 > 10,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.16 这个子女给过您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）非货币性的礼物或实物转移
（例如餐饮、消费品等等）吗?（不包括房产和日常生活补助）  [单
选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有 1  
 没有 2  
 
 
[If 1 in Q 5.16, answer Q 5.16.1] 
Q 5.16.1 您（如已婚，您和您的配偶）每年从这个子女得到的非货币性礼物和实
物转移总共价值多少？（不包括房产）   [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 20,000 8  
 > 20,000 9  
 据答 10  
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父母 -子女收入转移  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.17 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）为这个子女的住房费用提供过/将会提供
经济资助吗? [多选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我已出钱帮他/她买房或预交定金 1  
 是的，我将会出钱帮他/她买房或预交定金 2  
 是的，我帮他/她付过房租 3  
 是的，我将会帮他/她付过房租 4  
 没有 5  
 
 
[如果您在  Q 5.17中选了 1-4中的一项或多项，请回答 Q 5.17.1] 
Q 5.17.1 您（计划）为这个子女提供的住房补贴大概是多少? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 < 2,000,000 9  
 > 2,000,000 10  
 据答 11  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.18 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）为这个子女的结婚费用提供过/将会提供
经济资助吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我已提供过经济资助 1  
 是的，我将会提供经济资助 2  
 是的，我可能会提供经济资助 3  
 没有，而且将来也不会 4  
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[如果您在 Q 5.18中选了 1-3，请回答 Q 5.18.1] 
Q 5.18.1 您（如已婚，您和您的配偶）计划对这个子女的结婚费用大概提供多少
金额的经济资助? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1,000 2  
 < 2,500 3  
 < 5,000 4  
 < 10,000 5  
 < 50,000 6  
 < 100,000 7  
 < 250,000 8  
 < 500,000 9  
 > 500,000 10  
 据答 11  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.19 在您的这个子女年满 18 岁之后，您（如已婚，您或您的伴侣）还为他
/她提供教育费用（学费等）吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我提供过 1  
 是的，我将会提供 2  
 是的，我可能会提供 3  
 不，我没有，将来也不会提供 4  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 5.19中选了 1-3，请回答 Q 5.19.1] 
Q 5.19.1 在您的这个子女年满 18 岁之后，您（计划）为他/她提供的教育费用
（学费等）总共大概是多少? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2,500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 < 2,000,000 9  
 > 2,000,000 10  
 据答 11  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.20 除了住房、结婚与教育费用，您（如已婚，您或您的伴侣）为这个子女
还提供别的经济资助吗? [单选 ] 
注：“经济资助”在此包括日常开销的支付、特殊费用（如保险、医
保等）的缴纳、或账单的支付 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有，经常 1  
 有，但不经常 2  
 没有 3  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.21 您是否想给您的这个子女留下尽量多的遗产? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，当然 1  
 比较多 2  
 不确定 3  
 不，不会留很多 4  
 不，一点也不留 5  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 5.21中选了 1-4，请回答 Q 5.21.1] 
Q 5.21.1 您认为给这个子女留下多少遗产比较合理?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 500 1  
 < 1000 2  
 < 2500 3  
 < 5,000 4  
 < 10,000 5  
 < 50,000 6  
 < 100,000 7  
 < 250,000 8  
 < 500,000 9  
 <1,000,000 10  
 < 2,000,000 11  
 > 2,000,000 12  
 据答 13  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.22 您打算把您的房产留给这个子女吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是 1  
 否 2  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 5.23 您认为留给子女多少非货币性遗产比较合适？（不包括房产）?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 2500 1  
 < 5,000 2  
 < 10,000 3  
 < 50,000 4  
 < 100,000 5  
 < 250,000 6  
 < 500,000 7  
 <1,000,000 8  
 > 1,000,000 9  
 据答 10  
 
 
居住情况 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.1 您现在的居住情况是？  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 若单身 :   
 一个人住 1  
 和子女（们）住在一起 2  
 和父母住在一起 3  
 和子女（们）及父母住在一起 4  
 和兄弟姐妹住在一起 5  
 住在养老院 6  
 其他，请说明： 7  
 若您有配偶 :   
 我们两人一起住 8  
 我们以及我的子女 9  
 我们以及我的父母 10  
 我们以及我配偶的父母 11  
 我们以及子女和父母 12  
 我们以及我们的兄弟姐妹 13  
 其他，请说明： 14  
 
 
[如果您现在没有和子女住在一起，请回答 Q 6.1.1] 
Q 6.1.1 您打算将来和子女一起住吗?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我（们）会搬去和子女一起住。指出是哪位# 1  
 是的，我（们）可能会搬去和子女一起住。指出是哪位# 2  
 是的，子女会搬来和我（们）一起住。指出是哪位# 3  
 不确定 4  
 不会 5  
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[如果您在 Q 6.1.1中选了 1或 2，请回答 Q 6.1.1.1] 
Q 6.1.1.1 在搬去和子女一起住时，您会付一定住房费用/房租吗?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我会承担所有费用 100% 1  
 是的，我会承担大部分费用，超过 50% 2  
 是的，我会承担少部分费用，少于 50% 3  
 不会 4  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.2 您现在的住房归谁所有?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 我自己/我的配偶 1  
 子女，请指出是哪个 2  
 父母 3  
 兄弟姐妹 4  
 雇主/前雇主 5  
 我的房子是租来的 6  
 政府 7  
 其他，请指出__________ 8  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.2中选了 2-4或 8中某项，请回答 Q 6.2.1和 Q6.2.2] 
Q 6.2.1 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）在购买这套房产时，是否出过钱?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我会承担所有费用 100% 1  
 是的，我会承担大部分费用，超过 50% 2  
 是的，我会承担少部分费用，少于 50% 3  
 没有 4  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.2中选了 2-4或 8中某项，请回答 Q 6.2.1和 Q6.2.2] 
Q 6.2.2 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）对房产所有者支付房租吗?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，根据市场价支付 1  
 是的，但低于市场价 2  
 不支付 3  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.2中选了 6，请回答 Q 6.2.3] 
Q 6.2.3 房租由谁支付?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 我自己/我的配偶 1  
 我的子女 2  
 我的父母 3  
 我的兄弟姐妹 4  
 我的雇主/前雇主 5  
 政府 6  
 其他，请说明：____________ 7  
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[如果您在 Q 6.2.3中选了 2-6，请回答 Q 6.2.3.1] 
Q 6.2.3.1 您或您的配偶向他们支付房租吗?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，根据市场价支付 1  
 是的，但低于市场价 2  
 不支付 3  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.3 您估计您的房产值多少钱?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 25,000 1  
 < 50,000 2  
 < 100,000 3  
 < 250,000 4  
 < 500,000 5  
 < 1,000,000 6  
 < 2,000,000 7  
 < 3,500,000 8  
 < 5,000,000 9  
 < 7,500,000 10  
 < 10,000,000 11  
 >10,000,000 12  
 据答 13  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.4 若您出租的话，您的房子每月租金是多少 [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100 1  
 < 250 2  
 < 500 3  
 < 1,000 4  
 < 2,500 5  
 < 5,000 6  
 < 10,000 7  
 < 15,000 8  
 < 20,000 9  
 < 30,000 10  
 > 30,000 11  
 据答 12  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.5 您改变过您的居住情况吗?  [单选 ] 
定义：“居住情况”变化是指和您住在一起的家庭成员的变化或居所
的变化。 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有 1  
 没有 2  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.5中选了 1，请回答 Q 6.5.1 –  Q 6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.1: 您最近一次改变居住情况是哪一年? [开放题 ] 
  
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 
   
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.5中选了 1，请回答 Q 6.5.1 –  Q 6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.2 您之前的居住情况是怎样的? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 若单身 :   
 一个人住 1  
 和子女（们）住在一起。请说明是哪个子女#： 2  
 和父母住在一起 3  
 和子女（们）及父母住在一起。请说明是哪个子女#： 4  
 和兄弟姐妹住在一起 5  
 住在养老院 6  
 其他，请说明：______ 7  
 若您有配偶 :   
 我们两人一起住 8  
 我们以及我的子女。请说明是哪个子女#： 9  
 我们以及我的父母 10  
 我们以及我配偶的父母 11  
 我们以及子女和父母 12  
 我们以及我们的兄弟姐妹 13  
 其他，请说明：______ 14  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.5中选了 1，请回答 Q 6.5.1 –  Q 6.5.3] 
Q 6.5.3 您之前的住房归谁所有？或您以前的居住情况是谁承担大部分的房屋费
用?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 我自己/我的配偶 1  
 子女，请指出是哪个 2  
 父母 3  
 兄弟姐妹 4  
 雇主/前雇主 5  
 政府 6  
 其他，请指出：_______ 7  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.6 您（如已婚，您或您的配偶）有其他的房产吗?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有 1  
 没有 2  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.6中选了 1，请回答 Q 6.6.1 – Q6.6.2] 
Q 6.6.1 这个房产的价值是多少?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 50,000 1  
 < 100,000 2  
 < 250,000 3  
 < 500,000 4  
 < 1,000,000 5  
 < 2,000,000 6  
 < 3,500,000 7  
 < 5,000,000 8  
 < 7,500,000 9  
 < 10,000,000 10  
 >10,000,000 11  
 据答 12  
 
 
[如果您在 Q 6.6中选了 1，请回答 Q 6.6.1 – Q6.6.2] 
Q 6.6.2 这处房产的主要用途是?  [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 给子女的。请指出是哪个子女#: 1  
 给自己的第二套房/度假房 2  
 商业用途 3  
 纯粹投资 4  
 其他，请指出：_______ 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.7 在您看来，对于一对身体健康的已退休的老年夫妇来说，最合适的居住
情况是怎样的? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 夫妇两人自己住 1  
 和子女（们）一起住 2  
 和父母一起住 3  
 和父母以及子女一起住 4  
 和兄弟姐妹一起住 5  
 住在养老院 6  
 其他，请指出：_______ 7  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 6.8 在您看来，对于一个身体健康的已退休单身老年人来说，最合适的居住
情况是怎样的? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 自己一个人住 1  
 和子女（们）一起住 2  
 和父母一起住 3  
 和父母以及子女一起住 4  
 和兄弟姐妹一起住 5  
 住在养老院 6  
 其他，请指出：_______ 7  
 
 
储蓄习惯 
 
储蓄存量  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 7.3a 您从您的父母或您的祖父母总共得到过多少遗产? [单选 ] 
 
a) 总货币性遗产  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 50,000 7  
 < 100,000 8  
 < 250,000 9  
 < 500,000 10  
 < 1,000,000 11  
 > 1,000,000 12  
 据答 13  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 7.3b 您从您的父母或您的祖父母总共得到过多少遗产? [单选 ] 
 
b) 总非货币性遗产  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 1  
 < 500 2  
 < 1,000 3  
 < 2,500 4  
 < 5,000 5  
 < 10,000 6  
 < 50,000 7  
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Q 7.3b 您从您的父母或您的祖父母总共得到过多少遗产? [单选 ] 
 
b) 总非货币性遗产  
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 < 100,000 8  
 < 250,000 9  
 < 500,000 10  
 < 1,000,000 11  
 < 2,000,000 12  
 > 2,000,000 13  
 据答 14  
 
 
储蓄流量  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 7.4 您（如已婚，您和您的配偶）每月储蓄变化是多少? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 - 30,000 (减少储蓄) 1  
 - 20,000 2  
 - 10,000 3  
 - 5,000 4  
 - 2,500 5  
 - 1,000 6  
 - 500 7  
 - 100 8  
 0 9  
 + 100 10  
 + 500 11  
 + 1,000 12  
 + 2,500 13  
 + 5,000 14  
 + 10,000 15  
 + 20,000 16  
 + 30,000(储蓄) 17  
 据答 18  
 
 
储蓄动机 
 
遗产与财产转移动机  
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.1 您是否同意以下说法：“父母总应该给子女留下遗产，越多越好。” [
单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，非常同意 1  
 是的，同意 2  
 说不清 3  
 不，不同意 4  
 不，非常不同意 5  
 182 
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.2 您是否同意以下说法：“父母总应该尽量多地承担子女结婚的费用。”
[单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，非常同意 1  
 是的，同意 2  
 说不清 3  
 不，不同意 4  
 不，非常不同意 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.3 您是否同意以下说法：“父母总应该尽量多地承担子女买房的费用。”
[单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，非常同意 1  
 是的，同意 2  
 说不清 3  
 不，不同意 4  
 不，非常不同意 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.4 您是否同意以下说法：“如果父母不为子女留下遗产，或不承担任何子
女结婚或购房的费用，就会给家庭的声誉带来负面影响。”[单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，非常同意 1  
 是的，同意 2  
 说不清 3  
 不，不同意 4  
 不，非常不同意 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.5 您的储蓄动机主要是什么？请从最重要到最不重要按 1-5 排序。 [单
选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 缓冲不可预期的医疗费用   
 确保退休后的收入   
 自己添置房产/其他固定资产   
 给子女或（外）孙子女留下遗产   
 为子女或（外）孙子女的提供教育、结婚或买房支持。   
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情景假设题：长寿与健康风险动机  
 
注：最后一部分问题，我们想要知道被调查者在一些假设的情形下的偏好。这些情景和现实情况无关，所提到
的产品也并不存在。 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.6 假设有一个养老金计划，在今后的每个月都会给你支付固定金额的养老
金，一直到您去世。 
 
但是您需要将您所有的储蓄、未来的收入和非货币性资产，都投入到这
个养老金计划中；且您的子女或（外）孙子女都将得不到您的任何遗
产。 
 
作为回报，您每月可得到一笔固定收入，它的价值等于您投入的总费用
除以您的预期生存月份（根据期望寿命计算）。不管您的余生有多长，
您每月都能得到这笔固定金额的收入。 
 
在这个情景中，您也可以假设不会有任何意外的医疗费用（不管您是否
参与这项保险金计划）。 
 
您会参与这项养老保险计划吗？ [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我绝对会 1  
 是的，我挺愿意的 2  
 无所谓 3  
 不，我不太愿意 4  
 不，我绝对不会 5  
 
 
[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.7 假设有一个健康保险计划。 
 
在发生疾病时，这项保险将覆盖所有必须的医药费，没有上限。 
 
参加这项医疗保险计划，您不需要交纳任何费用，但是在您去世时，您
所有的储蓄和非货币性资产都将会自动被缴入这个保险计划中。这样，
您的子女或（外）孙子女都将得不到您的任何遗产。 
 
您会参加这项健康保险计划吗？[单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 是的，我绝对会 1  
 是的，我挺愿意的 2  
 无所谓 3  
 不，我不太愿意 4  
 不，我绝对不会 5  
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[提问所有人 ] 
Q 8.8 假设您赢得了 100,000 元的大奖，并且必须要将它分在两个保险箱
中：一部分用作遗产，另一部分用作将来的医疗健康费用。 
 
您不能拿出遗产保险箱中的钱，这笔钱将在您去世后，由您的遗产受益
人直接继承。 
 
您也不能随便拿出医疗保险箱中的钱，除非是用来支付您（或您的伴
侣）的个人健康医疗费用（每年 50,000 元），且不能用作遗产。 
 
您会将 100,000 元中的多少存入长期医疗保险箱呢？[单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 0 元 (0%) 1  
 10,000 元 2  
 20,000 元 3  
 30,000 元 4  
 40,000 元 5  
 50,000 元 (50%) 6  
 60,000 元 7  
 70,000 元 8  
 80,000 元 9  
 90,000 元 10  
 100,000 元 (100%) 11  
 
 
访问员观察 
 
注：  访问结束后，由访问员填写下列内容 
 
[所有被访者 ] 
Q 9.1 在调查时，有别人在场吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 没有 1  
 被访者的配偶 2  
 被访者的父母 3  
 被访者的子女 4  
 其他 5  
 
 
[所有被访者 ] 
Q 9.2 这些人（除了配偶）在调查时有干涉吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 有，经常 1  
 有时 2  
 没有 3  
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[所有被访者 ] 
Q 9.3 被访者能理解问题吗?愿意回答吗? [单选 ] 
 
Code 
( ) 
Note 
 不愿意合作，也不理解 1  
 能理解，但是不愿意合作 2  
 愿意合作 3  
 比较理解，比较愿意合作 4  
 非常理解，非常愿意合作 5  
 
 
